Incident Library
Applied filters ComponentAuthoritative DNS servers and recordsSymptomService outageFactorCircular dependencyClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 1:54 PM ET on 7 September 2023, Square products and services were unavailable, and at 2:02 PM ET engineers were notified of infrastructure issues and began investigating DNS. Square Online websites stayed up, but their customers could not make payments.

    Trigger

    At 11:04 AM ET a host-based firewall rule change was deployed to enable region communication, which increased the size of the firewall rules on nodes. Combined with a DNS service upgrade, it put unexpected load on the internal DNS servers. The timeline also lists a DNS zone change at 1:56 PM ET.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers were notified of infrastructure issues at 2:02 PM ET, eight minutes after services became unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Shed network traffic to the DNS servers and started bringing up new DNS servers by hand
    • Deployed networking changes by hand to re-enable the authorization and access services
    • Deployed the networking changes by hand to all data centers
    • Rebuilt the DNS servers
    • Built a new configuration from the reverted firewall ruleset and pushed it to the DNS hosts
    Action items
    • Move the DNS infrastructure onto isolated infrastructure
    • Add monitoring and optimizations for critical networking infrastructure
    • Optimize dependencies between the deploy and platform infrastructure where feasible
    • Expand support for Offline Mode and improve communication about when it is available
  2. Symptoms

    On 4 October 2021 Facebook's platforms went down worldwide: every connection in Facebook's global backbone network was lost, and the data centers were cut off from each other and from the internet. The rest of the internet could no longer find Facebook's servers, because Facebook's authoritative DNS servers had become unreachable.

    Trigger

    During routine maintenance of the backbone, a command was issued to assess the availability of global backbone capacity, and it unintentionally took down all connections in the backbone network.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Sent engineers onsite to the data centers to debug the issue and restart systems
    • Brought the backbone network back online across the data center regions
    • Brought services back gradually, managing the rising load to avoid crashes from a traffic surge
    Action items
    • Find ways to simulate the global backbone being taken offline in storm drills
    • Strengthen testing, drills and overall resilience
    Lessons

    The hardening that protects Facebook's data centers against unauthorized access slowed recovery from an outage caused by Facebook's own error, and the author judges that tradeoff worth keeping. Storm drills prepared the teams to bring load back safely, although no drill had yet simulated the global backbone going offline.

  3. Symptoms

    On 22 June 2021, within minutes of an update released at 8:25 AM UTC, bunny.net's global fleet of close to 100 DNS servers kept crashing and restarting, more than 60% of traffic was lost, hundreds of Gbits of throughput disappeared, and over 750,000 websites were affected. After 10 minutes the team realised that the DNS servers were restarting and dying and that nothing could bring them back up in that state.

    Trigger

    At 8:25 AM UTC bunny.net released an update meant to reduce the download size of the SmartEdge optimization database, and it uploaded a corrupted file to Edge Storage.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    About 10 minutes after the release, the team realised that the DNS servers were restarting and dying.

    Remediation
    • Deployed by hand an update that disabled the SmartEdge system on the DNS nodes
    • Routed all requests through Frankfurt instead of Madrid on a couple of DNS servers
    • Migrated the deployment systems and files to a third-party cloud storage service
    • Rewired the deployment system and DNS software to the new storage and deployed
    • Synced the databases and deployed the newest file sets through the third-party service
    Action items
    • Phase out the BinaryPack library as a hot-fix
    • Test third-party libraries more extensively
    • Migrate the internal APIs to an independent third-party service
    • Find how to stop non-critical software from becoming a single point of failure across clusters
    • Make the DNS system keep a local copy of all backup data with automatic failure detection
    Lessons

    bunny.net had built its systems to rely on each other, including the critical parts of its internal infrastructure, so one corrupted file brought down several layers of redundancy with no way back. A part of the infrastructure treated as non-critical turned out to be a single point of failure for several clusters at once, which canary deployments did not catch. Building infrastructure inside its own ecosystem lets one failure cascade through all of it. In the rush to fix the outage the team made typos and mistakes, and the final deployment came after it calmed down and double-checked everything.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Authoritative DNS servers and records and Backbone network (WAN). kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3