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Cases6 cases

1 to 5 of 6

  1. Symptoms

    On 18 September 2024, while a cookbook was reconfiguring Wikimedia's core MariaDB databases from one-way eqiad -> codfw replication to circular replication ahead of a datacenter switchover, replication in the codfw -> eqiad direction broke on the x1 and es6 sections. Engineers watching the run noticed at 21:28 UTC that the x1 primary was not replicating.

    Trigger

    Running the cookbook sre.switchdc.databases.prepare, which set up codfw -> eqiad replication and started pt-heartbeat, on the row-based x1 and es sections.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers watching the first run of the automation saw on orchestrator that the x1 primary was not replicating, because monitoring of circular replication was not yet enabled. The break in the eqiad -> codfw direction was reported by Icinga.

    Remediation
    • Skipped replication of the heartbeat tables with Replication_wild_ignore_table='heartbeat.%'
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the es hosts
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the x1 codfw hosts and removed the ignore rule
    Action items
    • Avoid the same issue again, probably by inserting the missing row when it is detected
    • Add a post-maintenance health check that replication works in both directions
    • Add options to run the maintenance in another order or on each section individually
    • Update the Phabricator task for each section rather than only at the end
    • Fix the monitoring gaps for circular replication
    • Made pt-heartbeat-wikimedia use STATEMENT format for its session on the x1 and row-based read-write es hosts, fixed in a later deploy
    Lessons

    Circular replication is not a normal working mode, so the first fix only moved the break to the other side; TRUNCATE would have worked better than DELETE because it always replicates as a statement, but it was not considered because it is more dangerous. Running sql_skip_slave_counter was avoided, since it could have made things worse or lost data. The check of the replication channel should also run once all tasks are complete, not only right after setup. The combination of row-based replication, pt-heartbeat and differing heartbeat rows was not described in earlier maintenance or documentation.

  2. Symptoms

    From 16:30 UTC on 5 August 2024, DigitalOcean's internal services could not discover the other services they depended on. Creates, event processing and the management of DigitalOcean products failed in all regions through the Cloud Control Panel and the API, while existing customer resources such as Droplets stayed online.

    Trigger

    During the rollout of a new datastore cluster in a new datacenter, a replication configuration was deployed against the datastore behind internal service discovery that gave the new datacenter, which held zero keys, 100% ownership of all keys.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Service discovery unavailability was first reported internally at 16:35 UTC, five minutes after the rollout of the new datastore cluster began.

    Remediation
    • Reverted the replication configuration and ran it against the region that had become the datastore owner
    • Applied the configuration by hand on the nodes of lagging regions and ran local data repairs
    • Cleaned up failed events and processed pending events that had not timed out
    Action items
    • Perform this kind of datastore extension inside a declared maintenance window, announced on the status page
    • Update the process documentation for this type of deployment, stage by stage
    • Automate the manual steps used in this deployment to reduce human error
    • Evaluate the internal datastore topology and whether to regionalise or layer it
  3. Symptoms

    On a Friday evening in December 2019, Razorpay's internal monitoring alerted on an unusually high number of 5xx errors. The SRE team found that the main application, called API, could not connect to its RDS MySQL database, but within about 110 seconds the application recovered by itself and the alerts stopped. The RDS logs showed that the master instance had gone through a Multi-AZ failover.

    Trigger

    The master instance of the API application's RDS MySQL database went through a Multi-AZ failover to its standby in another availability zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    An internal monitoring alert on unusually high 5xx errors, then alerts that replication had failed on all replicas. The data loss was found the next day by matching the database against the application trace logs.

    Remediation
    • Moved all read replica traffic to the master instance
    • Recreated all five read replicas after a six-hour full snapshot and moved traffic back to them
    • Recovered the missing queries from the binary logs and corrected the data stored in RDS
    • Changed innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit on the master from 2 to 1
    Lessons

    With innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit set to 2, Razorpay had been open to data loss on any failover all along, even though RDS Multi-AZ copies everything on the primary's disk to the standby. The incident also taught the team how RDS runs a Multi-AZ setup and its failovers.

  4. Symptoms

    On 26 September 2018 at 10:51 JST the whole Mackerel monitoring service stopped working properly and its alive monitoring stopped. The application servers could not connect to Redis, which stores Mackerel's monitoring data, and could not return correct responses.

    Trigger

    Redis memory use had been growing, so operators set up replication in order to scale Redis up. Building the replication took a long time and Redis stopped answering for a while, and keepalived treated this as a node failure and started a failover nobody intended.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Switched back to the correct Redis and briefly saw the application return
    • Restarted the application servers one after another, which did not improve the symptoms
    • Detected the organizations posting inappropriate metrics and blocked their requests
    • Adjusted the timeout interval of the application servers
    • Temporarily added capacity to Diamond, the TSDB
    • Increased the number of Kinesis shards and Redis Cluster shards
    • Scaled out the API application servers
    • Put Mackerel in maintenance mode, checked it internally and let outside requests back gradually
    Action items
    • Raise the number of keepalived health checks for Redis so a brief load increase does not trigger a failover
    • Scale Redis up
    • Add more application servers
    • Change the application to store only the monitoring data it needs in Redis, reducing Redis memory use
    • Build a way to detect inappropriate API requests quickly and show them on a dashboard
    • Build a function to block organizations making inappropriate requests quickly
    • Keep improving the accuracy of detecting inappropriate requests and consider adding features such as an API limit
    • Strengthen monitoring of the application servers' internal processing so problems are handled before they become outages
    Lessons

    Hatena did not find why recovery took so long, but expects that keeping failover from reacting to short load spikes and giving the application more performance headroom would prevent an outage this long. It also aims to keep problems contained to a small part of the service when a failure does happen.

  5. Symptoms

    At 10:24 AM EDT on April 5th, 2017, DigitalOcean began to receive alerts that its public services were not working, and by 10:27 the team had verified that the production database on the primary had been deleted. The control panel and the API were unavailable for four hours and fifty-six minutes: running Droplets kept working, but no new Droplets or other resources could be created or managed.

    Trigger

    A process performing automated testing had been misconfigured with production credentials, and the production primary database was deleted.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts at 10:24 AM EDT that public services were not functioning; within three minutes the team found that the primary database had been deleted.

    Remediation
    • Began recovery from a time-delayed database replica
    • Took a backup of the time-delayed replica
    • Copied the backup to the primary and recovered it
    • Copied the backups to the replicas until all systems were restored
    Action items
    • Drastically reduce access to the primary system for certain actions
    • Upgrade network connectivity between database servers
    • Update hardware to speed up recovery
    • Assess further safeguards against developer error
    • Improve the processes around data recovery
    • Explore ways to provide better real-time information to customers during future customer-impacting events
Check your cluster for this

These 6 cases involve Database replication and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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