Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 01:40 UTC on 14 February 2023, Twingate saw the number of connections drop in two of its Relay clusters, the one in us-east4 (Ashburn, Virginia) and the one in europe-west6 (Zurich, Switzerland).

    Trigger

    At 01:00 UTC on 14 February, Twingate started a Terraform change to all of its Relay clusters worldwide to add spot instance scaling; the rollout took about 45 minutes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 01:40 UTC Twingate noticed a decrease in the number of connections in the two clusters and started investigating.

    Remediation
    • Disabled the pods in the two affected Relay clusters at 02:04 UTC so Clients and Connectors reconnected to the next closest Relay cluster
    • Corrected the Terraform configuration error and redeployed the affected clusters at 03:30 UTC
    Action items
    • Make the staging environment reflect the sizing and configuration differences between Relay clusters
    • Create Terraform plans automatically for every environment and configuration variation on feature development branches
    • Extend Relay health checks so a cluster is not discoverable to Connectors and Clients when its network firewall tag is missing
    • Research and introduce staggered Terraform rollouts for the Relay cluster infrastructure
    • Add multi-cluster connectivity to Connectors so they handle regional Relay cluster problems automatically
  2. Symptoms

    From 9:28am Pacific Time on 8 March 2016, applications on the cloud.gov PaaS that relied on outbound traffic to reach the services they depended on became unavailable, and at one point every application on cloud.gov was down.

    Trigger

    At 9:28am Pacific Time on 8 March 2016 a contractor at Aquilent changed the AWS security group settings, one of several changes made in the process of achieving ATO for the platform.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Remediation
    • Added exceptions for individual applications, which restored some of them
    • Rolled back the security group change, which restored all applications
    Action items
    • Put all security group configuration into version control and make changes through pull requests
    • Monitor the applications running on cloud.gov and alert the cloud.gov team when they do not work as expected
    • Use CF security groups instead of AWS security groups and make the current rules visible to the cloud.gov team and the teams using it
    • Create a notification system to reach the key contact of each application on the platform
    • Create a more accurate staging environment to test changes like this
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve VPC route tables and firewall rules and Terraform. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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