Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 9 February 2026, InfluxDB Cloud customers on the AWS us-east-1 cluster prod101-us-east-1 found that some recent data did not show up in query responses. The first support ticket about data availability came in on 9 February, the day a compaction change was deployed, and more tickets followed on 10 February.

    Trigger

    On 9 February 2026 InfluxData deployed to prod101-us-east-1 a compaction change that runs several compaction jobs in parallel on one partition, each on a subset of the data chosen by org id prefix.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Tickets about data availability were raised, the first on 9 February and more on 10 February, when the status page reported that some recent data was not showing up in query responses.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the compaction change
    • Restored recent data first, rebuilt from the Kafka logs
    • Changed the restoration process to make historical data recovery more efficient
    • Restored historical data from the weekly TSM snapshots
    • Kept the cluster online and restored data incrementally so ingest and queries could continue
    Action items
    • Expand test coverage for changes to critical storage components such as the compactor, with scenarios closer to production-scale workloads
    • Strengthen safeguards around compaction so failures are detected and handled safely
    • Review restoration workflows and procedures to reduce elevated TTBR and slow queries during large restores
    • Revisit the backup and restore strategy to speed up cluster-wide restorations
  2. Symptoms

    From 04:48 UTC on 10 November 2025, queries on the table that stores annotations in Buildkite Pipelines timed out, CPU load on the affected databases rose sharply, and the Agent API, the REST API, GraphQL and the Web UI slowed down and returned more errors.

    Trigger

    At 04:48 UTC a database migration removed an index on the annotations table of the Pipelines product.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 04:53 UTC the impact of the removed index was detected as queries timing out on the annotations table.

    Remediation
    • Recreated the removed index, finishing on about half of the database shards by 05:30 UTC
    • Temporarily revoked the application user's permission to read from and write to the annotations table
    • Increased max_parallel_maintenance_workers in Postgres to speed up index creation
    • Finished recreating the index on the remaining shards between 07:50 and 08:43 UTC
    • Freed the agents and cleaned up the job states left inconsistent, handling by hand the cases the system could not self-heal, by 11:56 UTC
    Action items
    • Extend the internal tooling that flags risky migrations in code review to cover index removals and ask engineers to verify an index is no longer needed
    • Roll out high-risk migrations to shards in phases instead of to all shards at once
    • Evaluate tools such as HypoPG to analyse index creation and removal
    • Show index usage data from pganalyze more prominently in the development workflow
    • Automate the manual cleanup of inconsistent agent states so the system can heal itself
    Lessons

    Buildkite said the incident was mainly caused by a database migration that exposed gaps in its review process.

  3. Symptoms

    At 09:20 UTC on 4 April 2023, seven minutes after a deployment was triggered, Open Collective's service degraded: a migration in the deployment had locked the entire Transactions table in the production database.

    Trigger

    A deployment ran a migration that dropped indexes on the Transactions table and re-created them with CONCURRENTLY, excluding soft-deleted rows.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The degradation of service was noticed at 09:20 UTC, seven minutes after the deployment was triggered.

    Remediation
    • Killed the migration, though the table remained locked
    • Put the frontend into maintenance mode to limit queries
    • Closed the other connections to the database
    • Cancelled the new index creation and restored the old index
    • Restored the frontend and confirmed the issue was resolved
    Action items
    • Add a script that simulates production load locally, using a tool like vegeta
    • Run this kind of migration during specific maintenance windows
    • Create the new index first and drop the old one afterwards in future migrations
    • Insist on a review from another engineer before merging such a pull request
    Lessons

    Dropping the old index before creating the new one was too optimistic under constant production queries, even with CONCURRENTLY, and an unreviewed pull request let it through. Tests locally and on staging did not show the problem because there were no tools to run migrations in stressed environments. Putting the frontend in maintenance mode limited the impact while showing users a clear message.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Database and Database backups and snapshots. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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