Incident Library
Applied filters ComponentTransit gateway or network interconnectSymptomMonitoring outageFactorCircular dependencyClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    From 7:30 AM PST on 7 December 2021, AWS services in us-east-1 that communicate between AWS's internal network and its main network saw rising latency and errors. The AWS operations teams lost real-time monitoring data at once, and the first thing found in the logs was elevated internal DNS errors.

    Trigger

    At 7:30 AM PST an automated activity that scales the capacity of one AWS service hosted in the main AWS network triggered unexpected behaviour from a large number of clients inside the internal network.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The congestion immediately cut off real-time monitoring data for the AWS operations teams, who turned to logs and first identified elevated internal DNS errors.

    Remediation
    • Moved internal DNS traffic away from the congested network paths
    • Isolated the top sources of traffic onto dedicated network devices
    • Disabled some heavy network traffic services, including EventBridge event delivery
    • Brought additional networking capacity online
    • Disabled the automated scaling activities that triggered the event
    Action items
    • Keep the triggering scaling activities off until all remediations are deployed
    • Fix the latent issue that kept networking clients from backing off
    • Deploy network configuration that protects the affected networking devices in a similar congestion event
    • Keep API Gateway servers healthy when the internal network is unavailable and speed up their recycling
    • Release a new Service Health Dashboard that makes service impact easier to understand
    • Run the support system actively across multiple AWS regions
  2. Symptoms

    During the Americas' morning of 4 January 2021, an external monitoring service paged Slack because error rates were creeping up. While the investigation was starting, Slack's own dashboarding and alerting service became unavailable, so responders had to work without their usual dashboards and alerts.

    Trigger

    On the first working day after the holidays, Slack's traffic went from the quietest time of the year to one of its biggest days overnight, with cold client caches pulling more data than usual, and one of Slack's AWS Transit Gateways did not scale fast enough for it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An external monitoring service paged Slack when error rates started creeping up during the Americas' morning. AWS engineers were separately alerted to the packet drops by AWS's internal monitoring.

    Remediation
    • Disabled automated downscaling of the web tier to keep serving capacity and allow investigation
    • Cleared up the broken, partly provisioned instances that filled the autoscaling groups
    • Repaired provision-service so new web tier instances could be provisioned and enter service
    • AWS engineers increased the Transit Gateway capacity manually across all Availability Zones
    Action items
    • AWS reviews its Transit Gateway scaling algorithms for large packet-per-second increases
    • Request a preemptive upscaling of the Transit Gateways at the end of the next holiday season
    • Run the dashboard service instances in the same VPC as their database to remove the Transit Gateway dependency
    • Load test provision-service regularly
    • Reevaluate health-checking and autoscaling configurations so they cannot overload provision-service again
    Lessons

    Monitoring has to stay as independent as possible of the infrastructure it watches, or it fails when it is needed most. Here the dashboard and alerting services failed because they ran in a different VPC from their databases and so depended on the Transit Gateways. provision-service had been load tested before, but this event exceeded the earlier scale-ups.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Automated capacity manager and Transit gateway or network interconnect. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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