Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    A production service at Airbnb showed a high error rate and could not be deployed. The deploy failed with a cryptic Kubernetes error about being unable to access invalid index 5.

    Trigger

    A change to the mutating admission controller, which had been rolled out within the previous month, had gone in seven days before the incident surfaced; when it had to delete two items from an array in a spec, it generated an invalid JSON patch that removed index 2 and then index 3.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The affected service reported a high error rate and its deploy failed; the slow degradation of other services over the previous seven days had gone unnoticed.

    Remediation
    • deleted the mutating admission controller from the affected cluster
    Action items
    • Create alerts from the existing metrics that would have shown the problem earlier
    Lessons

    Keep in mind that a mutating admission controller exists in the cluster; a recently added one is easy to forget during an incident. Search for the exact error message early instead of working on the visible symptoms. Page a teammate when progress stalls.

  2. Symptoms

    On 30 May 2019, in the run-up to the Kubernetes 1.15 code freeze, Prow test jobs in the k8s-prow-build cluster failed in surprising ways or were aborted partway through. Jobs were reported to GitHub as failed while Deck still showed them as running, because pods exited without uploading `finished.json`, the file most Prow tooling uses to tell a job's state.

    Trigger

    A spike in test load before the Kubernetes 1.15 code freeze pushed disk I/O on the build nodes far beyond the IOPS that GCP allows for 250 GB disks.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Several users reported jobs that GitHub showed as failed but Deck showed as still running, and the first report came on Slack at 13:26. Alerting for these failures did not exist or did not work.

    Remediation
    • Requested and received additional disk quota
    • Brought up 55 nodes with 500 GB disks in a new node pool
    • Migrated all nodes from the 250 GB disk pool to the 500 GB disk pool by draining old nodes, finishing at 23:55
    Action items
    • Create or fix monitoring so the oncall is paged when tide stops doing things
    • Set a process and guidelines for adding new members to the oncall rotation, with preparation and extra support
    Lessons

    Prow metrics were not recorded before the incident, which made it hard to understand, and alerting for these failures did not exist or did not work. After the cause was found and a fix devised, nothing happened for another two hours. The team counts it as luck that someone who recognised IOPS as the problem happened to be around to look.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Admission webhook and Cloud block storage. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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