Incident Library
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Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    From about 21:00 UTC on March 4, 2026, customers using Linodes backed by NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada GPUs saw the GPUs lock up. At first the problem seemed limited to worker nodes of the Linode Kubernetes Engine (LKE); later Linode confirmed that every Linode with this hardware was affected, while Standard Compute and other GPU instances were not.

    Trigger

    Deployment of a repaired legacy GPU monitoring script, fixed during a routine improvement effort to restore a missing metric on internal observability dashboards.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers saw the lockups from about 21:00 UTC; the first status post went up at 02:07 UTC on March 5, about 5 hours after the lockups began.

    Remediation
    • Disabled the monitoring script across the GPU fleet
    • Rebooted the affected nodes
    Action items
    • Take improvement and prevention measures to stop a recurrence; the postmortem does not list them
    Lessons

    A monitoring script can take down the hardware it watches. A fix meant only to restore a missing metric brought back a firmware query written for an earlier GPU generation, and on the RTX 4000 Ada architecture that query against an active GPU triggers a lockup. The script ran across the GPU fleet, so every Linode with this GPU was affected in several regions, and the investigation first suspected a regression in the host hypervisor or the GPU firmware.

  2. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  3. Symptoms

    On 2025-03-12 from 10:58 UTC, alerts for high backend response times came in, and the MediaWiki deployments mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner, which serve MediaWiki for non-user-facing purposes, showed high latency and database errors. The External Storage cluster, whose hosts store the compressed text of wiki page revisions, had a sharp rise in load and connections. The same happened again on 2025-03-13 from 11:15 UTC.

    Trigger

    At 10:44 UTC on 12 March a Scap deployment of the PHP 8.1 rollout for mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner was run with the flag -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False; the rollout was deployed with Scap again at 11:15 UTC on 13 March.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts for high backend response times started at 10:58 UTC on 12 March, 14 minutes after the Scap deployment; 2 on-call engineers were paged. The MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate alert that pointed at the cause fired only briefly because its log pipeline was overloaded.

    Remediation
    • Deployed a patch to cirrus-streaming-updater that reduced SUP parallelism
    • Reduced the concurrency of the categoryMembershipChange job in changeprop-jobqueue
    • On 12 March, reverted 1126607 and 1126650 and re-ran Scap
    • On 13 March, rolling-restarted changeprop-jobqueue
    • Rolling-restarted mw-api-int
    • Disabled the categorymembership job in changeprop-jobqueue
    • Reverted 1127476 and 1127478
    • Redeployed mw-api-int to pick up the revert
    • Increased the number of mw-api-int replicas
    • Redeployed mw-jobrunner to pick up the revert
    • Redeployed mw-parsoid to pick up the revert
    Action items
    • Reduce the number of messages sent through channel:Memcached during failures
    • Add helm rollback functionality to Scap
    • Decide whether Scap should update helmfile-defaults when -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False is set
    • Consider removing envvars.inc from MediaWiki images
    • Consider "Why" dashboards that give an overview of a group of related components together with relevant links to follow
    • Coordinate incident responders better
    • Be able to work with MediaWiki developers during incidents
    Lessons

    The write-up puts the weight not on the technical root cause but on why the team could not see, even after the 12 March incident, that three MediaWiki deployments were running without Memcached. Alert dashboards showed what was happening, such as many busy PHP workers, but not why; dashboards linking components that affect each other, such as SQLBlobStore keys and External Storage, would have helped. The alert that pointed in the right direction did not stay firing and would probably have been lost among 78 others. The incident coordinator could not tell who was working on what or who had joined or left, the channels were noisy, the external impact was judged more critical than it was, and trace.wikimedia.org was not used although it might have helped.

  4. Symptoms

    An operation to upgrade the stats agent in Kubernetes was announced in advance, with a warning that metrics might be unavailable to services for a few minutes. A few minutes later a reply came in saying that all of the sender's Kubernetes services seemed to be down.

    Trigger

    A scheduled upgrade of the stats agent sidecar, during which the agent container crashed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A reply to the operation announcement, a few minutes later, said that all of the sender's Kubernetes services appeared to be down.

    Action items
    • Mark logging, tracing and stats agent containers as non-critical and leave them out of the service mesh's pod readiness check
    Lessons

    Every container in a pod affects the pod's readiness, so each sidecar needs a deliberate decision about how its health should count. A sidecar that crashes is not ready even when it has no probes, and any logic that requires all containers to be ready will take the pod out of traffic.

  5. Symptoms

    Overnight into 26 March 2019 (PDT), every Prow test job that needed a GCP project from Boskos, the Kubernetes test-infra service that hands out GCP projects to test jobs, failed. The required job pull-kubernetes-e2e-gce failed on every run, so no pull request could be merged in kubernetes/kubernetes for just over nine hours, and other projects saw similar failures.

    Trigger

    At 23:04 PDT the node running the only Boskos pod was drained to be replaced with a 1.13 node during the upgrade of the Prow clusters from Kubernetes 1.11 to 1.13. The replacement pod started from the StatefulSet's current spec, which named a newer Boskos image containing the bug.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported the failure on GitHub at 02:50 and on Slack at 05:16 and 06:27, and an engineer saw the Slack reports on waking at 07:16. The Boskos monitoring dashboard showed the failure, but no alert caught it.

    Remediation
    • Built and deployed a new Boskos image with the bug fixed
    • Cleaned up the GCP projects that had been left open
    Action items
    • Change the Boskos configuration so that deployments actually take effect (#11956)
    • Automate Boskos deploys (#11957)
    • Improve alerting on Boskos status (#11953)
    Lessons

    The write-up lists what went poorly: a ten-hour upgrade was started shortly after 17:00 when on-call coverage ended at 18:00; deployments were not checked to confirm that something had actually rolled out; the Boskos StatefulSet was not set up to perform updates, so changing its spec left the old pod running; the December change appears never to have been tested; and Boskos was deployed by hand, unlike most of Prow, which left more room for error. Once people were available, the problem was fixed quickly.

Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve CI system and Telemetry agent. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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