Cases6 cases

1 to 5 of 6

1. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down

   Backpackr2025

   Symptoms

   Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

   DNS resolution failuresIntermittent connection failuresHigh latencyOOMKilledService outage

   Trigger

   All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cachekubeletContainer memory limitNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsSingle point of failureNo caching

   Detection

   The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

   Remediation

   • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
   • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
   • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments

   Lessons

   The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

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2. IL-0169 The Scaleway Kubernetes API in FR-PAR ran out of memory under simultaneous deployments, and because it also handled node authentication, Kapsule and Kosmos nodes went NotReady

   Scaleway2024

   Symptoms

   At 23:48 CET on 24 January 2024 the Scaleway Kubernetes API for the FR-PAR region ran out of memory. At the same minute Scaleway saw requests to its API Gateway spike.

   Node NotReadyOOMKilledIntermittent timeoutsMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   Simultaneous deployments in the FR-PAR region pushed the Scaleway Kubernetes API out of memory.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Container memory limitkubelet

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureRetry storm

   Detection

   Increased load on the API Gateway was detected at 23:48, the minute the incident began, and the incident was escalated to on-call engineers at 00:00:10.

   Remediation

   • raised the memory limit and garbage collection thresholds of the Kubernetes managed services
   • deployed additional replicas of key services
   • purged the registry cache and monitored the clusters as they stabilised
   • adjusted service configurations after the incident to keep the platform stable

   Action items

   • Implement a local authentication cache
   • Further develop node authentication
   • Enhance monitoring, adjust rate limiting strategies and improve incident response protocols

   Lessons

   Because the Kubernetes API also handled node authentication, its memory exhaustion made some nodes NotReady, and the endless retries of those nodes added load on the API Gateway. Scaleway plans a local authentication cache and further work on node authentication.

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3. IL-0002 CI builder pods could not get AWS IAM credentials because kubelet fell minutes behind its API rate limit

   Zalando2019

   Symptoms

   Builds on Zalando's in-house Continuous Delivery Platform (CDP), which runs CI/CD on Kubernetes, timed out and failed for almost an hour on 11 June 2019. The Kubernetes builder pods could not get AWS IAM credentials.

   High error rateCredentials unavailableControl plane lag

   Trigger

   An unlucky rescaling of the CDP Kubernetes cluster left only one node available for builder pods. Builder pods were created and deleted on that node so quickly that kubelet fell behind.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   kubeletCredential broker for podsKubernetes API serverCI system

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsSingle point of failure

   Remediation

   • Scaled the CDP cluster up by hand so builder pods spread over more than one node

   Action items

   • Raise the kubelet QPS limit from the default 5 to 50 in the global cluster configuration

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4. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe

   NRE Labs2018

   Symptoms

   The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

   Control plane unresponsiveProbe failuresService outage

   Trigger

   Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

   Root cause

   unknown

   Component

   etcdkubeletKubernetes API server

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureUnreviewed defaultsHarmful manual actionIgnored early signalMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

   Remediation

   • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts

   Action items

   • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
   • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages

   Lessons

   Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

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5. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage

   Monzo2017

   Symptoms

   At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service that Monzo's current account needs to process payments, and every request to that service started to fail. Current account customers saw payment failures; the prepaid card was not affected at first because it does not use that service. The change was rolled back at 14:12, but the errors continued.

   High error rateStale endpoint routingService outage

   Trigger

   At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service needed to process current account payments. Two weeks earlier the etcd cluster had been upgraded and grown from three to nine nodes, and one day earlier another team had scaled a new service down to zero replicas while leaving its Kubernetes service in place.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   etcdKubernetes API serverLinkerdkubelet

   Contributing factor

   Ineffective rollbackHarmful manual actionOverlapping failuresMonitoring blind spotSingle point of failure

   Detection

   Payment failures began right after the 14:10 deploy. The team rolled back at 14:12 and declared an outage internally at 14:16. At 15:13, when no service could serve requests, practically all automated alerts fired.

   Remediation

   • Rolled back the payments service change (the errors continued)
   • Activated internal backup processes so most customers could still use their card
   • Restarted all linkerd instances (this made the outage worse)
   • Restarted the three Kubernetes API server processes so replacement linkerd instances could start
   • Began deploying a newer linkerd version with the fix for empty services
   • Deleted the Kubernetes service that had no endpoints, which let linkerd load service discovery again

   Action items

   • Fix the bug in Kubernetes that can trigger timeouts after a cluster reconfiguration
   • Roll out a new version of linkerd that fixes the parsing error
   • Create better health checks, dashboards and alerts for the affected components so they give clearer signals about what is wrong and prevent human error
   • Improve procedures to communicate outages internally and externally as clearly and quickly as possible

   Lessons

   A large failure in a distributed system can be very hard to understand, and well-meant human action can compound it, as restarting every linkerd instance did here by exposing a second incompatibility. Because Monzo deploys often and its network changes constantly, the deployment and request-routing systems have to be trustworthy. Monzo committed to publishing a similar post-mortem for any incident of this severity.

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