Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

  2. Symptoms

    From April 11, 2022 at 13:17 UTC customers and Gitpod staff reported that Gitpod workspaces were intermittently becoming unresponsive. CPU usage of nodes and pods looked normal, with nothing maxed out, and at 13:58 UTC the team found that the workspaces were IO bound rather than CPU bound.

    Trigger

    The ws39 generation of workspace clusters, released to all regional clusters on April 8th at 20:08 UTC and to the XL clusters on April 9th at 17:45 UTC, split the 1TB disk into smaller RAID0 disks, changed CPU limiting and workspace networking, and moved to faster machine types.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers and Gitpod staff reported on April 11th at 13:17 UTC that workspaces were intermittently unresponsive, and the team opened an incident in Slack through its incident.io integration. On April 17th the team noticed increased CPU load on the workspace nodes and opened an internal incident.

    Remediation
    • Shifted workspace starts back to the ws38 clusters on April 11th
    • Built ws39a clusters with c2d machines and local SSDs and moved traffic to them
    • Requested a limit increase from Let's Encrypt
    • Routed EU XL traffic to the regional EU cluster and built ws-eu39bxl to replace the crashed ws-eu39xl
    • Cleaned up workspaces stuck in a stopping state so users could start them again
    • Released ws40 with 1TB boot disks to get more IO bandwidth
    • Removed the workspaces that consumed excessive CPU time for crypto-mining
    • Blocked the fraudulent users behind the crypto-mining from using Gitpod
    • Rolled back the ws-daemon change that broke CPU limiting and shipped the fix in the ws34 clusters
    • Blocked ACME HTTP requests to workspace ports so Let's Encrypt rate limits would not be hit again
    • Rolled out IO limiting with the ws41xl and ws41 clusters and moved traffic to them step by step
    Action items
    • Invest in test automation so that test results stop releases like this one
    • Vary the interval between traffic shifts to new clusters, with more time for larger releases
    • Add a risk assessment stage, to be automated, that governs changeset size and rollout speed of workspace cluster rollouts
    • Reduce the impact teams have on each other
    • Add review criteria that find backwards incompatible changes before pull requests are merged, and split such pull requests
    • Recommend rollback as the primary means of mitigation in the incident procedures, and look at automating it
    • Make the status page show the workspace service as down when it is, and update the playbooks
    • Keep incident communication in a single Slack channel and Google Meet
    • Put 10% of the engineering staff on the on-call rotation from May 9th and use that time on observability, alerting and stability
    Lessons

    Gitpod concluded that it should have committed to rolling back on April 11th instead of building and shipping fixes, which kept customers on degraded workspaces longer than necessary. A large release so soon after the previous one needed a risk assessment and slower traffic shifts, and backwards incompatible changes that block a rollback need to be found before pull requests are merged. Failure-free operations require experience with failure.

  3. Symptoms

    An alert fired because some Metrictank instances could not drain their write queue, which meant they could not write to Cassandra. Google had not yet published an incident, but a team member's Discord server, also hosted on GCP, was down, which pointed at GCP; Google confirmed an SSD persistent disk incident about 90 minutes after it began.

    Trigger

    A Google Cloud incident in which SSD persistent disks performed so poorly that many I/O operations failed for an extended period.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert that Metrictank write instances could not flush their write queue to Cassandra. Error rates alone rose too slowly to notice quickly, because most queries were served from memory.

    Remediation
    • Added compute nodes hoping new nodes could attach the disks, which did not work
    • Deleted and recreated the Cassandra StatefulSet with an updated pod management policy, so all pods but one started
    • Raised Kafka topic retention to avoid data loss during the long downtime
    • Temporarily added nodes so Metrictank restarts were not slowed by CPU starvation
    • Restarted all Metrictank instances, which took more than 20 hours, so they connected to the new Cassandra IPs
    Action items
    • Re-instantiate the gocql connection in Metrictank when it is detected dead, so it reconnects even when all Cassandra IPs change
    • Fix the Metrictank write-queue deadlock by updating an internal data structure with atomics instead of a lock
    Lessons

    An OrderedReady StatefulSet cannot recover past a single pod whose volume will not attach; when every pod is down, the ordering that protects normal start-up blocks the whole cluster. A client that learns peer addresses only from live peers needs a way to go back to the service name when all peers are replaced at once. A long-tolerated bug with a config workaround can surface at the worst time; this one turned out to have a simple fix. Writing incoming data to a Kafka write-ahead log first meant all data could still be ingested after recovery, and Kafka on non-SSD disks escaped the disk incident. With both Metrictank bugs fixed, the team expects a similar event to take less than 3 hours to recover from instead of 23.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Node root disk and Container CPU limit. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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