Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. Symptoms

    From 15:05 UTC on 6 August 2026 GitHub Actions workflow runs failed to start, failed partway through or stayed queued for a long time, on both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners. Some requests to the Actions REST API returned errors, and some customers saw unexpected rate limiting in their workflows.

    Trigger

    A routine deployment to an internal Actions service that processes events and generates Actions jobs replaced pods, and the remaining capacity became saturated.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Expanded capacity of the affected services
    • Throttled incoming webhook-triggered work
    • Increased processing capacity for the backlog of affected events
    • Deployed changes that stopped runners from repeatedly trying to acquire invalid jobs
    • Deployed a fix for self-hosted runners that were not picking up jobs and enabled it incrementally
    • Paused migrations with GitHub Enterprise Importer
    • Restored webhook-triggered Actions workflows to full throughput
    • Rolled back the mitigation that left some ARC runners offline, and recovered those runners by hand
    • Shared CLI and UI steps for customers to clear jobs that could not be retried or canceled
    Action items
    • Improve deployment and capacity safeguards for the affected services
    • Strengthen monitoring for the conditions that preceded the incident
    • Improve the resiliency and recovery of queued work and runner assignment
    • Add automatic recovery for self-hosted runners in upcoming Runner and ARC releases
    • Reduce the risk of cascading failures and speed up recovery during large Actions disruptions
  2. Symptoms

    From 01:36 UTC on 12 March 2026, GitHub.com returned elevated error rates for Git operations, web requests and related services. At 01:54 UTC the GitHub status page said it was investigating reports of impacted performance for some services.

    Trigger

    During a planned infrastructure upgrade, a configuration issue made newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes run an incompatible version of etcd.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The status page opened the incident at 01:54 UTC, 18 minutes after errors began, citing reports of impacted performance.

    Remediation
    • paused deployments for the duration of the incident
    • identified the newly provisioned nodes running the incompatible etcd version and removed them, which restored cluster consensus
    • ran a validation deploy that confirmed all systems were healthy before resuming normal operations
    Action items
    • Enforce version compatibility programmatically during node replacements
    • Add monitoring that detects split-brain conditions earlier
    • Update the recovery tooling to reduce restoration time
  3. Symptoms

    From 18:05 UTC on March 17, 2025, GitHub.com web and API requests failed now and then for a small percentage of users, mostly requests about issues and pull requests. At 18:39 UTC the status page reported degraded performance for Issues.

    Trigger

    A framework upgrade rolled out to GitHub's Kubernetes infrastructure caused kernel panics.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The status page opened the incident at 18:39 UTC, 34 minutes after the failures began, as an investigation of reports of degraded performance for Issues.

    Remediation
    • Downgraded the framework upgrade that caused the kernel panics
    • Disabled the problematic feature of the framework
    Action items
    • Investigate why the upgrade caused the kernel panics
    • Take steps to temporarily prevent the problem from coming back
    • Work out longer-term patch plans
    • Improve observability so that similar classes of problems can be reacted to quickly
  4. Symptoms

    At 08:18 UTC on 13 July 2020, production Kubernetes pods began to be marked unavailable. The loss of pods spread through the clusters and reduced capacity until GitHub.com services went down.

    Trigger

    A container in the production pods exceeded its memory limit and was terminated; a routine DNS maintenance operation completed earlier had left the clusters unable to reach the image registry.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • restarted the process with the cached DNS records so the clusters could reach the registry
    • fetched the container images, redeployed and recovered the services
    Action items
    • Improve monitoring so pod restarts cannot fail again in the same pattern
    • Minimise the dependency on the image registry
    • Expand validation during DNS changes
    • Re-evaluate all existing Kubernetes deployment policies
    • Improve progressive deployments so the impact of a deployment can be evaluated incrementally
    Lessons

    A container that production traffic does not need can still take pods out of service, because a pod is available only when all of its containers are healthy. ImagePullPolicy Always turns every container restart into a registry dependency, so an unrelated DNS change that breaks registry access turns a one-minute self-healing event into a long outage, and a mass redeploy spreads it.

Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve CI system and etcd. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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