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  1. Symptoms

    At 04:01 UTC on 15 December 2024, StatusCake monitoring sent SMS alerts that OpenStreetMap.org was unreachable. The website and the mapping API had gone completely offline at 03:53 UTC.

    Trigger

    HE.net's routing equipment in Amsterdam failed at 03:53 UTC on 15 December 2024.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    StatusCake monitoring detected the outage at 04:01 UTC and sent SMS alerts, and the incident was reported to the operations team at once.

    Remediation
    • Activated a read-only backup instance of OpenStreetMap.org in Dublin
    • Brought a new Equinix Internet link into service in Amsterdam, bypassing HE.net and restoring full functionality
    • HE.net replaced its routing hardware and restored its service, and routing through HE.net resumed
    Action items
    • Move to a multi-ISP architecture so another provider can take over when one fails
    • Research backup ISPs for the Amsterdam servers, including BGP and keeping HE.net as a fallback
    • Add deeper route and latency monitoring and an automated escalation protocol
    • Hold failover drills for switching between ISPs and keep replication up to date
    • Agree SLAs with HE.net and Equinix Internet with defined escalation procedures and response times
    • Prepare the 4G out-of-band system as a manual fallback uplink that can sync Postgres replication data, and upgrade its hardware
    • Document outage communication procedures and delegate communication during outages
    • Investigate decoupling the OAuth service so authentication keeps working while the database is read-only
    Lessons

    Relying on HE.net alone left the Amsterdam servers with a single point of failure, so OpenStreetMap will keep multiple upstream providers. The 4G out-of-band link proved invaluable and should be able to carry data synchronisation. Resumed replication would have restored editing faster than the read-only backup. Frequent contact with the ISP gave no useful estimates, so the SLA needs to be better understood. Alerting on upstream connectivity needs refining, and a read-only OpenStreetMap.org also blocked logins to services that were not affected, because it could not save new tokens.

Check your cluster for this

This case involves Database replication and ISP and transit networks. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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