Incident Library
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Cases12 cases

1 to 5 of 12

  1. Symptoms

    The on-call engineer for a high-traffic service was alerted that requests were failing in large batches every 30 seconds.

    Trigger

    DEBUG level logging was on in production when traffic surged, raising log volume to about 100 times normal while the service logged synchronously.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The on-call engineer was alerted that requests were failing in large batches every 30 seconds.

    Action items
    • Replace synchronous logging with TraceAwareAsyncAppender, which captures trace_id and span_id on the calling thread and drops logs instead of blocking when the queue is full (neverBlock=true)
    • Keep the amount of log output at a sustainable level, since an asynchronous queue still fills under sustained overload
    Lessons

    Removing AsyncAppender to keep trace IDs also removed the protection that kept request threads away from stdout back-pressure. A company-wide standard applies the same side effect to dozens of services, so check what a standard rests on and what working behaviour it takes away. ThreadLocal context does not cross into an asynchronous worker, but capturing it on the calling thread before handing the event off keeps both the IDs and the asynchronous output. Under extreme load, dropping log lines is preferable to stopping request handling.

  2. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  3. Symptoms

    On 2025-03-12 from 10:58 UTC, alerts for high backend response times came in, and the MediaWiki deployments mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner, which serve MediaWiki for non-user-facing purposes, showed high latency and database errors. The External Storage cluster, whose hosts store the compressed text of wiki page revisions, had a sharp rise in load and connections. The same happened again on 2025-03-13 from 11:15 UTC.

    Trigger

    At 10:44 UTC on 12 March a Scap deployment of the PHP 8.1 rollout for mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner was run with the flag -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False; the rollout was deployed with Scap again at 11:15 UTC on 13 March.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts for high backend response times started at 10:58 UTC on 12 March, 14 minutes after the Scap deployment; 2 on-call engineers were paged. The MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate alert that pointed at the cause fired only briefly because its log pipeline was overloaded.

    Remediation
    • Deployed a patch to cirrus-streaming-updater that reduced SUP parallelism
    • Reduced the concurrency of the categoryMembershipChange job in changeprop-jobqueue
    • On 12 March, reverted 1126607 and 1126650 and re-ran Scap
    • On 13 March, rolling-restarted changeprop-jobqueue
    • Rolling-restarted mw-api-int
    • Disabled the categorymembership job in changeprop-jobqueue
    • Reverted 1127476 and 1127478
    • Redeployed mw-api-int to pick up the revert
    • Increased the number of mw-api-int replicas
    • Redeployed mw-jobrunner to pick up the revert
    • Redeployed mw-parsoid to pick up the revert
    Action items
    • Reduce the number of messages sent through channel:Memcached during failures
    • Add helm rollback functionality to Scap
    • Decide whether Scap should update helmfile-defaults when -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False is set
    • Consider removing envvars.inc from MediaWiki images
    • Consider "Why" dashboards that give an overview of a group of related components together with relevant links to follow
    • Coordinate incident responders better
    • Be able to work with MediaWiki developers during incidents
    Lessons

    The write-up puts the weight not on the technical root cause but on why the team could not see, even after the 12 March incident, that three MediaWiki deployments were running without Memcached. Alert dashboards showed what was happening, such as many busy PHP workers, but not why; dashboards linking components that affect each other, such as SQLBlobStore keys and External Storage, would have helped. The alert that pointed in the right direction did not stay firing and would probably have been lost among 78 others. The incident coordinator could not tell who was working on what or who had joined or left, the channels were noisy, the external impact was judged more critical than it was, and trace.wikimedia.org was not used although it might have helped.

  4. Symptoms

    When MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining endpoints of its backend API sent to EKS from 1% to 25%, Sentry filled with errors saying the API could not reach the database and outside services. The errors were about DNS name resolution, and the traffic had to be shifted back to the EC2 version.

    Trigger

    MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining API endpoints routed by the ALB to the EKS version from 1% to 25%.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Sentry showed a large number of errors about connecting to the database and outside services right after the traffic share was raised.

    Remediation
    • Shifted the requests back to the EC2 version to stop the errors
    • Added an HPA to autoscale the CoreDNS pods as a stopgap, which let the migration to EKS finish
    Action items
    • Set ndots to 1 through dnsConfig in the application Deployments
    • Set cache 600 in the Corefile in the coredns ConfigMap to lengthen the CoreDNS cache TTL
    • Add lameduck 30s to the CoreDNS health plugin so CoreDNS keeps serving while it is scaled in
    • Consider reducing the differences between production and staging, weighed against cost
    Lessons

    MonotaRO assumed that a managed service would not cause problems and so skipped researching other companies' migrations, load testing and monitoring. Staging differed from production in its network layout, so ndots differed between them, and staging databases could not take a high-load test. Looking at the CoreDNS logs and resolv.conf instead of guessing found that ndots:5 made lookups of outside names try every search domain first.

  5. Symptoms

    On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

    Remediation
    • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
    • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
    • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
    • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
    • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls
    Lessons

    The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

Check your cluster for this

These 12 cases involve Database and Telemetry agent. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0179 With DEBUG logging and synchronous log output, a high-traffic service filled the 64 KB stdout pipe, so request threads blocked in write() while holding database connections and HikariCP ran dry, failing requests in 30-second bursts
  2. IL-0442 Older pods on LIFULL's KEEL Kubernetes cluster were preempted all at once and the external error rate spiked
    LIFULL2021
  3. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021
  4. IL-0066 Broken ConfigMap change lay dormant for weeks, then took down Pusher's edge proxy when a cluster upgrade replaced its pods
    Pusher2019

Faulty deployment2 cases

  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy
  2. IL-0324 Three MediaWiki deployments lost Memcached after a PHP 8.1 rollout and overloaded the External Storage database cluster

Capacity exhaustion4 cases

  1. IL-0433 Shifting API traffic from EC2 to EKS on Fargate overloaded two CoreDNS pods and caused mass name-resolution errors
  2. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down
  3. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API
  4. IL-0518 gitlab.freedesktop.org on GKE ran short of volume space and a planned 30-minute storage upgrade became a 4-hour outage

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0193 A GCP persistent disk degradation took down a Cassandra StatefulSet whose OrderedReady policy blocked recovery, and Metrictank could not reconnect to the recreated pods, causing a 23-hour Graphite query outage