Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    While the Spring Cloud Config Server was briefly down for an upgrade, every client application began to answer its liveness probe with a failure saying it could not reach the config server.

    Trigger

    A downtime upgrade of the Spring Cloud Config Server made it stop responding for a short time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Lessons

    A liveness probe that includes an external dependency turns a short outage of that dependency into a restart loop of every client. Keep external dependencies out of liveness checks and handle temporary problems with readiness probes. Libraries can add health indicators to Spring Boot's actuator health endpoint automatically, so check what the probe path actually reports. The author ran another Kubernetes environment for two years without liveness probes, relying on strict readiness probes and on the application terminating itself on unrecoverable faults.

  2. Symptoms

    Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

    Trigger

    An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
    • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
    • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided
    Action items
    • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
    • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths
    Lessons

    Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

  3. Symptoms

    During a traffic surge from a breaking news alert, pods of a Gunosy service on Kubernetes could not start because the containers could not read their settings from the ConfigMap. The pods that kept running took the extra load and were restarted, failed to start again, and pod after pod died.

    Trigger

    A breaking news alert increased traffic and pods were scaled out automatically while a release that removed an old database's settings from the ConfigMap had been rolled out to only one canary pod.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Action items
    • Configure Argo Rollouts to roll out automatically, with setWeight 1, a one-hour pause and then setWeight 100
    • Add the "helm.sh/resource-policy": keep annotation so Helm keeps past versions of the ConfigMap
    • Build and use a Helm plugin, helm-clear, that keeps only the last few ConfigMap versions by the revision number in their names, set to keep 5 in CD
    Lessons

    Gunosy holds that a review that only resolves to be careful next time would soon be followed by the same failure, because human attention cannot be relied on, so each incident gets a permanent fix built into the system. Keeping past ConfigMap versions also made it possible to roll back quickly without going through CI/CD, which a ConfigMap change had previously prevented.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve In-memory cache and ConfigMaps and Secrets. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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