Incident Library
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  1. Symptoms

    On 10 July 2019 the Stripe API failed a substantial majority of requests twice, from 16:35 to 17:02 UTC and from 21:14 to 22:47 UTC. In the first period automated monitoring detected within a minute that a database cluster had failed to elect a new primary.

    Trigger

    The primary node of a database cluster failed at 16:35 UTC while one shard had several stalled nodes. The second period was set off by rolling the election protocol back to the previous minor version at 20:42 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the failed election within a minute, and the team was alerted at 16:36 UTC. The second period was announced at 21:14 UTC by automated alerts that some shards in the cluster were unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Restarted all nodes of the database cluster, which forced a successful primary election
    • Updated the production configuration and restarted the database cluster's nodes
    • Ramped traffic back up, putting services for user-initiated API requests first
    Action items
    • Alert when nodes stop reporting their replication lag
    • Alert when a shard enters a state that could trigger the election fault
    • Work with the database maintainers on a fix for the underlying fault
    • Add circuit breaking on failed operations to particular database clusters
    • Use fault isolation to contain the impact of a single failed shard
    • Limit the resources used by clients that keep retrying failed requests
    • Add procedures and tooling that make rapid configuration changes during incident response safer
  2. Symptoms

    On Monday, September 10th, 2012, during a schema migration, the health checks on GitHub's MySQL master failed and Percona Replication Manager moved the 'active' role to another node of the new three-node cluster. That node's InnoDB buffer pool was cold and it performed poorly, its health checks failed in turn, and the role failed back to the original server. GitHub.com went down.

    Trigger

    A schema migration on Monday, September 10th put more load on the master database than earlier migrations had, and Percona Replication Manager's health checks on the master failed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On the morning of September 11th, a developer told the operations team that the 'standby' node was returning incorrect query results.

    Remediation
    • Enabled Pacemaker's maintenance-mode so no health checks or automatic failovers ran, and let the buffer pool warm
    • Powered off the out-of-date node 'c' to end the partition
    • Stopped Pacemaker and Heartbeat on nodes 'a' and 'b' and started them on node 'a' only
    • Started MySQL on node 'a' in the active role
    • Removed the events leaked to wrong dashboards and audited the wrongly routed repositories
    • Contacted the owners of the exposed private repositories
    Action items
    • Change the Pacemaker configuration so the active database role fails over only when an operations engineer starts it
    • Find a way to warm the InnoDB buffer pool of slave databases so failovers do not hurt performance
    • Audit the Pacemaker and Heartbeat stack, focusing on the code path behind the segfault
    • Run hardware tests on the server where the segfault happened
    Lessons

    GitHub concluded that automated failover is not the right strategy for its primary production database: for every failover in this incident, any member of the operations team would have said it should not happen. Failovers that must happen, in an emergency or during maintenance, should not hurt performance.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database failover manager. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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