Incident Library
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  1. Symptoms

    Shortly after 9am UTC on 17 July 2018, the disk space of the GitLab cluster behind gitlab.freedesktop.org was critical, and some API requests were failing because of the shortage. The administrator first learned of the failure when people mentioned it on IRC.

    Trigger

    Many recently created forks of Mesa, each about 2.1GB, filled the disk space of the GitLab cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    People mentioned the failure on IRC. Monitoring and alerting on disk usage and API error rate had not been set up yet.

    Remediation
    • Dropped all inbound traffic to GitLab at the firewall except from the administrator's IP
    • Took a manual backup by streaming tar over SSH to an encrypted partition on a local machine
    • Snapshotted all GCE disks behind the PersistentVolumes
    • Copied the data from the old disk snapshots to new enlarged volumes through a temporary GCE VM
    • Re-did the copy into new empty volumes with the correct directory structure and checked repositories, users and workflows
    • Restored public access to GitLab
    Action items
    • Set up monitoring, logging and alerts
    • Find ways to communicate outages much better; this one was announced only on IRC, and the lists were not told when it dragged on
    • Use the Cloud console clients instead of the slow Cloud Console web UI
    • Add more GitLab administrators, ideally someone familiar with Kubernetes deployments
    • Move from the single Omnibus container to GitLab's cloud native deployment with one container per service
    • Move storage to resizeable volumes or to Google Cloud Storage
    Lessons

    The backup step alone used up the outage window; backups had grown along with the disk problem, and a test run before announcing the window could have measured it. The changes had been tested on a scratch cluster, but not exactly as run, and tests of steps such as disk snapshots could have been more realistic. A single GitLab administrator who was new to Kubernetes was a single point of failure. Keeping at least three copies of the data from the first destructive step meant no data was lost.

Check your cluster for this

This case involves Cloud block storage and Helm. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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