Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 18 September 2024, while a cookbook was reconfiguring Wikimedia's core MariaDB databases from one-way eqiad -> codfw replication to circular replication ahead of a datacenter switchover, replication in the codfw -> eqiad direction broke on the x1 and es6 sections. Engineers watching the run noticed at 21:28 UTC that the x1 primary was not replicating.

    Trigger

    Running the cookbook sre.switchdc.databases.prepare, which set up codfw -> eqiad replication and started pt-heartbeat, on the row-based x1 and es sections.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers watching the first run of the automation saw on orchestrator that the x1 primary was not replicating, because monitoring of circular replication was not yet enabled. The break in the eqiad -> codfw direction was reported by Icinga.

    Remediation
    • Skipped replication of the heartbeat tables with Replication_wild_ignore_table='heartbeat.%'
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the es hosts
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the x1 codfw hosts and removed the ignore rule
    Action items
    • Avoid the same issue again, probably by inserting the missing row when it is detected
    • Add a post-maintenance health check that replication works in both directions
    • Add options to run the maintenance in another order or on each section individually
    • Update the Phabricator task for each section rather than only at the end
    • Fix the monitoring gaps for circular replication
    • Made pt-heartbeat-wikimedia use STATEMENT format for its session on the x1 and row-based read-write es hosts, fixed in a later deploy
    Lessons

    Circular replication is not a normal working mode, so the first fix only moved the break to the other side; TRUNCATE would have worked better than DELETE because it always replicates as a statement, but it was not considered because it is more dangerous. Running sql_skip_slave_counter was avoided, since it could have made things worse or lost data. The check of the replication channel should also run once all tasks are complete, not only right after setup. The combination of row-based replication, pt-heartbeat and differing heartbeat rows was not described in earlier maintenance or documentation.

  2. Symptoms

    On a Friday evening in December 2019, Razorpay's internal monitoring alerted on an unusually high number of 5xx errors. The SRE team found that the main application, called API, could not connect to its RDS MySQL database, but within about 110 seconds the application recovered by itself and the alerts stopped. The RDS logs showed that the master instance had gone through a Multi-AZ failover.

    Trigger

    The master instance of the API application's RDS MySQL database went through a Multi-AZ failover to its standby in another availability zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    An internal monitoring alert on unusually high 5xx errors, then alerts that replication had failed on all replicas. The data loss was found the next day by matching the database against the application trace logs.

    Remediation
    • Moved all read replica traffic to the master instance
    • Recreated all five read replicas after a six-hour full snapshot and moved traffic back to them
    • Recovered the missing queries from the binary logs and corrected the data stored in RDS
    • Changed innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit on the master from 2 to 1
    Lessons

    With innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit set to 2, Razorpay had been open to data loss on any failover all along, even though RDS Multi-AZ copies everything on the primary's disk to the standby. The incident also taught the team how RDS runs a Multi-AZ setup and its failovers.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database replication. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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