Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 14 March 2023 at about 18:00 UTC, communication errors rose on one CircleCI service, and pipelines for all customers began to start late until jobs did not run at all. Within an hour the errors had spread to many services and to every function of the application, including the CircleCI UI and API.

    Trigger

    At about 17:40 UTC on 14 March the infrastructure team resumed the upgrade of the main production Kubernetes cluster with a changed approach for some components, after a first attempt on 13 March had been rolled back. The ongoing upgrade left kubelet and kube-proxy at mismatched versions.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 18:00 UTC engineers saw communication errors rise on one service, then job processing delays climbing and job queues backing up across several services. The kube-proxy "Sync failed" errors were found only in the analysis after the incident.

    Remediation
    • Restarted every node in the cluster so each node built a fresh iptables ruleset
    • Restarted a separate pool of dependencies so jobs using contexts or the machine executor ran again
    • Added capacity to work through the backlog of jobs
    • Restarted the RabbitMQ nodes to fix a few corrupted queues
    Action items
    • Improve the Kubernetes upgrade process to limit the risk of future upgrades
    • Add metrics and alerts for kube-proxy sync errors
    • Evaluate ways to make the RabbitMQ infrastructure more resilient
    Lessons

    No single trigger caused the incident. Because networking underlies everything in the cluster, Kubernetes upgrades carry inherent risk, and CircleCI's risk mitigation did not hold up when several events interacted.

  2. Symptoms

    At 11:32 UTC on 18 November 2021, a user reported in the jenkinsci/jenkins Gitter channel that https://www.jenkins.io/doc/pipeline/steps/ was answering HTTP/503 errors with the message "Guru meditation" from Fastly's varnish.

    Trigger

    The ingress-nginx Helm chart was upgraded from 4.0.6 to 4.0.8 at 10:42 UTC, and the new chart added an admission webhook rule that forbids Nginx configuration blocks in Ingress annotations.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A user reported in the jenkinsci/jenkins Gitter channel at 11:32 UTC that a jenkins.io page answered HTTP/503 errors, and status.jenkins.io reported the incident at 11:49 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Disabled the automated systems, rolled the ingress-nginx chart back to 4.0.6 and deleted the admission webhook by hand
    • Removed the forbidden annotations from the jenkins.io configuration
    • Upgraded the jenkins.io Helm chart to the last version known to work with ingress-nginx 4.0.8
    • Redeployed the jenkins.io Helm chart through the automated system and told Fastly to drop all cached pages
    Action items
    • Always read the changelog in depth when updating the ingress controllers, with two people pairing in real time
    • Add custom Datadog monitoring for www.origin.jenkins.io so that such an outage is detected
    • Make the monitor send the Host header www.jenkins.io so it is not redirected to Fastly
    • Check a set of pages, such as the pipeline steps page, not only the front page
    • Consider an ephemeral k3s end-to-end test before deploying to production
    Lessons

    Trusting a patch version of a Helm chart for the Ingress controller without reading its changelog in depth let a new admission rule remove the jenkins.io Ingress in production. Without monitoring on origin.jenkins.io, a user found the outage. A complete staging cluster with the same DNS setup would have caught the problem before production.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Admission webhook and CDN and edge network. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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