Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 05:01 UTC on 9 October 2024 a page fired for GatewayBackendErrorsHigh, elevated 5xx errors from page-analytics_cluster in codfw, followed by a growing number of KubernetesCalicoDown alerts for WikiKube nodes not running the calico-node pod and by MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate. For about an hour uncached MediaWiki requests, such as those of logged-in users, edits and API calls, saw high latency or errors.

    Trigger

    An operator used the new mwscript-k8s utility to run a batch of video transcode maintenance, the TimedMediaHandler requeueTranscodes.php script. mwscript-k8s deploys a whole helm release for every script invocation, so the batch created close to 2k Calico NetworkPolicies along with many other resources over several hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the issue and paged the on-call SRE: GatewayBackendErrorsHigh at 05:01:36 UTC, 16 KubernetesCalicoDown alerts at 05:03:32 UTC and MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate at 05:04:15 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Raised the resource limits of the Calico and Typha pods and applied the change with helmfile, which redeployed all Calico pods
    Action items
    • Stop mwscript-k8s from creating so many resources
    Lessons

    The incident came close to a full outage. Automated monitoring caught it and many responders found the cause, but end users were affected and responders were unsure whether they could switch over to eqiad. The problem was noticed just before the hand-off from Americas to EMEA SRE shifts, a period with a long-known lack of coverage, and it helped that the transcodes were not queued on a Friday evening in the US.

  2. Symptoms

    Shortly after 9am UTC on 17 July 2018, the disk space of the GitLab cluster behind gitlab.freedesktop.org was critical, and some API requests were failing because of the shortage. The administrator first learned of the failure when people mentioned it on IRC.

    Trigger

    Many recently created forks of Mesa, each about 2.1GB, filled the disk space of the GitLab cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    People mentioned the failure on IRC. Monitoring and alerting on disk usage and API error rate had not been set up yet.

    Remediation
    • Dropped all inbound traffic to GitLab at the firewall except from the administrator's IP
    • Took a manual backup by streaming tar over SSH to an encrypted partition on a local machine
    • Snapshotted all GCE disks behind the PersistentVolumes
    • Copied the data from the old disk snapshots to new enlarged volumes through a temporary GCE VM
    • Re-did the copy into new empty volumes with the correct directory structure and checked repositories, users and workflows
    • Restored public access to GitLab
    Action items
    • Set up monitoring, logging and alerts
    • Find ways to communicate outages much better; this one was announced only on IRC, and the lists were not told when it dragged on
    • Use the Cloud console clients instead of the slow Cloud Console web UI
    • Add more GitLab administrators, ideally someone familiar with Kubernetes deployments
    • Move from the single Omnibus container to GitLab's cloud native deployment with one container per service
    • Move storage to resizeable volumes or to Google Cloud Storage
    Lessons

    The backup step alone used up the outage window; backups had grown along with the disk problem, and a test run before announcing the window could have measured it. The changes had been tested on a scratch cluster, but not exactly as run, and tests of steps such as disk snapshots could have been more realistic. A single GitLab administrator who was new to Kubernetes was a single point of failure. Keeping at least three copies of the data from the first destructive step meant no data was lost.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Helm and Cloud block storage. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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