Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 24 October 2024 every BSEE SaaS customer instance showed the Environment Unavailable message, and the SaaS Uptime Over Time metric dropped sharply at 04:45. The Technology Team learned of the outage when the Growth team posted about it at 08:07 and a member of the Product team told the Technology Team verbally at 08:15.

    Trigger

    AWS made Bottlerocket v1.26.0 the latest Bottlerocket AMI in eu-west-1 between 02:00 and 04:30, and at 04:00 Karpenter saw the new version and started replacing the EC2 nodes of the production EKS cluster with it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The Growth team reported the outage in the BSEE cloud onboarding issues channel at 08:07, and a member of the Product team told the Technology Team verbally at 08:15. The SaaS Uptime Over Time metric had already dropped at 04:45.

    Remediation
    • Reverted all EC2 instances in the SaaS production account to Bottlerocket v1.25.0
    • Deployed Bottlerocket 1.25.0 across all EKS clusters and rolled out new EKS nodes
    Action items
    • Change the Karpenter resources to deploy a specific versioned Bottlerocket AMI instead of the latest released AMI
    • Add the Bottlerocket release ATOM feed to an internal tooling release dashboard
    • Set up a public status page to communicate with customers
  2. Symptoms

    On 23 February 2023 Stytch's EKS worker nodes went Ready:Unknown one after another, Karpenter failed to launch replacement nodes, and with fewer and fewer pods scheduled the Live Stytch API went down for 14 minutes, returning 5XX on every call.

    Trigger

    At 14:21 UTC Stytch landed a change to remove unused EKS managed node groups, because it had decided to run its data plane applications fully on nodes provisioned by Karpenter. Because Crossplane resources use an orphan deletion policy, engineers deleted the node groups in the AWS console, first in staging and then in production.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Low-urgency alerts that Karpenter could not find the instance profile fired in staging at 16:06 UTC and in production at 17:48 UTC but were not treated as an incident. The incident process started at 20:26 UTC when node launch failures spiked the Karpenter error rate, and Kubernetes monitoring alerts in production followed at 20:44 UTC. The support team flagged the outage at 21:14 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Reverted the node group deletion, which recreated the managed node groups
    • Manually scaled up one of the Live API node groups with more and much larger nodes and removed its taints
    • Removed node selectors from the applications one after another so their pods could be scheduled
    Action items
    • Treat Karpenter errors as high-urgency alerts that page the on-call engineer
    • Tune cluster alerting thresholds to send a high-urgency page earlier
    • Add alerts for nodes that stay NotReady or Unknown for long periods
    • Raise the thresholds of other deployment alerts, such as unschedulable pods and replicas not available
    • Give Karpenter its own IAM instance profile, separate from the one used by the node groups
    • Separate other AWS resources that were shared between uses, specifically IAM and security groups
    • Rework the EKS and Karpenter configuration so system instance profiles are unique, static per cluster and generated by Karpenter
    • Introduce a cloud visualization tool for engineers making infrastructure changes
    • Add live system and product metrics to the status page
    • Ask AWS to confirm the undocumented actions and side effects of deleting a node group
    • Correct the shared use of IAM roles and security groups across the infrastructure
    Lessons

    The IAM role for Karpenter's self-managed nodes should never have been the same as the one for the managed node groups; sharing it is what let the node group deletion break Karpenter, and the roles had been left combined for speed and simplicity when Karpenter was first set up. The hours-long delay between the configuration change and its effect made the incident hard to assess, and AWS confirmed that this delay is expected, so Stytch will allow for it in future IAM instance profile changes.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Karpenter and Configuration templating. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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