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Cases7 cases

1 to 5 of 7

  1. Symptoms

    Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

    Trigger

    All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

    Remediation
    • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
    • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
    • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments
    Lessons

    The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

  2. Symptoms

    At 09:36 on 18 March 2025, during the upgrade of the live cluster to EKS 1.30, users reported that their pods were being terminated and were not restarting automatically, in both production and non-production environments. Automated infrastructure alerts fired as well, and production services had outages.

    Trigger

    Upgrading the live EKS cluster from 1.29 to 1.30, during which the descheduler attempted to reschedule all pods on the cordoned nodes simultaneously.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported at 09:36 that pods were being terminated and not restarting, and automated infrastructure alerts fired.

    Remediation
    • Removed the cordon annotation so pods could be rescheduled
    • Deleted stuck 1.30 nodes to force their recreation
    • Added a new node group of 20 nodes running 1.30 by hand
    • Cordoned and drained all old 1.29 nodes onto the new 1.30 nodes
    Action items
    • Raise an AWS Production System Down support case (Case ID: 174229643100496)
    • Get guidance from AWS support on querying control-plane logs to find the root cause of similar issues
    • Document a runbook for emergency scaling of a new node group in case of unexpected capacity shortages
    • Alert on an imbalance between the autoscaling group and the Kubernetes nodes
    • Review the descheduler configuration to understand why it throws pods off cordoned nodes, and fix it where possible
    • Alert on spikes in the pending pod count
    Lessons

    The write-up lists review actions rather than lessons. They show the team had no documented way to add an emergency node group, no alert on a mismatch between the autoscaling group and the nodes Kubernetes sees, no alert on a spike in pending pods, and no clear understanding of how the descheduler treats cordoned nodes.

  3. Symptoms

    At 09:33 UTC on 14 February 2023 end users told the platform team that Kubernetes logs were not arriving in CloudWatch as expected. The investigation went through fluentd and found that the nodes were running containerd as their container runtime instead of docker-shim. A scheduled node rollover the day before, at 07:30 UTC on 13 February, had set containerd as the default runtime by accident.

    Trigger

    A scheduled node rollover had accidentally made containerd the default container runtime, which stopped log shipping to CloudWatch; the unscheduled rollover to revert it timed out, and the pipeline run that followed reduced the Auto Scaling group from 30 to 15 instances.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    End users reported the missing CloudWatch logs that started the work. The postmortem lists 2 minutes as the time to detection of the node failure.

    Remediation
    • ran the node rollover script to add new nodes, which failed on a timeout from Docker Hub
    • ran the node rollover script a second time, which added new nodes that the load balancer marked healthy at 11:01 UTC
    Action items
    • Document the rollover process, especially what can be done when it goes wrong
    • Investigate options for improving the rollover process
    • Add fluentd log collection to the QA test suite so logs are covered end to end
    • Add alarms for fluentd when too little or no log data is sent
    • Implement a staging environment
    • Implement guards against selecting an invalid container runtime
    Lessons

    When a change goes wrong, rolling back to a known working configuration is safer than rushing a fix, which can make the damage worse. Launching new worker nodes depends on the cloud-init script not failing in any way. The QA configuration differed from production, there was no staging environment, the QA tests did not cover fluentd log collection, and the rollover process had no documentation for when it fails.

  4. Symptoms

    About a minute after the etcd leader changed, two replicas of the Cortex distributor started logging "context deadline exceeded" when they tried to read keys from etcd. Writes from some customers that landed on those two replicas failed, while the other distributor replicas kept working, so the service saw an error rate of about 20% on writes to the London region of Hosted Prometheus.

    Trigger

    A scheduled Kubernetes version upgrade abruptly terminated the node that ran the etcd leader at 11:19:00 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An SLO-based alert paged the on-call engineer at 11:31, 11 minutes after the errors started. At a 20% error rate the monthly SLA would have taken about 18 hours to breach.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the two affected Cortex distributor replicas at 11:32, which stopped the errors
    Action items
    • Enable gRPC keepalive probes in the Cortex etcd client (DialKeepAliveTime 10s, DialKeepAliveTimeout, PermitWithoutStream)
    • Make the Kubernetes upgrade process terminate pods and machines gracefully, including the etcd pods managed by the etcd operator
    Lessons

    When a node dies abruptly, clients holding TCP connections to it are not told; without keepalive probes an etcd client can keep sending requests into a dead connection long after a new leader exists. A failover that works on the server side still needs clients that detect the dead peer. Node replacement during cluster upgrades should drain pods gracefully, including pods owned by operators that the upgrade scripts do not know about, and should give instances enough time to shut down.

  5. Symptoms

    A colleague wrote in Slack that his application was taking a long time to deploy. A deployment that normally finishes in minutes had been running for about an hour: about half of the new pods were running and serving traffic, and the other half were Pending.

    Trigger

    The cluster reaching 256 nodes, the most its /16 pod secondary range could hold at 256 addresses per node; every further node creation failed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A colleague reported in Slack that a deployment was slow; the pending pods' events and the cluster autoscaler status ConfigMap showed the exhausted IP space.

    Remediation
    • lowered the maximum pods per node on selected node pools, cutting IP consumption by about 30%
    • moved some node pools to larger instance types
    Action items
    • Lower the maximum pods per node on node pools that do not run many pods
    • Use larger instance types in some node pools
    Lessons

    In a VPC-native GKE cluster the number of nodes, not the number of pods, uses up the pod range: by default each node reserves 256 addresses, so even a /16 is full at 256 nodes. Maximum pods per node and node size are the practical levers; larger nodes pack better but take more pods down when they fail.

Check your cluster for this

These 7 cases involve Node pool and Cluster autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

  1. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down
  2. IL-0015 A GKE cluster's /16 pod address range ran out at 256 nodes, leaving new pods Pending and node scale-ups failing

Faulty deployment1 case

  1. IL-0020 During an EKS 1.30 upgrade the descheduler tried to reschedule every pod on the cordoned nodes at once and production workloads went down

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0109 A retried node rollover on a DFDS EKS cluster set the Auto Scaling group back to 15 instances, and the default termination policy removed every healthy worker node, leaving the cluster with no nodes
    DFDS2023
  2. IL-0055 A failing CronJob with the default concurrency policy piled up thousands of restarting pods and took down a cluster
    Target2018

Software defect1 case

Component
Organisation
  1. IL-0190 Cortex distributors kept a stuck connection to a dead etcd leader after a Kubernetes upgrade terminated its node, failing writes to Hosted Prometheus for 12 minutes

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0054 All ingress traffic lost while draining a GKE node pool because the load balancer only targeted new nodes without ingress-nginx pods