Incident Library
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Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. Symptoms

    Shortly after 29CM's Igu Week sale began on 3 November 2025, the servers for the display domain, which serve search results and product listings, showed anomalies. Some pods went down and stopped taking traffic, and the remaining pods received more traffic than they could handle and saturated their Netty event loops.

    Trigger

    Igu Week, 29CM's largest Black Friday sale and its busiest traffic of the year, raised Redis network traffic to about four times normal.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Anomalies on the display servers, pods going down and Netty event loops saturating, were the first sign. The Redis cause was found from Redis health check failure logs and then the Redis network metrics.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the Redis nodes up from cache.r7g.large to cache.r7g.2xlarge, about twice the baseline network bandwidth
    Action items
    • Extended the monitoring dashboard to show in real time whether network in and out bandwidth exceeds the baseline, with metrics such as aws.elasticache.network_bandwidth_out_allowance_exceeded and aws.elasticache.traffic_management_active
    • Added Datadog alerts that fire when network bandwidth crosses a threshold
    • Added a Caffeine local cache in front of Redis for data that changes rarely
    • Look into compressing cached data with Snappy to reduce Redis network bandwidth
    • Look into storing cached data as Protocol Buffers instead of JSON; measured on the cached Item Document data, Snappy and protobuf together are expected to cut the size by about 73%
    • Keep improving the architecture for traffic growth, building on the cache restructuring, stronger monitoring and read separation already applied
    Lessons

    CPU and memory metrics alone did not show the problem, so Redis needs network monitoring against the node's bandwidth baseline. Burst credits kept the nodes working for about two hours after traffic passed the baseline, which delayed the failure and made its cause slower to find.

  2. Symptoms

    On 14 March 2023 at about 18:00 UTC, communication errors rose on one CircleCI service, and pipelines for all customers began to start late until jobs did not run at all. Within an hour the errors had spread to many services and to every function of the application, including the CircleCI UI and API.

    Trigger

    At about 17:40 UTC on 14 March the infrastructure team resumed the upgrade of the main production Kubernetes cluster with a changed approach for some components, after a first attempt on 13 March had been rolled back. The ongoing upgrade left kubelet and kube-proxy at mismatched versions.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 18:00 UTC engineers saw communication errors rise on one service, then job processing delays climbing and job queues backing up across several services. The kube-proxy "Sync failed" errors were found only in the analysis after the incident.

    Remediation
    • Restarted every node in the cluster so each node built a fresh iptables ruleset
    • Restarted a separate pool of dependencies so jobs using contexts or the machine executor ran again
    • Added capacity to work through the backlog of jobs
    • Restarted the RabbitMQ nodes to fix a few corrupted queues
    Action items
    • Improve the Kubernetes upgrade process to limit the risk of future upgrades
    • Add metrics and alerts for kube-proxy sync errors
    • Evaluate ways to make the RabbitMQ infrastructure more resilient
    Lessons

    No single trigger caused the incident. Because networking underlies everything in the cluster, Kubernetes upgrades carry inherent risk, and CircleCI's risk mitigation did not hold up when several events interacted.

  3. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

  4. Symptoms

    For about six months, applications on Omio's Google Kubernetes Engine clusters stalled at random: they got stuck, stopped answering health check requests or lost network connections, and nothing the team looked at explained why.

    Trigger

    Multi-threaded workloads running with CPU limits on nodes whose kernel did not yet have the fix for a known CFS quota bug that causes unnecessary throttling.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Months of random stalls and failed health checks led the team to read the cgroup cpu.stat throttling counters inside the pods, which showed far more throttling than the limits should allow.

    Remediation
    • removed CPU limits until the kernel with the CFS bug fix was deployed across all clusters
    Action items
    • Deploy the kernel with the CFS quota bug fix across all clusters
    • Monitor utilisation, saturation and error metrics, API latency and error rates to confirm the change behaves as expected
    Lessons

    A CPU limit is a time quota per 100 ms period, not a share of cores, so a multi-threaded container can be stopped for most of each period long before it uses the cores it was given, and a kernel bug can make that worse. Throttling is invisible in standard Kubernetes metrics and has to be read from the cgroup counters. Removing limits trades away protection against a container that takes a whole node, which is only acceptable when runtimes are tuned.

Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve kubelet and Linux kernel. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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