Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

1. IL-0405 An expired AWS Load Balancer Controller webhook certificate left no healthy targets and took BSEE SaaS down

   PortSwigger2026

   Symptoms

   From 10:00 UTC on 11 January 2026 every BSEE SaaS instance in PortSwigger's US and Canada regions was unavailable: customers could not open the Web UI or start scans. The platform team learned of it only when customers reported it through support at 09:52 UTC the next day.

   Service outageTLS certificate errors

   Trigger

   The upgrade of the AWS Load Balancer Controller from v1.14.1 to v1.16.0 on 28 November 2025 left an orphaned webhook TLS secret that cert-manager could not renew, and the certificate in it expired on 8 January 2026.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   Ingress controllerAdmission webhookcert-managerHelmConfigMaps and SecretsCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Change with a delayed effectMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   Customers reported the outage through support at 09:52 UTC on 12 January 2026, almost 24 hours after impact began, and the platform team began investigating at 10:00 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Deleted the orphaned aws-load-balancer-tls secrets in the US and Canada clusters
   • Redeployed the AWS Load Balancer Controller configuration with Helm
   • Verified that new certificates were generated and the webhooks worked again

   Action items

   • Audit all clusters for orphaned secrets that have no owning Certificate resource and resolve them
   • Add high-level application access alerting for each SaaS cluster from an external probe

   View case
2. IL-0522 An ingress-nginx chart upgrade deleted the jenkins.io Ingress and Fastly served HTTP/503 errors for hours

   Jenkins project2021

   Symptoms

   At 11:32 UTC on 18 November 2021, a user reported in the jenkinsci/jenkins Gitter channel that https://www.jenkins.io/doc/pipeline/steps/ was answering HTTP/503 errors with the message "Guru meditation" from Fastly's varnish.

   Service outageResources deleted

   Trigger

   The ingress-nginx Helm chart was upgraded from 4.0.6 to 4.0.8 at 10:42 UTC, and the new chart added an admission webhook rule that forbids Nginx configuration blocks in Ingress annotations.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   Ingress controllerAdmission webhookHelmCDN and edge network

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionCache-masked failureMonitoring blind spotHarmful manual action

   Detection

   A user reported in the jenkinsci/jenkins Gitter channel at 11:32 UTC that a jenkins.io page answered HTTP/503 errors, and status.jenkins.io reported the incident at 11:49 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Disabled the automated systems, rolled the ingress-nginx chart back to 4.0.6 and deleted the admission webhook by hand
   • Removed the forbidden annotations from the jenkins.io configuration
   • Upgraded the jenkins.io Helm chart to the last version known to work with ingress-nginx 4.0.8
   • Redeployed the jenkins.io Helm chart through the automated system and told Fastly to drop all cached pages

   Action items

   • Always read the changelog in depth when updating the ingress controllers, with two people pairing in real time
   • Add custom Datadog monitoring for www.origin.jenkins.io so that such an outage is detected
   • Make the monitor send the Host header www.jenkins.io so it is not redirected to Fastly
   • Check a set of pages, such as the pipeline steps page, not only the front page
   • Consider an ephemeral k3s end-to-end test before deploying to production

   Lessons

   Trusting a patch version of a Helm chart for the Ingress controller without reading its changelog in depth let a new admission rule remove the jenkins.io Ingress in production. Without monitoring on origin.jenkins.io, a user found the outage. A complete staging cluster with the same DNS setup would have caught the problem before production.

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3. IL-0518 gitlab.freedesktop.org on GKE ran short of volume space and a planned 30-minute storage upgrade became a 4-hour outage

   freedesktop.org2018

   Symptoms

   Shortly after 9am UTC on 17 July 2018, the disk space of the GitLab cluster behind gitlab.freedesktop.org was critical, and some API requests were failing because of the shortage. The administrator first learned of the failure when people mentioned it on IRC.

   Persistent volume fullHigh error rateService outage

   Trigger

   Many recently created forks of Mesa, each about 2.1GB, filled the disk space of the GitLab cluster.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Persistent volumes and stateful setsCloud block storageHelm

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionUnrepresentative stagingMonitoring blind spotChange during peak hours

   Detection

   People mentioned the failure on IRC. Monitoring and alerting on disk usage and API error rate had not been set up yet.

   Remediation

   • Dropped all inbound traffic to GitLab at the firewall except from the administrator's IP
   • Took a manual backup by streaming tar over SSH to an encrypted partition on a local machine
   • Snapshotted all GCE disks behind the PersistentVolumes
   • Copied the data from the old disk snapshots to new enlarged volumes through a temporary GCE VM
   • Re-did the copy into new empty volumes with the correct directory structure and checked repositories, users and workflows
   • Restored public access to GitLab

   Action items

   • Set up monitoring, logging and alerts
   • Find ways to communicate outages much better; this one was announced only on IRC, and the lists were not told when it dragged on
   • Use the Cloud console clients instead of the slow Cloud Console web UI
   • Add more GitLab administrators, ideally someone familiar with Kubernetes deployments
   • Move from the single Omnibus container to GitLab's cloud native deployment with one container per service
   • Move storage to resizeable volumes or to Google Cloud Storage

   Lessons

   The backup step alone used up the outage window; backups had grown along with the disk problem, and a test run before announcing the window could have measured it. The changes had been tested on a scratch cluster, but not exactly as run, and tests of steps such as disk snapshots could have been more realistic. A single GitLab administrator who was new to Kubernetes was a single point of failure. Keeping at least three copies of the data from the first destructive step meant no data was lost.

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4. IL-0040 Parallel Helm installs saturated small gp2 root volumes on a kops cluster and left all three workers NotReady with the kubelet or Docker down

   Saltside2017

   Symptoms

   While running the CI process on a local machine to test an application Helm chart, the SRE lead watched the pods with watch kubectl get pods. All pods reached Running, and then some went back to Pending. Two hours later the problem had grown and some pods showed the phase Unknown.

   Pods PendingImage pull failuresNode NotReadyService outage

   Trigger

   A CI run installed the application's Helm charts for all four markets (Efritin.com, Tonaton.com, Ikman.lk and Bikroy.com) on the nonproduction cluster at the same time.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node root diskkubeletContainer runtimeHelm

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsMonitoring blind spotIgnored early signalSingle point of failure

   Detection

   The SRE lead saw pods go from Running back to Pending while watching kubectl get pods during the CI run; no monitoring raised an alert, even when all three workers were not ready.

   Remediation

   • terminated the three worker nodes and let the auto scaling group replace them

   Action items

   • Fix the Datadog integration for the nonproduction AWS account and repeat the installs with telemetry
   • Increase the worker root EBS volumes from 20GB to 120GB
   • Keep common base images pulled on every node with a DaemonSet until kops supports user hooks
   • Configure different allocation limits for the different layers in Kubernetes
   • Discuss a highly available Tiller with the Helm team
   • Find a way to throttle the number of newly created pods

   Lessons

   An ordinary deploy of the application could collapse the cluster, because the default 20GB gp2 root volumes could not keep up with parallel image pulls and container starts. Without node metrics and pod phase metrics, three NotReady workers raised no alert. A single Tiller replica can block the deploy that would fix an outage.

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