Incident Library
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  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    On 19 August 2026 the first equipment-level signs in Nebius's us-central1 region appeared around 09:40 UTC: the InfiniBand fabric degraded and GPU over-temperature alerts began to accumulate. Customer reports followed shortly after 10:00. At 10:15 on-call engineers were paged on critical component temperature alerts, and the incident was declared at 10:21.

    Trigger

    A storm-related event at the data center building took the building management system offline and shut down the chilled-water cooling loop.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    No facility-level alert fired, because the storm also disabled the building management system that monitors the facility. Engineers acted on component over-temperature alerts that paged on-call at 10:15 UTC, after InfiniBand degradation, GPU over-temperature alerts and customer reports; the temperature rise from about 09:15 was visible on dashboards but had no alert.

    Remediation
    • had the facility operator switch cooling to manual bypass mode and opened rack rear doors to vent heat
    • re-energised tripped racks, control-plane racks first
    • restored the regional infrastructure control plane by manual intervention
    • restarted block-storage host components to clear stale disk attachment state
    • raised the VM recovery rate limits by hand for the region-scale recovery
    • started the affected Managed Kubernetes control-plane instances by hand
    • applied a controlled stop and start to control-plane instances whose data disk had been left unattached
    • identified and started 104 customer VMs that the incident had stopped
    Action items
    • Complete a joint resilience review with the facility operator covering redundancy of facility-management and monitoring systems, cooling that keeps running when those fail, electrical protection of cooling equipment and on-site response
    • Add facility-level environmental alerting on cooling plant state and room temperature trend that pages on-call independently of the building management system
    • Set up a documented emergency escalation path with the facility operator, with an on-call contact tree and guaranteed response times
    • Define an emergency heat-load reduction procedure with criteria, ownership and mechanics for shutting down or degrading workloads during a cooling loss
    • Establish a dependency-ordered region cold-start procedure with clear ownership for each service layer
    • Run regular region-scale recovery drills that cover VMs, storage attachments and Managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Fix the disk-attachment bug that extended the Managed Kubernetes outage and deploy the fix to all production regions
    • Improve the recovery policies Compute users can configure, and move all Managed Kubernetes control-plane nodes to the improved policy
    • Automate reconciliation of stale storage attachment state after abrupt host failures
    • Remove in-region dependencies from monitoring startup and recovery, and extend cross-region monitoring
    • Make regional health checks used for global traffic management reflect real service availability
    Lessons

    Facility monitoring that runs on the same system it watches goes silent in exactly the failure it should report, and with no alert on the room temperature trend there was no practical window to shed heat load in a controlled way. A cold start of a whole region exercised recovery paths built for isolated failures: single-attempt VM recovery, conservative rate limits and stale disk attachments all needed manual work. The longest part of the outage was restoring customer resources, Managed Kubernetes control planes above all, so Nebius is extending its recovery drills to that layer.

  2. Symptoms

    On 15 January 2025, from about 09:55 to 11:36 CET, a database outage at Magic Pages took down customer websites. It began when the founder tried to reconnect a failed third node to the high-availability MySQL cluster and the database server reported ambiguous errors about missing metadata information.

    Trigger

    One of the three nodes of the MySQL cluster went down, and reconnecting it failed with errors about missing metadata information.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Restarted the storage server to fix PVC provisioning
    • Let the MySQL nodes restore and sync with each other for about 45 minutes to rebuild the cluster metadata
    • Cleaned up the corrupted cluster metadata
    • Redeployed MySQL Router
    Action items
    • Monitor the health of the storage system more closely
    • Improve the failover procedures for MySQL Router
    • Investigate and fix the status page so it shows reliable information
    Lessons

    The cluster survived the first node failure as designed and lost no data, but its metadata turned out to be a single point of failure. Better monitoring of PVC health could help prevent similar issues, the 45-minute recovery leaves room for improvement, and the status page has to detect failing customer sites reliably.

  3. Symptoms

    An upgrade of the network subsystem under Target's datacenter OpenStack, meant to cause only a brief disruption, ran into problems and left network connectivity disrupted for several hours. Kafka, which runs on that OpenStack, became intermittently available.

    Trigger

    A network subsystem upgrade in the datacenter OpenStack infrastructure disrupted connectivity for several hours and made Kafka intermittently available.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • enabled gossip encryption on Consul so messages from the poisoned mesh were rejected
    • stabilized the deployment engine and redeployed the development environment with encryption, terminating instances without it
    • upgraded Consul in place to 1.2.3 and then to 1.3.0
    Action items
    • Reduce how much of an outage a single Docker daemon can cause, together with running smaller and more numerous clusters
    Lessons

    Smaller and more numerous clusters limited the damage: the smaller development clusters and production were not hit the same way as the one large cluster, and dev and prod on one cluster would have been far worse. A Docker daemon shared by many workloads is a brittle failure point. Per-workload logging and metrics sidecars were judged the right design; a shared cluster-level agent would almost certainly have made the problem worse and harder to fix.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Cloud block storage and Container runtime. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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