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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 08:45 CET on 22 April 2024 the Hugging Face Hub became unstable, and by 09:30 it was unresponsive. For most users the website was slow or could not be reached at all.

    Trigger

    Bursts of requests to revision endpoints that read heavily from the *_info_cache collections: a call to https://huggingface.co/api/datasets/lighteval/mmlu/revision/main rose sharply right before the first crash, and a call to https://huggingface.co/api/models/sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2/revision/main, a model with 300+ associated spaces, lined up with the crash at 21:30 on 23 April.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Instability started at 08:45 on 22 April and the Hub was unresponsive by 09:30; the team followed MongoDB Atlas metrics and a MongoDB support case. The root cause was found days later from a new graph of requests per URL.

    Remediation
    • Added a firewall rule blocking all requests with a Java/* user agent
    • Disabled the quicksearch feature on the Hub
    • Scaled the MongoDB Atlas cluster by hand from tier 2 to tier 3
    • Switched the Hub to maintenance mode with a 503 page through AWS WAF and blocked incoming traffic
    • Scaled all Hub pods down to 0 and brought them back
    • Set an aggressive rate limit
    • Added timeouts to requests and reworked database queries that were slow or returned large bodies
    Action items
    • Add timeouts to requests based on their usual completion time
    • Optimise requests that took too long or returned a large body, and rework poorly designed database queries
    • Remove old unused indexes from the database
    • Build new dashboards and monitoring metrics
    • Move the *_info_cache collections to Redis
    • Make it possible to abort any database request when the client aborts theirs
    Lessons

    Finding the root cause took two to three days: the existing charts did not show it, and a per-URL request breakdown did. Not cancelling database work when a client goes away turns a strained database into a thundering herd. A close inspection of the database exposed architectural flaws and bottlenecks, such as a collection with large unused indexes, and taught the team which metrics need closer watching to anticipate crashes. Unrelated failures happening at the same time added to the stress and made restoring service harder.

  2. Symptoms

    Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

    Trigger

    An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
    • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
    • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided
    Action items
    • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
    • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths
    Lessons

    Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Application database and In-memory cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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