Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 10 July 2019 the Stripe API failed a substantial majority of requests twice, from 16:35 to 17:02 UTC and from 21:14 to 22:47 UTC. In the first period automated monitoring detected within a minute that a database cluster had failed to elect a new primary.

    Trigger

    The primary node of a database cluster failed at 16:35 UTC while one shard had several stalled nodes. The second period was set off by rolling the election protocol back to the previous minor version at 20:42 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the failed election within a minute, and the team was alerted at 16:36 UTC. The second period was announced at 21:14 UTC by automated alerts that some shards in the cluster were unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Restarted all nodes of the database cluster, which forced a successful primary election
    • Updated the production configuration and restarted the database cluster's nodes
    • Ramped traffic back up, putting services for user-initiated API requests first
    Action items
    • Alert when nodes stop reporting their replication lag
    • Alert when a shard enters a state that could trigger the election fault
    • Work with the database maintainers on a fix for the underlying fault
    • Add circuit breaking on failed operations to particular database clusters
    • Use fault isolation to contain the impact of a single failed shard
    • Limit the resources used by clients that keep retrying failed requests
    • Add procedures and tooling that make rapid configuration changes during incident response safer
  2. Symptoms

    On 12 January 2017 at 14:09 UTC, Mailgun engineers began responding to alerts for the click and open tracking services and the primary MongoDB clusters in one production region. Within ten minutes the engineers found that the MongoDB secondary servers, which serve most reads, were under heavy load and slow to answer, which also caused the tracking errors. The status page reported intermittent timeouts on the Control Panel, API, SMTP and tracking links.

    Trigger

    A gradual increase in connections to the MongoDB secondary servers, which coincided with several MongoDB configuration changes made the day before. A rollback of those changes then also introduced, by mistake, a change that moved the API and SMTP services from the secondaries to the primary.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts for the click and open tracking services and the primary MongoDB clusters at 14:09 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the previous day's MongoDB configuration changes through several pull requests from 15:15 UTC
    • Resized the MongoDB servers to handle more connections
    • Deployed connection limits at the MongoDB server level
    • Limited the number of connections the services could open to the MongoDB primary
    • Redeployed the configuration that makes services prefer secondary servers for reads
    Action items
    • Run the tracking infrastructure across two independent regions
    • Limit the number of connections every service can open to the database
    • Permanently increase the size of the primary Mongo cluster and roll the change out to the other data centers
    • Let click redirection keep working when downstream services fail
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database failover manager. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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