Incident Library
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Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025
    Symptoms

    At 5:00 PM BST on 12 August 2025 a 2i2c engineer declared an incident. While deploying a new cluster called temple and running into NFS issues, the engineer had deleted the prod namespace; the deletion hung, and listing the pods showed many users from a different cluster. The engineer's first message suggested that the kubeconfig had somehow been mutated or corrupted and that some other cluster was being torn down.

    Resources deletedService outage
    Trigger

    While working around a bug in the NFS deployment process for a new hub, an engineer ran a delete of the prod namespace with the kubeconfig context pointing at the LEAP cluster.

    Root cause
    Operator error
    Component
    Persistent volumes and stateful setsJobs and CronJobsIngress controllerTerraform
    Contributing factor
    No safeguard on destructive changeNo runbook
    Detection

    The engineer who ran the deletion noticed when it hung and the pod list showed users of another cluster, and declared the incident at 5:00 PM BST, before the uptime check on leap.2i2c.cloud failed at 5:32 PM.

    Remediation
    • deleted the single remaining user pod in prod so the namespace deletion completed
    • killed the nfs-share-creator job that was blocking the deployment
    • redeployed the prod hub with the updated NFS server IP address
    • deleted the prod ingress during the deployment so that users could not start servers mid-deployment
    Action items
    • Write an incident report
    • Write a short incident response document for the case "I deleted prod, what next?"
    • Upgrade jupyterhub-home-nfs and remove the nfs-share-creator job
    • Add opt-in hardening against nested kubeconfig contexts to the deployer system
    • Change the engineer's shell configuration to show distinct kubeconfig contexts more clearly
    Lessons

    Provisioning persistent storage outside Kubernetes with Terraform meant a deleted namespace cost an hour of downtime and no data. The engineer had no visible cue for which kubeconfig context was active, which turned a workaround on a new cluster into a deletion on a production one. The engineer knew the fix but did not feel confident redeploying without first confirming with the tech lead, in another time zone, that there was no risk of losing persistent data, and reaching the tech lead took time.

    View case
  2. IL-0244 A queued pull request destroyed the EKS subnet route table associations and Cloud Platform services went offline
    UK Ministry of Justice2024
    Symptoms

    On 20 September 2024 at 11:24 the Cloud Platform team received high priority Pingdom alerts for services on the live cluster, and from 11:26 teams reported in the #ask channel that services were unavailable. Users reported that services could not be resolved.

    Service outageNetwork unreachableResources deleted
    Trigger

    At 11:21 the infrastructure-vpc-live-1 pipeline was unpaused, and a pull request that had been waiting in its queue ran automatically.

    Root cause
    Operator error
    Component
    TerraformCI systemVPC route tables and firewall rules
    Contributing factor
    No safeguard on destructive change
    Detection

    High priority Pingdom alerts for live cluster services reached the Cloud Platform team at 11:24, and users reported that services could not be resolved.

    Remediation
    • Ran terraform apply locally to rebuild the subnet route table associations
    Action items
    • Review and update the process for pausing and resuming infrastructure pipelines so every team member knows its implications
    • Find a way to hold queued pull requests while manual infrastructure updates are under way
    • Find ways to isolate the plan and apply tasks of infrastructure pipelines better
    View case
  3. IL-0207 A routine task run from an engineer's local environment switched to production and deleted GitLab.com's Consul release, so Patroni lost Consul and GitLab.com returned 5xx errors to all traffic
    GitLab2022
    Symptoms

    GitLab's monitoring and alerting fired at once. One of the alerts reported a Patroni failover, and users of GitLab.com received 5XX errors; the CDN counted about 13 million requests answered with 503 during the outage.

    Service outageHigh error rateResources deleted
    Trigger

    An engineer ran a routine task with GitLab's tools in a local development environment; during a local deploy or rollback operation the tool's context changed from local development to production, and the change was applied to production.

    Root cause
    Operator error
    Component
    Database
    Contributing factor
    No safeguard on destructive change
    Detection

    GitLab's monitoring and alerting fired immediately; one of the alerts reported a Patroni failover.

    Remediation
    • re-applied the Consul release to the production Kubernetes cluster, with manual steps because the tooling did not support the redeploy directly
    Action items
    • Improve the Kubernetes deployment process to reduce the risk of running harmful deployment operations against production from local environments (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-infra/reliability/-/issues/16875)
    • Integrate Teleport with the Kubernetes clusters, which could give SREs a read-only role by default (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-infra/reliability/-/issues/16221)
    Lessons

    A tool that can switch its target from a local environment to production during a deploy or rollback turns routine local work into a production change. GitLab plans to improve its Kubernetes deployment process so that harmful deployment operations are less likely to be run against production from local environments, and to integrate Teleport with its clusters, which could give SREs a read-only role by default. Detection and diagnosis were fast because the alerts led straight from Patroni to its dependency, Consul. Bringing the deleted release back needed manual work, because the tooling did not make the redeploy straightforward, but it was still done relatively quickly.

    View case
  4. IL-0089 A test cluster deletion script run with the kube context pointing at the live-1 production cluster deleted its ingress controller, monitoring, logging, cert-manager, kiam and external-dns
    UK Ministry of Justice2020
    Symptoms

    At 18:27 on 21 September 2020 the Cloud Platform team detected that some services running on the live-1 production cluster had gone down, and some users could not reach them. The incident was declared at 18:40.

    Service outageResources deletedMonitoring outageStale endpoint routing
    Trigger

    A script for deleting a test cluster was triggered while the kube context was pointing at the live-1 production cluster instead of the test cluster.

    Root cause
    Operator error
    Component
    Ingress controllerCredential broker for podsexternal-dnsCloud load balancerPrometheus
    Contributing factor
    No safeguard on destructive change
    Detection

    The first detection was at 18:27, and the incident was declared 13 minutes later, at 18:40.

    Remediation
    • restored the default ingress controller together with external-dns and kiam, which it depends on
    • corrected the owner field in the Formbuilder Route 53 TXT records so external-dns pointed their A records at the new NLB
    • restored the remaining components with a targeted apply
    • ran the apply pipeline to restore all certificates, ServiceMonitors and Prometheus rules from the environment repository
    View case
Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve Ingress controller and Terraform. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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By root cause1

Operator error4 cases

Component
Ingress controller2Terraform2CI system1Cloud load balancer1Credential broker for pods1Database1external-dns1Jobs and CronJobs1Persistent volumes and stateful sets1Prometheus1VPC route tables and firewall rules1
Contributing factor
No safeguard on destructive change4No runbook1
Organisation
UK Ministry of Justice22i2c1GitLab1
  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025
  2. IL-0244 A queued pull request destroyed the EKS subnet route table associations and Cloud Platform services went offline
    UK Ministry of Justice2024
  3. IL-0207 A routine task run from an engineer's local environment switched to production and deleted GitLab.com's Consul release, so Patroni lost Consul and GitLab.com returned 5xx errors to all traffic
    GitLab2022
  4. IL-0089 A test cluster deletion script run with the kube context pointing at the live-1 production cluster deleted its ingress controller, monitoring, logging, cert-manager, kiam and external-dns
    UK Ministry of Justice2020