Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

1. IL-0048 DNS lookups timed out in a large EKS cluster when CoreDNS hit the 1024 packets-per-second link-local limit, driven by sudo hostname lookups

   unknown2025

   Symptoms

   CI jobs failed now and then because a hostname could not be resolved. The failures came from tensorstore, appeared on several different instances and did not repeat consistently. The error read: "./tensorstore/util/result.h:420: Status not ok: status(): UNAVAILABLE: CURL error Could not resolve hostname: Could not resolve host: company-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com".

   DNS resolution failuresIntermittent timeouts

   Trigger

   An administrative pod running with host networking called sudo in a loop. Each sudo call looked up the node's own hostname, and with ndots:5 and four search domains every lookup became five queries, for both A and AAAA records.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheVPC DNS resolver

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitUnreviewed defaults

   Detection

   Reports of flaky CI jobs that could not resolve an S3 bucket hostname, followed by i/o timeout errors in the CoreDNS logs.

   Remediation

   • added 'Defaults !fqdn' in /etc/sudoers.d/00-no-fqdn (mode 440) to the container image so sudo stopped looking up the hostname

   Lessons

   Traffic from CoreDNS to the VPC DNS resolver is limited to 1024 packets per second per interface, and drops show up only as UDP timeouts; the linklocal_allowance_exceeded counter in ethtool shows them. Names that are not fully qualified are multiplied by the search domains under ndots:5, and AAAA lookups double them again. sudo looks up the host's own name on every call unless 'Defaults !fqdn' is set.

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2. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down

   Backpackr2025

   Symptoms

   Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

   DNS resolution failuresIntermittent connection failuresHigh latencyOOMKilledService outage

   Trigger

   All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cachekubeletContainer memory limitNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsSingle point of failureNo caching

   Detection

   The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

   Remediation

   • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
   • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
   • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments

   Lessons

   The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

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3. IL-0033 Uneven load across kube-dns pods and a DNS packets-per-second limit pushed service latency to 20 seconds

   Airbnb2019

   Symptoms

   On May 10 the latency graphs of several services showed a few spikes of up to about one second, then latency climbed to five seconds and then to 20 seconds, and it stayed there for a long time. The same pattern appeared on many services, not just one.

   High latencyIntermittent timeoutsLoad imbalanceDNS resolution failures

   Trigger

   Several services sent a high volume of external DNS queries, all of which went through kube-dns.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   kube-dnskube-proxyClient-side DNS resolver and cache

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaults

   Detection

   Latency graphs of several services showed the rise; engineers then looked at load per kube-dns pod.

   Lessons

   By default a pod discovers DNS through the kube-dns cluster IP and uses the ClusterFirst policy, so even external lookups go through kube-dns. If a pod does not need cluster DNS, set its dnsPolicy to Default or None. Check the DNS policy early and often. iptables picks backends at random and is not a load balancer, so pods behind a cluster IP, kube-dns included, can carry very different loads.

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4. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries

   Zalando2019

   Symptoms

   Customers of the Zalando Fashion Store got a high rate of errors on all web product pages and outfit pages for more than an hour. The errors came from the main data aggregation layer service, which runs in one of Zalando's Kubernetes clusters.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresOOMKilledMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   Calls from the aggregation layer to a single, not very important downstream service started timing out. The aggregation layer returned 404s for them, clients retried, and the resulting spike in requests became a spike in DNS queries to CoreDNS.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSContainer memory limitClient-side DNS resolver and cache

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitNo cachingRetry stormUnreviewed defaultsExcessive blast radiusMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The on-call engineer for the aggregation layer phoned the on-call Kubernetes engineer. Automatic paging did not happen because the cluster's monitoring and alerting ran inside the cluster and failed along with DNS. The Kubernetes engineer then saw that the CoreDNS pods were being OOM-killed.

   Remediation

   • Raised the CoreDNS memory requests and limits by hand from 100Mi to 2000Mi

   Action items

   • Introduce a more resilient DNS setup: CoreDNS fronted by dnsmasq on every node
   • Improve high-level alerting from outside the clusters, so that a cluster problem is known before or at the same time as applications are affected
   • Improve incident response processes and tooling so that any on-call engineer can escalate directly to other teams when automatic paging fails, for example through a chat bot

   Lessons

   The Kubernetes DNS setup was far from resilient enough: a single application could take down DNS for everything in the cluster. The blast radius of one application sending more DNS queries should be limited to one node at most, ideally to single pods. Known Kubernetes DNS problems, such as Linux kernel races in conntrack handling and the ndots 5 problem, were familiar to the team and partly mitigated, but their combined effect on the DNS infrastructure was worse than the team had understood. Monitoring that runs inside the cluster was not robust enough: when the cluster's DNS broke, it could not page anyone, and recovery took longer than it should have.

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By root cause1