Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 21:06 UTC on 14 February 2026 every GPU node in Lambda's AUS01 data center rebooted at the same moment, without warning or plan, affecting multiple customers. The nodes came back online quickly, but the storage they used had disconnected, and customer workloads failed.

    Trigger

    A power event at the AUS01 data center caused a loss of power.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Remediation
    • restored the compute fabric and InfiniBand connectivity, bringing all spine switches and most leaf switches back online
    • restored part of the UPS redundancy
    • powered up all nodes in AUS01, completed physical checks and started the storage back up
    • restored Starbase and the other storage-dependent services in us-west-3
    • told affected customers to reboot their VMs, or the hypervisor if needed, to clear stale or empty NFS mounts
    Lessons

    A power loss that reboots the network spine and the shared storage together with the GPU nodes takes longer to recover than the nodes themselves. The GPU nodes were back quickly, but the fabric was restored first, storage was started only after physical checks, and some VMs were left with stale NFS mounts that customers were told to fix with a VM reboot or, if that was not enough, a hypervisor reboot.

  2. Symptoms

    At 20:31 UTC on 15 November 2023, some GPU virtual machines in us-northcentral1-a became unavailable. One row of servers in a Crusoe Cloud data center in the us-northcentral1 region had lost power, and every server in the row powered off together with the VMs running on it.

    Trigger

    While the row's UPS was in bypass mode for routine maintenance, power switched from the primary source to a backup source for reasons unrelated to the maintenance.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The power failure happened at 20:31 UTC. The first status post, at 21:07 UTC, said certain VMs in us-northcentral1-a were unavailable, and at 21:31 UTC the status page said the affected VMs had been identified.

    Remediation
    • identified the VMs on the row that lost power
    • restarted the affected VMs after power was restored
    Action items
    • Review the standard operating procedures for UPS maintenance to minimise customer impact during future maintenance
    • Build future data centers with redundant UPSs
    • Improve recovery procedures to reduce mean time to resolution
    Lessons

    When the only UPS for a row is in bypass for maintenance, the row is exposed to any power event during that window, even one unrelated to the work. Crusoe Cloud's response is redundant UPSs in future data centers, a review of maintenance procedures, and faster recovery of VMs after power returns.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Data center power and cooling and InfiniBand fabric. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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