Incident Library
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Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    From 22:47 UTC on 25 August 2026 the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, job queue and notifications stopped working for every customer. No one could create a build from the UI or the REST API, job dispatch was delayed, and some builds that were already running when the outage began stayed stuck until the services recovered.

    Trigger

    At 22:44 UTC an application deploy created a surge of new pods, which used up the free capacity on the existing nodes and made the EKS cluster scale out. Background worker pools with unusually high maximum replica counts were scaling out at the same time and kept asking for more pods while new nodes were still being provisioned. Together they produced an unusually high rate of change in applications, network endpoints and nodes, and with it a sudden rise in demand on CoreDNS.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first status post, at 22:55 UTC, eight minutes after the outage began, said something had gone wrong, and at 23:05 UTC the status page said a sitewide outage was being investigated. CoreDNS query duration had been rising as the cluster grew, but a defect in a key monitoring query and too little monitoring of query volume meant this went unnoticed before the outage.

    Remediation
    • paused further application deploys
    • scaled CoreDNS from three to twelve pods
    • raised each CoreDNS pod's memory limit from 512 MiB to 2 GiB
    • expanded the system node pool that runs CoreDNS
    Action items
    • Increase immediate CoreDNS headroom: twelve pods instead of three, a 2 GiB memory limit instead of 512 MiB, and a larger system node pool
    • Enable EKS-managed CoreDNS autoscaling with a tested minimum replica count and enough capacity to spread the replicas across nodes and availability zones
    • Add direct alerts on CoreDNS query duration, query volume, goroutine growth, memory pressure, OOM restarts and available replicas, and track longer-term trends in capacity planning
    • Find other cluster-critical services that lack tested capacity, direct alerting, spread across failure domains, and either safe autoscaling or documented static headroom, and fix them
    Lessons

    A CoreDNS deployment sized once and left at a fixed size can carry a growing cluster for months and then fail on the first burst of churn it cannot absorb. When query processing slows, pending queries take up memory, the pods hit their limits and restart, and client retries keep the service down after the restart. Server-side DNS query duration and volume need their own alerts: here client-side latency was masked by unrelated application speed-ups, and a broken monitoring query hid the server-side trend. Maximum replica counts raised as a temporary measure remove the cap that normally stops runaway scaling when new nodes are slow to arrive.

  2. Symptoms

    The day began with an alert that several instances of the Redis cluster were running out of disk space. That part was fixed quickly. The outage came an hour later: right after the Redis StatefulSet was deleted and recreated at 8:10 UTC, Kubernetes restarted every Redis pod within about five minutes, and problems started to appear.

    Trigger

    To make Git match the volumes that had been resized by hand, the Redis StatefulSet was deleted with orphan (non-cascading) deletion and recreated with the new storage template; Kubernetes reconciled the new spec by restarting the entire Redis cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert about Redis instances running out of disk space started the work; the outage itself showed up as backend errors about Redis connections right after the StatefulSet was recreated.

    Remediation
    • made the Redis masters forget obsolete node identities, reset the affected replicas and rejoined them, then waited for replication to catch up
    • identified the component that was actually running out of memory, scaled the backend service and raised memory limits for that component
    • temporarily relaxed probes so backend instances took traffic immediately instead of flapping between ready and not ready
    • reverted the temporary workarounds at 10:00 UTC
    Action items
    • Add startup probes so a Redis pod is not marked ready until its dataset is loaded
    • Build an own control plane for Redis that handles restarted pods stuck to an old master address
    • Reduce dependence on the single Redis cluster: move some important data to other stores, such as a separate Redis cluster per server, and use Kafka for some backend components
    Lessons

    The disk resize was not the problem; the cleanup afterwards was. An immutable field pushes operators toward deleting and recreating the controller, and that can set off a full reconcile. Startup and readiness probes are what slow a rolling restart down to a safe pace; without them a distributed store restarts in the most fragile way. Recovery plans must expect a cluster to heal slowly, and dependent services need to degrade gracefully while it does.

  3. Symptoms

    Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

    Trigger

    All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

    Remediation
    • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
    • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
    • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments
    Lessons

    The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

  4. Symptoms

    Between 5:42 AM and 7:16 AM PT on 8 November 2023 a large share of requests to OpenAI failed with 502 or 503 errors. Every model and API endpoint saw significant failures.

    Trigger

    A morning with dramatically more completions than any previous day pushed the routing layer nodes, which already had a chronic memory problem, past their memory limits.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • limited incoming traffic
    • redeployed the routing service en masse
    • ramped traffic back up slowly
    Action items
    • Pre-allocate the responseBuffer and reuse it instead of allocating a new one in a loop (3X improvement in memory and CPU usage)
    • Adjust the configured memory limits to an appropriate level so the service has significant headroom
    • Add rate limit controls to shed traffic more gracefully
    • Increase the service's capacity
    • Change alerting to catch the underlying memory behaviour before it escalates into service issues
    • Configure autoscaling for the service, which was not possible before because added capacity could hurt an upstream service
  5. Symptoms

    During a rollout of the Grafana Loki distributor Deployment in one Grafana Cloud Logs environment, the write path went down for about 25 minutes. The newly started distributor pods were OOM-killed over and over, never passed their health and readiness checks, and the rollout stopped making progress.

    Trigger

    Step 1 of moving the Loki ring off a separately deployed key-value store onto embedded memberlist added a new label, gossip_ring_member: 'true', to the distributor pods and Service, together with a small config change, and the change required a rollout of the distributors.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first clue was kubectl get pods and the kube_deployment_status_replicas_updated metric showing that only 16 of 140 distributor pods had been updated.

    Remediation
    • scaled the distributor Deployment out horizontally so the load spread over more pods with the new label and the rollout could continue
    • reverted the migration step to end the outage
    • set service_ignored_labels:: [$._config.gossip_member_label] and passed it to k.util.serviceFor so the label is no longer copied into the Service selector
    Action items
    • Update the function that generates a Service from a Deployment or StatefulSet to handle edge cases, including this one
    Lessons

    A Service whose selector is built by copying every label of a workload changes which pods it matches as soon as a new label is added. During a rollout it then matches only the new pods, which receive all the traffic before there are enough of them. A few errors during a rollout in other environments hid the problem, because those environments gave distributors more memory and could absorb the shift. Manifest diffs kept for every pull request made it possible to see that the Service selector had changed.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve Container memory limit and Node pool. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0102 CoreDNS pods on a production EKS cluster ran out of memory under a burst of new pods, endpoints and nodes, taking down the Buildkite web UI, APIs and job dispatch
  2. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down
  3. IL-0094 Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub
    2i2c2020

Configuration change2 cases

  1. IL-0063 VPN outage after recreating a Redis StatefulSet restarted the whole Redis cluster without readiness checks
  2. IL-0191 A label selector accidentally added to the Loki distributor Service matched only the new pods of a rollout, which took all write traffic, were OOM-killed and stalled the rollout

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0123 A response buffer allocated anew in a loop made OpenAI's routing layer nodes hit their memory limits and fail readiness checks on a morning with more completions than any day before, causing 502 and 503 errors across all models
    OpenAI2023
  2. IL-0196 Adding a second Redis replica and lowering memory limits in one RedisFailover change restarted the only Redis pod that held data, and Sentinel promoted the empty new replica, erasing the data
    Palark2020

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0199 A non-essential container exceeding its memory limit made GitHub's production pods unavailable, and their restarts failed because a DNS maintenance change had left the clusters unable to reach the image registry
    GitHub2020