Cases4 cases

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1. IL-0085 A control plane node of Magic Pages' Kubernetes cluster on Hetzner Cloud ran out of memory, the cluster's own calls then used up the Hetzner API rate limit, and all customer websites were down for about 7.5 hours

   Magic Pages2025

   Symptoms

   At around 09:33 UTC one of the three control plane nodes of the Kubernetes cluster that hosts Magic Pages went offline. Looking at the node showed that it had run out of memory.

   Service outageNode NotReadyCloud API rate limit exhausted

   Trigger

   One of the three control plane nodes ran out of memory and went offline at about 09:33 UTC; the attempts to replace it with hetzner-k3s failed while the cluster's own components were exhausting the Hetzner API rate limit.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Cloud controller managerPersistent volumes and stateful sets

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitRetry stormMonitoring blind spotLimited debug accessSingle point of failureNo runbook

   Detection

   The founder found the control plane node offline at about 09:33 UTC. Monitoring alerts about unreachable customer websites started around the time the replacement attempts failed, and about half an hour of investigation identified the exhausted Hetzner API rate limit.

   Remediation

   • powered off all servers of the Kubernetes cluster to stop the API requests so the Hetzner rate limit could recover
   • waited until ratelimit-remaining had built up a buffer before starting recovery
   • restarted the control plane servers
   • started the essential Longhorn components by hand so Longhorn could heal and make storage volumes available
   • restarted the remaining websites by hand

   Action items

   • Monitor the Hetzner API call rate coming from the Kubernetes cluster nodes themselves to get early warning of high usage
   • Get a higher Hetzner API rate limit; Hetzner support was contacted
   • Investigate how to reduce the cluster's reliance on a single API, including alternatives to hetzner-k3s
   • Document and test a procedure for recovering Longhorn after a full cluster shutdown

   Lessons

   The running cluster, not only the deployment tooling, consumed the cloud provider's API quota, and in a failure it consumed it fast enough that the quota never recovered. The default limit of 3600 requests per hour was not enough for failure and recovery scenarios, and API usage from inside the cluster was not monitored. A tool that hides the provider's API errors slows diagnosis. After a full, non-graceful shutdown, Longhorn needed manual intervention to come back, which lengthened the outage.

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2. IL-0153 DOKS worker nodes went NotReady at 06:00 UTC on three days because a systemd timer in the Debian image ran apt upgrade and killed it mid kernel upgrade, breaking node networking

   DigitalOcean2023

   Symptoms

   Customers of DigitalOcean Managed Kubernetes (DOKS) saw worker nodes go NotReady between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC and stay unavailable, taking down the services on them, until the nodes were replaced or rebooted; some nodes needed several replacements or reboots. The first sporadic reports on October 8 said replacing the node fixed it. The same thing happened again around 06:00 UTC on October 9, more widely and across many regions, and again on October 10. Only clusters on versions 1.27.6-do.0 and 1.28.2-do.0 were affected.

   Node NotReadyService outage

   Trigger

   A systemd timer in the DigitalOcean Debian image started apt upgrade daily at 06:00 UTC, with a random delay of up to 60 minutes.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Node operating system imageLinux kernelkubelet

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsLimited debug accessChange with a delayed effect

   Detection

   Sporadic customer reports of failed worker nodes arrived at 07:43 UTC on October 8; internal incident response started at 07:10 UTC on October 9 after broader impact across regions.

   Remediation

   • Advised customers to replace or reboot affected worker nodes
   • Arranged SSH and console access to worker nodes while they were healthy, and live-debugged an affected node on October 10
   • Released a DaemonSet to all affected clusters that disables the apt upgrade systemd timer on every worker node
   • Released new node images without the auto-update process

   Action items

   • Disable the timer during node provisioning, then remove the DaemonSet from all clusters
   • Add a check to the internal conformance test suite for new cluster versions that the auto-upgrade process and other unwanted timers stay disabled
   • Support logging into worker nodes even when normal access paths are broken

   Lessons

   An operating system auto-update timer left enabled in a node image can change the kernel and systemd underneath Kubernetes, and a timeout that kills the upgrade half-way can leave a node without networking. Failures that start at the same time every day point to a scheduled job on the nodes, and systemd timers belong on that list next to cron jobs. When the failure takes out a node's network, an investigation that depends on logging into the node stalls; access paths that work while the node is broken shorten diagnosis.

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3. IL-0501 Every node of the UToronto Kubernetes cluster on Azure went NotReady and the JupyterHub became unreachable

   2i2c2022

   Symptoms

   On 30 August 2022 at 11:15 AM Pacific time, the UToronto JupyterHub at jupyter.utoronto.ca stopped responding and users could not reach it at all. The outage was reported through 2i2c's support desk.

   Service outageNode NotReady

   Trigger

   Microsoft Azure rolled out an Ubuntu update to all Ubuntu 18.04 nodes, which triggered a systemd bug that broke networking.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   Node operating system image

   Contributing factor

   Limited debug access

   Detection

   The outage was reported at 11:15 AM through 2i2c's Freshdesk support desk because jupyter.utoronto.ca was not responding. At 11:25 AM the customer's representative forwarded the Microsoft advisory on the same ticket, which pointed the team to the cause.

   Remediation

   • Started an upgrade of the cluster's Kubernetes and node versions, which replaced all old nodes with new working ones

   Action items

   • Document how to SSH into the Kubernetes nodes
   • Find a way to be notified of Azure advisories

   Lessons

   Once the cause was known, a single action brought the hub back quickly. The team had no documented way to SSH into its Kubernetes nodes, and the customer's representative saw the Azure advisory and pointed it out on the support ticket, which saved a lot of time.

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4. IL-0591 Gitpod workspaces in all regions became IO bound and unresponsive for days after the ws39 workspace cluster release

   Gitpod2022

   Symptoms

   From April 11, 2022 at 13:17 UTC customers and Gitpod staff reported that Gitpod workspaces were intermittently becoming unresponsive. CPU usage of nodes and pods looked normal, with nothing maxed out, and at 13:58 UTC the team found that the workspaces were IO bound rather than CPU bound.

   Throughput degradationSustained high node CPUNode NotReadyData loss

   Trigger

   The ws39 generation of workspace clusters, released to all regional clusters on April 8th at 20:08 UTC and to the XL clusters on April 9th at 17:45 UTC, split the 1TB disk into smaller RAID0 disks, changed CPU limiting and workspace networking, and moved to faster machine types.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Node root diskContainer CPU limit

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutGap in automated testsUnrepresentative stagingUnknown limitOverlapping failuresIneffective rollbackHarmful manual actionLimited debug access

   Detection

   Customers and Gitpod staff reported on April 11th at 13:17 UTC that workspaces were intermittently unresponsive, and the team opened an incident in Slack through its incident.io integration. On April 17th the team noticed increased CPU load on the workspace nodes and opened an internal incident.

   Remediation

   • Shifted workspace starts back to the ws38 clusters on April 11th
   • Built ws39a clusters with c2d machines and local SSDs and moved traffic to them
   • Requested a limit increase from Let's Encrypt
   • Routed EU XL traffic to the regional EU cluster and built ws-eu39bxl to replace the crashed ws-eu39xl
   • Cleaned up workspaces stuck in a stopping state so users could start them again
   • Released ws40 with 1TB boot disks to get more IO bandwidth
   • Removed the workspaces that consumed excessive CPU time for crypto-mining
   • Blocked the fraudulent users behind the crypto-mining from using Gitpod
   • Rolled back the ws-daemon change that broke CPU limiting and shipped the fix in the ws34 clusters
   • Blocked ACME HTTP requests to workspace ports so Let's Encrypt rate limits would not be hit again
   • Rolled out IO limiting with the ws41xl and ws41 clusters and moved traffic to them step by step

   Action items

   • Invest in test automation so that test results stop releases like this one
   • Vary the interval between traffic shifts to new clusters, with more time for larger releases
   • Add a risk assessment stage, to be automated, that governs changeset size and rollout speed of workspace cluster rollouts
   • Reduce the impact teams have on each other
   • Add review criteria that find backwards incompatible changes before pull requests are merged, and split such pull requests
   • Recommend rollback as the primary means of mitigation in the incident procedures, and look at automating it
   • Make the status page show the workspace service as down when it is, and update the playbooks
   • Keep incident communication in a single Slack channel and Google Meet
   • Put 10% of the engineering staff on the on-call rotation from May 9th and use that time on observability, alerting and stability

   Lessons

   Gitpod concluded that it should have committed to rolling back on April 11th instead of building and shipping fixes, which kept customers on degraded workspaces longer than necessary. A large release so soon after the previous one needed a risk assessment and slower traffic shifts, and backwards incompatible changes that block a rollback need to be found before pull requests are merged. Failure-free operations require experience with failure.

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