Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

1. IL-0470 Buildkite notifications were delayed after Prometheus storage filled and EKS notification workers could not autoscale

   Buildkite2026

   Symptoms

   From 20:01 UTC on 28 May 2026, Buildkite build and job notifications (GitHub commit status, email, Slack and webhook notifications) reached a subset of customers late. Internal queue latency monitoring showed the delay as queues grew while notification-processing workers stayed underprovisioned.

   High latencyAutoscaler misbehaviour

   Trigger

   The Prometheus service used by Buildkite's EKS autoscaling path ran out of storage, so some EKS-based notification workers could not autoscale while their queues were growing.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Prometheus

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitPartial rolloutIneffective rollbackUnverified assumptionHarmful manual action

   Detection

   Internal queue latency monitoring detected the rising notification delivery latency.

   Remediation

   • Moved the affected notification-processing workloads from EKS back to the ECS-based infrastructure
   • Adjusted scaling configuration and worker counts by hand
   • Completed the rollback and scaled the remaining affected ECS services
   • Increased Prometheus storage capacity and recorded the change in infrastructure as code

   Action items

   • Alert before Prometheus storage exhaustion can affect autoscaling
   • Fix GitHub notification retry behaviour for a class of errors that could cause repeated retries
   • Make the EKS-to-ECS rollback verify destination capacity, autoscaling configuration and traffic movement
   • Review the CPU, memory and storage allocations of EKS control-plane dependencies such as KEDA and Karpenter
   • Move customer-critical workloads to EKS more gradually, with clearer settling periods
   • Improve customer-level monitoring of notification delivery latency to detect customer-impacting regressions earlier
   • Review which notification types sit on customers' scheduling or CI hot path and need tighter latency, separate queueing or specific alerting
   • Update the status page earlier when notification latency is likely to affect customer workflows
   • Describe the customer-visible impact in status page updates, not only the affected internal service
   • Improve internal escalation for customers who report critical CI impact

   Lessons

   Buildkite said recovery took longer than expected because the rollback path from EKS to ECS did not fully handle this failure, and that its public status page did not show the customer-visible impact as quickly or clearly as it should have, since notification latency affects customers differently depending on how their CI and deployment workflows use notifications.

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2. IL-0006 VPC subnets ran out of IP addresses because the AWS VPC CNI kept IPs on full nodes, and WARM_IP_TARGET changes then blocked pod starts after every pod deletion

   Neon2025

   Symptoms

   On 16 May 2025, in Neon's Kubernetes cluster in AWS us-east-1, new compute pods were scheduled but could not start and failed with IP allocation errors. Each Neon compute is a Postgres database running in a lightweight virtual machine in its own pod, so without new pods, idle customer databases could not be woken up.

   IP address exhaustionPods Pending

   Trigger

   On 16 May the Neon control plane's periodic job that terminates idle computes started failing. Compute creations continued, and the number of active computes rose from about 5k to about 8.1k within minutes. On 19 May, a follow-up change that set WARM_IP_TARGET back to 1 started the second round of failures.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   AWS VPC CNIVPC subnet or pod address rangeCluster autoscaler

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsNo capacity planningUnverified assumptionHarmful manual actionIneffective rollbackRetry storm

   Detection

   As cluster-autoscaler added nodes, the team saw IP allocation errors on new pods that were scheduled but could not start. The rate of successful pod starts and VPC subnet metrics were then used to follow the problem.

   Remediation

   • Set WARM_IP_TARGET=1 to release IPs held by nodes without free CPU or memory
   • Fixed the control plane's periodic job so idle computes were terminated again
   • Restarted the aws-node DaemonSet several times, each with a temporary improvement
   • Set WARM_IP_TARGET=0, MINIMUM_IP_TARGET=0 and WARM_ENI_TARGET=0, which let nodes allocate enough IPs and stabilised the cluster
   • On 19 May, set WARM_IP_TARGET back to 0 after setting it to 1 failed again
   • Enlarged the pool of pre-created warm compute pods to absorb failed pod starts

   Action items

   • Open a pull request to AWS CNI to improve how ipamd releases IPs in this situation
   • Follow up with AWS Support about the roughly 100 subnet IPs that were never allocated, for reasons Neon could not explain
   • Change the architecture to support horizontal scaling

   Lessons

   With default settings AWS CNI can keep many IPs on nodes that cannot use them, so the share of subnet IPs assigned to pods does not tell how close the subnet is to running out. WARM_IP_TARGET and WARM_ENI_TARGET follow different logic, a warm IP target of zero switches to the ENI logic, and IPs in cooldown count toward the target, which behaves badly under high pod churn. Changing these settings during an incident without knowing that logic prolonged the outage, and reverting a setting did not bring back the earlier healthy state.

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3. IL-0433 Shifting API traffic from EC2 to EKS on Fargate overloaded two CoreDNS pods and caused mass name-resolution errors

   MonotaRO2023

   Symptoms

   When MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining endpoints of its backend API sent to EKS from 1% to 25%, Sentry filled with errors saying the API could not reach the database and outside services. The errors were about DNS name resolution, and the traffic had to be shifted back to the EC2 version.

   DNS resolution failuresHigh error rate

   Trigger

   MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining API endpoints routed by the ALB to the EKS version from 1% to 25%.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheContainer CPU limitHorizontal pod autoscalerPod termination

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsNo resource requests or limitsUnrepresentative stagingUnverified assumption

   Detection

   Sentry showed a large number of errors about connecting to the database and outside services right after the traffic share was raised.

   Remediation

   • Shifted the requests back to the EC2 version to stop the errors
   • Added an HPA to autoscale the CoreDNS pods as a stopgap, which let the migration to EKS finish

   Action items

   • Set ndots to 1 through dnsConfig in the application Deployments
   • Set cache 600 in the Corefile in the coredns ConfigMap to lengthen the CoreDNS cache TTL
   • Add lameduck 30s to the CoreDNS health plugin so CoreDNS keeps serving while it is scaled in
   • Consider reducing the differences between production and staging, weighed against cost

   Lessons

   MonotaRO assumed that a managed service would not cause problems and so skipped researching other companies' migrations, load testing and monitoring. Staging differed from production in its network layout, so ndots differed between them, and staging databases could not take a high-load test. Looking at the CoreDNS logs and resolv.conf instead of guessing found that ndots:5 made lookups of outside names try every search domain first.

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4. IL-0094 Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub

   2i2c2020

   Symptoms

   At 08:52 PM IST a report came in from WER that many students could not access the JupyterHub and that it was frozen; pages were stuck and nothing was usable. A rise in activity was visible by 09:02 PM, but the usual fixes, such as opening an incognito window and restarting servers, did not help.

   Service outageSustained high node CPU

   Trigger

   WER students' pods used a good chunk of their memory limit (tests had shown they almost always use just under 1G of their 2G limit, against a 512M guarantee) on nodes shared with the hub's core pods.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolContainer memory limit

   Contributing factor

   No resource requests or limitsUnverified assumptionExcessive blast radius

   Detection

   WER reported stuck pages and students unable to reach the hub in a GitHub issue (2i2c-org/docs#27).

   Remediation

   • removed memory overcommit for the WER students
   • raised resource guarantees for all core pods, which restarted them and moved some to a new node

   Action items

   • Put user pods in a separate pool so they do not create pressure on the core pods (infrastructure#89)
   • Set limits on the support infrastructure (Prometheus, Grafana, ingress) as well (infrastructure#90)
   • Document and think about overcommit ratios for memory usage (infrastructure#91)
   • Set up better Grafana dashboards to monitor resource usage (infrastructure#92)
   • Document how people can get kubectl access to the cluster so others can look into issues too (infrastructure#87)

   Lessons

   Core pods without resource guarantees get whatever is left on a node, so when user pods on the same nodes fill the CPU and memory, the hub that serves everyone freezes. The memory overcommit ratio has to come from measured use: WER students used just under 1G against a 512M guarantee, which a 4x overcommit could not hold.

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5. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down

   Moonlight2019

   Symptoms

   On Friday, January 18, Moonlight's API began returning occasional errors that looked like connection problems with its Redis database. The API checks Redis on every authenticated request to validate the session. At the same time the Kubernetes monitoring reported some nodes and pods as unresponsive.

   High error rateIntermittent connection failuresNode NotReadyService outageSustained high node CPU

   Trigger

   The Kubernetes scheduler put several CPU-heavy pods on the same node, including all three replicas of the website and the server-side rendering pods.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Pod scheduling and placementLinux kernelDatabase

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureUnverified assumptionAutomation amplification

   Detection

   API errors that looked like Redis connectivity problems, and Kubernetes monitoring that showed nodes and pods as unresponsive. Google Cloud Support later found the link between sustained 100% CPU and kernel panics.

   Remediation

   • added anti-affinity rules to all major deployments so their pods spread across nodes

   Action items

   • Keep working with Google Cloud support to find and fix the cause of the node kernel panics

   Lessons

   Three replicas give no fault tolerance if the scheduler places them all on one node; anti-affinity rules make the spread explicit. A node failure that comes from the workload itself moves with the workload when the scheduler reschedules it.

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