Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 12 May 2025 at 20:15 EEST a Freshdesk ticket reported that users' servers on the Earthscope hub were taking more than 15 minutes to start and that their kernels were being killed. It happened during a workshop and also affected other instructors using the hub; a second report said a short course of about 30 users was having major problems.

    Trigger

    A workshop with about 30 users on a profile option that guaranteed 8 GB of memory and set no memory limit on 32 GB nodes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Freshdesk support ticket from the community at 20:15 EEST, brought to the team's attention in the #support-freshdesk Slack channel at 20:49.

    Remediation
    • ran a helm rollout and hub redeploy, which partly improved server starts
    • made the 'medium' profile available and raised its memory guarantee to reduce overcommitment
    • pre-warmed the cluster with 15 nodes for the 30-user workshop
    • set explicit memory limits, with the guarantee equal to the limit, on the community's small-node profile options (https://github.com/2i2c-org/infrastructure/pull/6047)
    Action items
    • Write an incident report
    • Hold an internal retrospective about the incident (https://github.com/2i2c-org/meta/issues/2194)
    Lessons

    A memory guarantee without a limit lets a user server grow into memory that other pods on the same node were counting on, and on a shared node that ends with users' pods evicting each other. Setting the guarantee equal to the limit removes the overcommitment. For a known workshop, pre-warming enough nodes ahead of time keeps server start times short.

  2. Symptoms

    At 08:52 PM IST a report came in from WER that many students could not access the JupyterHub and that it was frozen; pages were stuck and nothing was usable. A rise in activity was visible by 09:02 PM, but the usual fixes, such as opening an incognito window and restarting servers, did not help.

    Trigger

    WER students' pods used a good chunk of their memory limit (tests had shown they almost always use just under 1G of their 2G limit, against a 512M guarantee) on nodes shared with the hub's core pods.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    WER reported stuck pages and students unable to reach the hub in a GitHub issue (2i2c-org/docs#27).

    Remediation
    • removed memory overcommit for the WER students
    • raised resource guarantees for all core pods, which restarted them and moved some to a new node
    Action items
    • Put user pods in a separate pool so they do not create pressure on the core pods (infrastructure#89)
    • Set limits on the support infrastructure (Prometheus, Grafana, ingress) as well (infrastructure#90)
    • Document and think about overcommit ratios for memory usage (infrastructure#91)
    • Set up better Grafana dashboards to monitor resource usage (infrastructure#92)
    • Document how people can get kubectl access to the cluster so others can look into issues too (infrastructure#87)
    Lessons

    Core pods without resource guarantees get whatever is left on a node, so when user pods on the same nodes fill the CPU and memory, the hub that serves everyone freezes. The memory overcommit ratio has to come from measured use: WER students used just under 1G against a 512M guarantee, which a 4x overcommit could not hold.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Container memory limit and Node pool. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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