Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

    Trigger

    One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

    Remediation
    • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
    • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
    • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
    • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
    • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
    • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
    Action items
    • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
    • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
    • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
    • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
    • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
    Lessons

    A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

  2. Symptoms

    On 1 April 2025 users of Linode Kubernetes Engine (LKE) began having trouble connecting to their clusters' control planes, and the LKE Dashboard was affected as well. Services inside the clusters kept working. The first status update was posted at 20:28 UTC; at 21:33 UTC Linode said it was investigating an issue with DNS functionality within LKE.

    Trigger

    An earlier update to a database that the LKE DNS system depends on caused the DNS service to hang.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The first status update, at 20:28 UTC on 1 April, said Linode was investigating and that users might have difficulty connecting to their cluster control plane. At 21:33 UTC Linode said the issue affected DNS functionality within LKE, and at 22:29 UTC that it had identified the underlying cause.

    Remediation
    • restarted the affected LKE DNS services
    Action items
    • Improve how the DNS services recover from transient connectivity failures to their dependencies
    • Improve monitoring to detect similar problems sooner
    • Update the deployment process to better coordinate changes between dependent systems
    Lessons

    A change to a database that the DNS service depends on can make the DNS service hang, which here cut off external access to the clusters and the LKE Dashboard while services inside the clusters kept working. The DNS service should recover by itself from transient failures of its dependencies, and changes to dependent systems need to be coordinated.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Application database and Authoritative DNS servers and records. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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