Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 22:47 UTC on 25 August 2026 the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, job queue and notifications stopped working for every customer. No one could create a build from the UI or the REST API, job dispatch was delayed, and some builds that were already running when the outage began stayed stuck until the services recovered.

    Trigger

    At 22:44 UTC an application deploy created a surge of new pods, which used up the free capacity on the existing nodes and made the EKS cluster scale out. Background worker pools with unusually high maximum replica counts were scaling out at the same time and kept asking for more pods while new nodes were still being provisioned. Together they produced an unusually high rate of change in applications, network endpoints and nodes, and with it a sudden rise in demand on CoreDNS.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first status post, at 22:55 UTC, eight minutes after the outage began, said something had gone wrong, and at 23:05 UTC the status page said a sitewide outage was being investigated. CoreDNS query duration had been rising as the cluster grew, but a defect in a key monitoring query and too little monitoring of query volume meant this went unnoticed before the outage.

    Remediation
    • paused further application deploys
    • scaled CoreDNS from three to twelve pods
    • raised each CoreDNS pod's memory limit from 512 MiB to 2 GiB
    • expanded the system node pool that runs CoreDNS
    Action items
    • Increase immediate CoreDNS headroom: twelve pods instead of three, a 2 GiB memory limit instead of 512 MiB, and a larger system node pool
    • Enable EKS-managed CoreDNS autoscaling with a tested minimum replica count and enough capacity to spread the replicas across nodes and availability zones
    • Add direct alerts on CoreDNS query duration, query volume, goroutine growth, memory pressure, OOM restarts and available replicas, and track longer-term trends in capacity planning
    • Find other cluster-critical services that lack tested capacity, direct alerting, spread across failure domains, and either safe autoscaling or documented static headroom, and fix them
    Lessons

    A CoreDNS deployment sized once and left at a fixed size can carry a growing cluster for months and then fail on the first burst of churn it cannot absorb. When query processing slows, pending queries take up memory, the pods hit their limits and restart, and client retries keep the service down after the restart. Server-side DNS query duration and volume need their own alerts: here client-side latency was masked by unrelated application speed-ups, and a broken monitoring query hid the server-side trend. Maximum replica counts raised as a temporary measure remove the cap that normally stops runaway scaling when new nodes are slow to arrive.

  2. Symptoms

    Resizing an LKE cluster produced an incorrect number of nodes, so some customer clusters were resized in unexpected ways and the extra worker nodes were billed to the customer accounts. The clusters themselves kept functioning. Linode's first status update, at 05:07 UTC on 1 June 2023, advised customers to avoid resizing their clusters if possible.

    Trigger

    At about 16:00 UTC on 31 May 2023 a change to the API that caused LKE clusters to scale improperly was pushed to production.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first status update, at 05:07 UTC on 1 June, said Linode had been made aware of an issue when resizing LKE clusters, about 13 hours after the change went out.

    Remediation
    • advised customers to avoid resizing their clusters
    • deployed a hotfix at 09:40 UTC on 1 June that corrected the scaling behaviour
    • left the extra worker nodes in place to avoid disrupting customer workloads
    • contacted affected customers by ticket about credit adjustments and further mitigation
    Action items
    • Audit the automated tests
    • Add pre-deployment checklist items so the same failure does not happen again
    Lessons

    An API change that alters scaling behaviour resized customer clusters and added cost while the clusters themselves kept working; Linode announced the issue about 13 hours after the change went out. Removing the extra nodes would have disrupted workloads, so the cost was handled through credits instead.

  3. Symptoms

    On the evening of a long-overdue upgrade of a loveholidays production GKE cluster from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, planned to take 2 to 2.5 hours, the master upgrade and the first two 7-node NodePools went smoothly. After that the NodePool upgrades slowed to a crawl. Each node is cordoned, drained and upgraded in turn. Even a 14-node cluster at about 5 minutes per node took over an hour, and with about 100 more nodes to go, some of them taking over 15 minutes to drain, the sequential drains were too slow to finish at a reasonable hour.

    Trigger

    A manual upgrade of the GKE masters and NodePools from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, two versions at once, on 19 March 2019; GKE's release notes of 14 March had already said that version was no longer available for new clusters or master upgrades because masters showed elevated error rates, but it could still be selected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The slow drains, zombie nodes and stuck NodePool were seen by the engineer running the upgrade; the broken Ingress was noticed after the upgrade and explained by Google support; the HPA problem was noticed the next day.

    Remediation
    • drained the remaining NodePool nodes ahead of the upgrade with kubectl drain --ignore-daemonsets --delete-local-data
    • deleted the zombie instances from the managed instance group with gcloud compute instance-groups managed delete-instances
    • cancelled the stuck UPGRADE_NODES operation with gcloud beta container operations cancel
    • used kubectl port-forward in place of the broken internal Ingresses
    • scaled down the older of two active ReplicaSets, or triggered a dummy deployment, to bring the HPA back
    Action items
    • Alert when a HorizontalPodAutoscaler is at 70% and at 100% of its capacity
    • Alert when a deployment has had two active ReplicaSets for 30 minutes and for 60 minutes
    • Re-evaluate termination grace periods that were set to arbitrary large values
    • Read the GKE release notes before every cluster upgrade
    • Use auto-upgrade in non-production environments, and manual cluster upgrades with automatic node upgrades in production
    • Keep environments as identical as possible, including resource names
    Lessons

    Read the release notes before upgrading: the target version had been withdrawn five days earlier. Drain time depends on pod configuration, so emptyDir volumes, long grace periods and missing disruption budgets turn a NodePool upgrade into hours. Pre-production only catches problems like the ingress bug if it matches production down to resource names. Auto-upgrades in non-production surface problems early, and a mix of manual cluster upgrades and automatic node upgrades in production keeps clusters current without much effort.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Node pool and Horizontal pod autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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