Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  2. Symptoms

    At 15:35 EST on 11 March 2021 the CircleCI web UI and runner.circleci.com became unavailable. The API, which uses a separate ingress point, stayed reachable, and builds kept running.

    Trigger

    An update deployed to a test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from CircleCI's primary production cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    CircleCI engineers were alerted and began investigating. The status page posted its first notice at 20:45 UTC.

    Remediation
    • restored Traefik in the production cluster
    • restored Calico in the production cluster, after which pods served customer requests again
    Action items
    • Improve network-level documentation and runbooks to cover every layer of the Kubernetes networks
    • Improve monitoring and alerting for the network infrastructure
    • Add guardrails that isolate the production and staging clusters so they cannot interfere with each other
    Lessons

    A deployment path that can reach both a test cluster and production can remove shared networking components from production. When the ingress controller and the CNI are both affected, restoring the ingress alone is not enough: engineers had to find the link between Calico and Traefik and restore Calico before pods served traffic again. Time went to DNS and AWS red herrings because nothing linked the outage to the test deployment; CircleCI's answer is better network runbooks, network alerting and guardrails between clusters.

  3. Symptoms

    At 12:39 on 7 September 2020 the Cloud Platform team found that the Ingress API of the live-1 cluster was refusing every POST request. A user who provisioned a new service could not create an ingress into the cluster. The incident was declared at 12:54.

    Trigger

    Version 0.1.0 of the team's ingress controller module started creating a ValidatingWebhookConfiguration resource, and one new 0.1.0 ingress controller in the live-1 cluster failed to be created because of AWS resource limits.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The Ingress API was found refusing 100% of POST requests at 12:39; the incident was declared at 12:54.

    Remediation
    • removed by hand all the additional admission controllers created by module version 0.1.0
    • removed the admission webhook from the ingress controller module and released version 0.1.1
    • upgraded every ingress module on version 0.1.0 to 0.1.1
    Lessons

    Turning on the validating webhook in the shared ingress controller module made the webhook a single point of failure for every ingress controller pod in the ingress-controllers namespace: when one controller could not come up, no team could create an ingress.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Ingress controller and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1