Cases3 cases

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1. IL-0112 The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeouts

   DFDS2022

   Symptoms

   On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

   Node NotReadyUpgrade stallIntermittent timeoutsIntermittent connection failures

   Trigger

   At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Node operating system imageLinux kernelkubeletAWS VPC CNINode launch templateTerraform

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutAutomation amplificationOverlapping failuresMonitoring blind spotNo health probes

   Detection

   The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

   Remediation

   • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
   • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
   • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline

   Action items

   • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
   • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
   • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
   • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
   • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
   • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
   • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
   • Collect logs from nodes centrally
   • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts

   Lessons

   When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

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2. IL-0012 CPU limits and an unpatched kernel CFS quota bug throttled multi-threaded services into stalls, failed health checks and timeouts

   Omio2020

   Symptoms

   For about six months, applications on Omio's Google Kubernetes Engine clusters stalled at random: they got stuck, stopped answering health check requests or lost network connections, and nothing the team looked at explained why.

   CPU throttlingProbe failuresHigh error rateHigh latencyIntermittent timeoutsIntermittent connection failures

   Trigger

   Multi-threaded workloads running with CPU limits on nodes whose kernel did not yet have the fix for a known CFS quota bug that causes unnecessary throttling.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Container CPU limitLinux kernelkubelet

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitMonitoring blind spotUnpatched known bug

   Detection

   Months of random stalls and failed health checks led the team to read the cgroup cpu.stat throttling counters inside the pods, which showed far more throttling than the limits should allow.

   Remediation

   • removed CPU limits until the kernel with the CFS bug fix was deployed across all clusters

   Action items

   • Deploy the kernel with the CFS quota bug fix across all clusters
   • Monitor utilisation, saturation and error metrics, API latency and error rates to confirm the change behaves as expected

   Lessons

   A CPU limit is a time quota per 100 ms period, not a share of cores, so a multi-threaded container can be stopped for most of each period long before it uses the cores it was given, and a kernel bug can make that worse. Throttling is invisible in standard Kubernetes metrics and has to be read from the cgroup counters. Removing limits trades away protection against a container that takes a whole node, which is only acceptable when runtimes are tuned.

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3. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage

   Monzo2017

   Symptoms

   At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service that Monzo's current account needs to process payments, and every request to that service started to fail. Current account customers saw payment failures; the prepaid card was not affected at first because it does not use that service. The change was rolled back at 14:12, but the errors continued.

   High error rateStale endpoint routingService outage

   Trigger

   At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service needed to process current account payments. Two weeks earlier the etcd cluster had been upgraded and grown from three to nine nodes, and one day earlier another team had scaled a new service down to zero replicas while leaving its Kubernetes service in place.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   etcdKubernetes API serverLinkerdkubelet

   Contributing factor

   Ineffective rollbackHarmful manual actionOverlapping failuresMonitoring blind spotSingle point of failure

   Detection

   Payment failures began right after the 14:10 deploy. The team rolled back at 14:12 and declared an outage internally at 14:16. At 15:13, when no service could serve requests, practically all automated alerts fired.

   Remediation

   • Rolled back the payments service change (the errors continued)
   • Activated internal backup processes so most customers could still use their card
   • Restarted all linkerd instances (this made the outage worse)
   • Restarted the three Kubernetes API server processes so replacement linkerd instances could start
   • Began deploying a newer linkerd version with the fix for empty services
   • Deleted the Kubernetes service that had no endpoints, which let linkerd load service discovery again

   Action items

   • Fix the bug in Kubernetes that can trigger timeouts after a cluster reconfiguration
   • Roll out a new version of linkerd that fixes the parsing error
   • Create better health checks, dashboards and alerts for the affected components so they give clearer signals about what is wrong and prevent human error
   • Improve procedures to communicate outages internally and externally as clearly and quickly as possible

   Lessons

   A large failure in a distributed system can be very hard to understand, and well-meant human action can compound it, as restarting every linkerd instance did here by exposing a second incompatibility. Because Monzo deploys often and its network changes constantly, the deployment and request-routing systems have to be trustworthy. Monzo committed to publishing a similar post-mortem for any incident of this severity.

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