Incident Library
Applied filters ComponentDatabaseSymptomHigh latencyFactorGap in automated testsClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 9 February 2026, InfluxDB Cloud customers on the AWS us-east-1 cluster prod101-us-east-1 found that some recent data did not show up in query responses. The first support ticket about data availability came in on 9 February, the day a compaction change was deployed, and more tickets followed on 10 February.

    Trigger

    On 9 February 2026 InfluxData deployed to prod101-us-east-1 a compaction change that runs several compaction jobs in parallel on one partition, each on a subset of the data chosen by org id prefix.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Tickets about data availability were raised, the first on 9 February and more on 10 February, when the status page reported that some recent data was not showing up in query responses.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the compaction change
    • Restored recent data first, rebuilt from the Kafka logs
    • Changed the restoration process to make historical data recovery more efficient
    • Restored historical data from the weekly TSM snapshots
    • Kept the cluster online and restored data incrementally so ingest and queries could continue
    Action items
    • Expand test coverage for changes to critical storage components such as the compactor, with scenarios closer to production-scale workloads
    • Strengthen safeguards around compaction so failures are detected and handled safely
    • Review restoration workflows and procedures to reduce elevated TTBR and slow queries during large restores
    • Revisit the backup and restore strategy to speed up cluster-wide restorations
  2. Symptoms

    From about 18:50 to 19:43 UTC on Monday, November 8, 2021, CircleCI customer jobs on all executors were blocked in a "not running" state. Errors and alerts appeared right after a deploy that changed a field type in the database of the job distribution service.

    Trigger

    At 18:50 UTC a deploy changed the type of a field in the PostgreSQL database of the job distribution service, in a way that was not backwards compatible.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Errors and alerts related to the distribution failure appeared immediately after the 18:50 UTC deploy.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the field type change, which did not clear the errors
    • Wrote, built and manually deployed a change that made the distribution system ignore the field
    • Manually scaled the primary compute cluster for the expected thundering herd of work
    • Monitored until processing was normal and resolved the incident
    Action items
    • Fix the gaps found in the testing strategy
    • Change how the distributor reacts to unexpected data so that this kind of deploy should not affect all jobs
    • Make recovery faster when unforeseen failures occur
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database backups and snapshots. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1