Cases10 cases

1 to 5 of 10

1. IL-0470 Buildkite notifications were delayed after Prometheus storage filled and EKS notification workers could not autoscale

   Buildkite2026

   Symptoms

   From 20:01 UTC on 28 May 2026, Buildkite build and job notifications (GitHub commit status, email, Slack and webhook notifications) reached a subset of customers late. Internal queue latency monitoring showed the delay as queues grew while notification-processing workers stayed underprovisioned.

   High latencyAutoscaler misbehaviour

   Trigger

   The Prometheus service used by Buildkite's EKS autoscaling path ran out of storage, so some EKS-based notification workers could not autoscale while their queues were growing.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Prometheus

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitPartial rolloutIneffective rollbackUnverified assumptionHarmful manual action

   Detection

   Internal queue latency monitoring detected the rising notification delivery latency.

   Remediation

   • Moved the affected notification-processing workloads from EKS back to the ECS-based infrastructure
   • Adjusted scaling configuration and worker counts by hand
   • Completed the rollback and scaled the remaining affected ECS services
   • Increased Prometheus storage capacity and recorded the change in infrastructure as code

   Action items

   • Alert before Prometheus storage exhaustion can affect autoscaling
   • Fix GitHub notification retry behaviour for a class of errors that could cause repeated retries
   • Make the EKS-to-ECS rollback verify destination capacity, autoscaling configuration and traffic movement
   • Review the CPU, memory and storage allocations of EKS control-plane dependencies such as KEDA and Karpenter
   • Move customer-critical workloads to EKS more gradually, with clearer settling periods
   • Improve customer-level monitoring of notification delivery latency to detect customer-impacting regressions earlier
   • Review which notification types sit on customers' scheduling or CI hot path and need tighter latency, separate queueing or specific alerting
   • Update the status page earlier when notification latency is likely to affect customer workflows
   • Describe the customer-visible impact in status page updates, not only the affected internal service
   • Improve internal escalation for customers who report critical CI impact

   Lessons

   Buildkite said recovery took longer than expected because the rollback path from EKS to ECS did not fully handle this failure, and that its public status page did not show the customer-visible impact as quickly or clearly as it should have, since notification latency affects customers differently depending on how their CI and deployment workflows use notifications.

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2. IL-0063 VPN outage after recreating a Redis StatefulSet restarted the whole Redis cluster without readiness checks

   AdGuard VPN2025

   Symptoms

   The day began with an alert that several instances of the Redis cluster were running out of disk space. That part was fixed quickly. The outage came an hour later: right after the Redis StatefulSet was deleted and recreated at 8:10 UTC, Kubernetes restarted every Redis pod within about five minutes, and problems started to appear.

   Service outageOOMKilledProbe failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   To make Git match the volumes that had been resized by hand, the Redis StatefulSet was deleted with orphan (non-cascading) deletion and recreated with the new storage template; Kubernetes reconciled the new spec by restarting the entire Redis cluster.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Persistent volumes and stateful setsIn-memory cacheContainer memory limit

   Contributing factor

   No health probesUnverified assumptionSingle point of failureRetry stormNo headroom

   Detection

   An alert about Redis instances running out of disk space started the work; the outage itself showed up as backend errors about Redis connections right after the StatefulSet was recreated.

   Remediation

   • made the Redis masters forget obsolete node identities, reset the affected replicas and rejoined them, then waited for replication to catch up
   • identified the component that was actually running out of memory, scaled the backend service and raised memory limits for that component
   • temporarily relaxed probes so backend instances took traffic immediately instead of flapping between ready and not ready
   • reverted the temporary workarounds at 10:00 UTC

   Action items

   • Add startup probes so a Redis pod is not marked ready until its dataset is loaded
   • Build an own control plane for Redis that handles restarted pods stuck to an old master address
   • Reduce dependence on the single Redis cluster: move some important data to other stores, such as a separate Redis cluster per server, and use Kafka for some backend components

   Lessons

   The disk resize was not the problem; the cleanup afterwards was. An immutable field pushes operators toward deleting and recreating the controller, and that can set off a full reconcile. Startup and readiness probes are what slow a rolling restart down to a safe pace; without them a distributed store restarts in the most fragile way. Recovery plans must expect a cluster to heal slowly, and dependent services need to degrade gracefully while it does.

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3. IL-0324 Three MediaWiki deployments lost Memcached after a PHP 8.1 rollout and overloaded the External Storage database cluster

   Wikimedia Foundation2025

   Symptoms

   On 2025-03-12 from 10:58 UTC, alerts for high backend response times came in, and the MediaWiki deployments mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner, which serve MediaWiki for non-user-facing purposes, showed high latency and database errors. The External Storage cluster, whose hosts store the compressed text of wiki page revisions, had a sharp rise in load and connections. The same happened again on 2025-03-13 from 11:15 UTC.

   Database overloadHigh latencyHigh error rateLog floodMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   At 10:44 UTC on 12 March a Scap deployment of the PHP 8.1 rollout for mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner was run with the flag -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False; the rollout was deployed with Scap again at 11:15 UTC on 13 March.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   DatabaseIn-memory cacheConfigMaps and SecretsHelmCI system

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionDependence on a warm cacheSignal buried in noise

   Detection

   Alerts for high backend response times started at 10:58 UTC on 12 March, 14 minutes after the Scap deployment; 2 on-call engineers were paged. The MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate alert that pointed at the cause fired only briefly because its log pipeline was overloaded.

   Remediation

   • Deployed a patch to cirrus-streaming-updater that reduced SUP parallelism
   • Reduced the concurrency of the categoryMembershipChange job in changeprop-jobqueue
   • On 12 March, reverted 1126607 and 1126650 and re-ran Scap
   • On 13 March, rolling-restarted changeprop-jobqueue
   • Rolling-restarted mw-api-int
   • Disabled the categorymembership job in changeprop-jobqueue
   • Reverted 1127476 and 1127478
   • Redeployed mw-api-int to pick up the revert
   • Increased the number of mw-api-int replicas
   • Redeployed mw-jobrunner to pick up the revert
   • Redeployed mw-parsoid to pick up the revert

   Action items

   • Reduce the number of messages sent through channel:Memcached during failures
   • Add helm rollback functionality to Scap
   • Decide whether Scap should update helmfile-defaults when -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False is set
   • Consider removing envvars.inc from MediaWiki images
   • Consider "Why" dashboards that give an overview of a group of related components together with relevant links to follow
   • Coordinate incident responders better
   • Be able to work with MediaWiki developers during incidents

   Lessons

   The write-up puts the weight not on the technical root cause but on why the team could not see, even after the 12 March incident, that three MediaWiki deployments were running without Memcached. Alert dashboards showed what was happening, such as many busy PHP workers, but not why; dashboards linking components that affect each other, such as SQLBlobStore keys and External Storage, would have helped. The alert that pointed in the right direction did not stay firing and would probably have been lost among 78 others. The incident coordinator could not tell who was working on what or who had joined or left, the channels were noisy, the external impact was judged more critical than it was, and trace.wikimedia.org was not used although it might have helped.

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4. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

   Adevinta2023

   Symptoms

   On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresHigh latency

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsUnknown limitIgnored early signalUnverified assumption

   Detection

   A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

   Remediation

   • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
   • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
   • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
   • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
   • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls

   Lessons

   The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

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5. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx

   LINE Plus2022

   Symptoms

   The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

   Connection resetsDatabase overloadIntermittent connection failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   HAProxyCloud load balancerconntrack tableIngress controller

   Contributing factor

   Change with a delayed effectExcessive blast radiusRetry stormUnverified assumption

   Detection

   The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

   Remediation

   • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
   • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
   • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
   • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops

   Lessons

   A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

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