Cases4 cases

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1. IL-0310 An Aurora PostgreSQL failover to an upsized reader reversed twice and backend writes failed in read-only transactions

   Hightouch2025

   Symptoms

   At 16:39 EDT on 23 October 2025, Hightouch triggered a failover of its Aurora PostgreSQL cluster in us-east-1 to a newly upsized reader. The AWS Console showed the usual parameter adjustments and instance restarts, but after the page refreshed the original writer was still the primary, and backend services could not run write queries although AWS showed the cluster as healthy.

   Failover failureWrites rejected

   Trigger

   A planned upsize of the Aurora cluster's instances, done without a maintenance window, after the AWS us-east-1 outage of 20 October had left an event backlog that strained the small Postgres instance. The manual failover to the upsized reader at 16:39 EDT started the failure.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   DatabaseDatabase failover manager

   Contributing factor

   Unrepresentative staging

   Detection

   The AWS Console showed after a refresh that the original writer was still primary, and backend application logs showed write errors on a read-only transaction. Per-instance query monitoring in Datadog and the RDS database logs showed the brief writer advertisement.

   Remediation

   • Restarted the backend services, which cleared the write errors after each failed failover
   • Scaled down every service that writes to the database
   • Triggered the failover again with no concurrent writes, which completed, and upsized the cluster in us-east-1

   Action items

   • Pause writers before any intentional failover, as written into the internal playbooks
   • Monitor for unexpected flips of the instance that advertises the writer role

   Lessons

   Hightouch's takeaways are that a migration can end in the desired state, the starting state or somewhere in between even with services one trusts, so traffic redirection and brief dependency outages should be planned for. The brief writer advertisement could only be found because queries to each instance were monitored in Datadog and the RDS database logs were available. Limiting how much any single component can affect the system helps both uptime and maintenance, and a staging load test, even of the exact procedure, did not reproduce the conditions that triggered the Aurora race condition.

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2. IL-0241 A database shard could not elect a new primary, and the Stripe API failed most requests in two periods on one day

   Stripe2019

   Symptoms

   On 10 July 2019 the Stripe API failed a substantial majority of requests twice, from 16:35 to 17:02 UTC and from 21:14 to 22:47 UTC. In the first period automated monitoring detected within a minute that a database cluster had failed to elect a new primary.

   High error rateFailover failureWrites rejectedIntermittent timeoutsSustained high node CPU

   Trigger

   The primary node of a database cluster failed at 16:35 UTC while one shard had several stalled nodes. The second period was set off by rolling the election protocol back to the previous minor version at 20:42 UTC.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   DatabaseDatabase failover manager

   Contributing factor

   Change with a delayed effectMonitoring blind spotExcessive blast radiusHarmful manual actionUnverified assumptionOverlapping failures

   Detection

   Automated monitoring detected the failed election within a minute, and the team was alerted at 16:36 UTC. The second period was announced at 21:14 UTC by automated alerts that some shards in the cluster were unavailable.

   Remediation

   • Restarted all nodes of the database cluster, which forced a successful primary election
   • Updated the production configuration and restarted the database cluster's nodes
   • Ramped traffic back up, putting services for user-initiated API requests first

   Action items

   • Alert when nodes stop reporting their replication lag
   • Alert when a shard enters a state that could trigger the election fault
   • Work with the database maintainers on a fix for the underlying fault
   • Add circuit breaking on failed operations to particular database clusters
   • Use fault isolation to contain the impact of a single failed shard
   • Limit the resources used by clients that keep retrying failed requests
   • Add procedures and tooling that make rapid configuration changes during incident response safer

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3. IL-0388 A Google Cloud live migration took a Discord Redis primary offline, and the failover broke API instances and then guilds

   Discord2017

   Symptoms

   At about 14:01 PDT on 13 October 2017, Discord engineers were alerted to anomalies by real-time metrics and monitoring. A Redis instance that was the primary of a highly available cluster used by the API services had dropped offline after Google Cloud Platform migrated it automatically, and some API instances did not handle the failover to the secondary node correctly.

   Failover failureHigh latencyService outage

   Trigger

   Google Cloud Platform automatically migrated the Redis instance that was the primary of a highly available cluster used by the API services, and the node incorrectly dropped offline.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   In-memory cacheDatabaseCDN and edge network

   Contributing factor

   Unpatched known bugOverlapping failuresMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   Real-time metrics and monitoring alerted engineers at 14:01 PDT. The second phase was seen at 15:41 as another anomaly in monitoring, and end user reports of servers appearing offline were escalated at 15:42.

   Remediation

   • Ran a rolling restart of all API instances to clear the Redis connection issues
   • Corrected the misconfigured edge caching rule for the expensive API route
   • Disabled the problem API endpoint on the edge network
   • Recovered the Cassandra cluster
   • Ran a second rolling restart of all API instances for the latency left by the Cassandra issues
   • Removed the misbehaving guilds node from the service hashring
   • Forcefully restarted the misbehaving guilds node
   • Restarted the whole service, forcing all users to reconnect
   • Blocked traffic that relied on the failing push component to reduce its load
   • Corrected the API setting that lets users reconnect quickly and safely

   Action items

   • Fix the known issues with Redis failover within the coming weeks
   • Change the cached route so this type of error does not degrade other services
   • Monitor the signals that would have warned of the cascading failure
   • Improve the reliability and failure handling of the affected services
   • Roll out an update of the library with the suspected flaws

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4. IL-0303 GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went down

   GitHub2012

   Symptoms

   On Monday, September 10th, 2012, during a schema migration, the health checks on GitHub's MySQL master failed and Percona Replication Manager moved the 'active' role to another node of the new three-node cluster. That node's InnoDB buffer pool was cold and it performed poorly, its health checks failed in turn, and the role failed back to the original server. GitHub.com went down.

   Failover failureDatabase overloadHigh latencyReplication lagSplit brainService outage

   Trigger

   A schema migration on Monday, September 10th put more load on the master database than earlier migrations had, and Percona Replication Manager's health checks on the master failed.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   DatabaseDatabase failover managerDatabase replication

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationDependence on a warm cacheHarmful manual actionOverlapping failures

   Detection

   On the morning of September 11th, a developer told the operations team that the 'standby' node was returning incorrect query results.

   Remediation

   • Enabled Pacemaker's maintenance-mode so no health checks or automatic failovers ran, and let the buffer pool warm
   • Powered off the out-of-date node 'c' to end the partition
   • Stopped Pacemaker and Heartbeat on nodes 'a' and 'b' and started them on node 'a' only
   • Started MySQL on node 'a' in the active role
   • Removed the events leaked to wrong dashboards and audited the wrongly routed repositories
   • Contacted the owners of the exposed private repositories

   Action items

   • Change the Pacemaker configuration so the active database role fails over only when an operations engineer starts it
   • Find a way to warm the InnoDB buffer pool of slave databases so failovers do not hurt performance
   • Audit the Pacemaker and Heartbeat stack, focusing on the code path behind the segfault
   • Run hardware tests on the server where the segfault happened

   Lessons

   GitHub concluded that automated failover is not the right strategy for its primary production database: for every failover in this incident, any member of the operations team would have said it should not happen. Failovers that must happen, in an emergency or during maintenance, should not hurt performance.

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