Incident Library
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Cases14 cases

1 to 5 of 14

  1. Symptoms

    From 01:36 UTC on 12 March 2026, GitHub.com returned elevated error rates for Git operations, web requests and related services. At 01:54 UTC the GitHub status page said it was investigating reports of impacted performance for some services.

    Trigger

    During a planned infrastructure upgrade, a configuration issue made newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes run an incompatible version of etcd.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The status page opened the incident at 01:54 UTC, 18 minutes after errors began, citing reports of impacted performance.

    Remediation
    • paused deployments for the duration of the incident
    • identified the newly provisioned nodes running the incompatible etcd version and removed them, which restored cluster consensus
    • ran a validation deploy that confirmed all systems were healthy before resuming normal operations
    Action items
    • Enforce version compatibility programmatically during node replacements
    • Add monitoring that detects split-brain conditions earlier
    • Update the recovery tooling to reduce restoration time
  2. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  3. Symptoms

    In Microsoft's cloud LLM inference service, the inference engines themselves failed in 94 of the 156 high-severity incidents from April to June 2025 (≈60%). Requests timed out or ran into resource exhaustion under load, and callers got HTTP 408, 429 and 5xx errors.

    Trigger

    Bursty load, traffic with unusually high sampling parameters and long-running requests pushed the inference engines into resource exhaustion and timeouts.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Across the 156 incidents, 115 (≈74%) were auto-detected, meaning health probes or DRI pipelines alerted before customers reported the problem; the others were not.

    Remediation
    • Enabled dynamic pushback at the load balancer with caps on pending tokens and requests
    • Tuned request batching and GPU/CPU replica counts
    • Improved gRPC backoff and error mapping
    • Limited sampling parameters and throttled per client
    • Enabled streaming, tuned request batching and capped pending tokens against engine connection timeouts on long-running requests
    • Increased capacity, routed traffic to healthy endpoints and restarted nodes, the actions applied mostly to inference engine failures
    Action items
    • Optimise serving for long-running requests and high sampling regimes, with connection liveness and GPU capacity-aware routing as the main levers
    • Expand health-probe-driven failover and GPU capacity-aware routing so traffic moves off degraded endpoints on its own
    • Forecast token and throughput growth and automate capacity increase decisions
    • Deploy adaptive alerting and expand engine-level telemetry to close detection gaps
    Lessons

    Hotfixes restore correctness but lengthen time to mitigate, while traffic routing and node rebalancing mitigate faster under overload and timeout patterns. Even with AIOps tooling a meaningful share of incidents still needs manual detection or judgement, so health-probe-driven traffic routing, restarts and capacity increases are the decisions to automate first.

  4. Symptoms

    Alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST on 11 December 2024, and from 3:16 PM every OpenAI service was significantly degraded or completely unavailable, including ChatGPT, the API and Sora. The status page reported API calls returning errors and difficulties logging in to platform.openai.com and ChatGPT. Customer impact peaked at 3:40 PM.

    Trigger

    At 2:23 PM PST a change introducing a new telemetry service, which collects detailed Kubernetes control plane metrics, was merged and the deployment pipeline started. Between 2:51 PM and 3:20 PM the change was applied to all clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    OpenAI's detection tools worked: alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST, a few minutes before customer impact began at 3:16 PM, and the root cause was identified at 3:16 PM.

    Remediation
    • Scaled clusters down to reduce the total Kubernetes API load
    • Blocked network access to the Kubernetes admin APIs so no new expensive requests arrived
    • Scaled up the Kubernetes API servers
    • Removed the telemetry service once enough control was back
    • Moved traffic from impacted clusters to healthy ones
    • Intervened manually in clusters where simultaneous resource downloads saturated resource limits
    Action items
    • Put every infrastructure configuration change through a phased rollout with continuous monitoring of both the service workloads and the clusters, including the Kubernetes control plane
    • Run fault injection tests in which the data plane runs without the control plane for longer, and tests that roll out bad changes on purpose to check detection and rollback
    • Build break-glass mechanisms so engineers can reach the Kubernetes API servers in any circumstances
    • Decouple the Kubernetes data plane from the control plane so that service discovery for critical workloads does not depend on the control plane
    • Speed up recovery with better caching and dynamic rate limiters for resources needed at cluster startup, and regular drills that rapidly replace an entire cluster
    Lessons

    Several systems and processes failed at once and interacted in unexpected ways: tests did not catch the change's effect on the Kubernetes control plane, DNS caching put a delay between the change and the failures, and being locked out of the control plane made remediation very slow. Because service discovery used Kubernetes DNS, the control plane was carrying load for product traffic even though the data plane was meant to be independent of it.

  5. Symptoms

    About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

    Trigger

    An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

    Remediation
    • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
    • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
    • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
    • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
    • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
    • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
    • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand
    Action items
    • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
    • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
    • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
    • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
    • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe
    Lessons

    Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

Check your cluster for this

These 14 cases involve etcd and Kubernetes API server. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Configuration change5 cases

  1. IL-0200 Newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes ran an incompatible etcd version and broke cluster consensus in several GitHub production clusters, causing 5XX errors on Git operations and page loads
    GitHub2026
  2. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services
    OpenAI2024
  3. IL-0009 A duplicated generated name made Argo CD replace the InfluxDB Cloud production Application and delete the whole production environment
  4. IL-0461 Every rollout of Datadog's metrics query service on Kubernetes raised errors that the logs blamed on DNS
  5. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy

Capacity exhaustion4 cases

  1. IL-0413 LLM inference engines timed out or ran out of resources under load in about 60% of 156 severe incidents at Microsoft
  2. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API
  3. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries
  4. IL-0518 gitlab.freedesktop.org on GKE ran short of volume space and a planned 30-minute storage upgrade became a 4-hour outage

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023

Software defect3 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0032 Mutating admission controller generated broken JSON patches, silently blocking deploys for a week until a production service ran down to two pods
    Airbnb2020
  2. IL-0012 CPU limits and an unpatched kernel CFS quota bug throttled multi-threaded services into stalls, failed health checks and timeouts
    Omio2020
  3. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017