Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    From around 19:00 UTC on 31 January 2017, load on GitLab.com's PostgreSQL database rose, which GitLab suspected was spam, and many users could not post comments on issues and merge requests. Around 23:00 UTC the replication of the PostgreSQL secondary fell behind and then failed, because WAL segments it still needed had already been removed from the primary.

    Trigger

    While trying to restore replication to the secondary, an engineer ran the removal of the PostgreSQL data directory on the primary, db1.cluster.gitlab.com, believing it was the secondary.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The engineer who ran the deletion on the primary noticed the mistake and stopped it a second or two later.

    Remediation
    • Raised max_wal_senders from 3 to 32 and lowered max_connections from 8000 to 2000 so PostgreSQL would restart
    • Stopped the deletion on the primary a second or two after noticing it
    • Restored the database from the LVM snapshot taken about 6 hours before the outage by copying the PostgreSQL data directory from staging
    • Restored the webhooks from a separate database built from the snapshot and imported them as a SQL dump
    • Incremented all database sequences by 100,000 so IDs used before the outage could not be reused
    • Re-enabled GitLab.com gradually
    • Rebuilt projects created after 17:20 UTC in basic form from their Git repositories on the NFS cluster
    Action items
    • Change the shell prompt (PS1) on all hosts to show more clearly which host and environment is in use
    • Monitor backups with Prometheus
    • Set PostgreSQL's max_connections to a sane value
    • Investigate point-in-time recovery and continuous archiving for PostgreSQL
    • Take LVM snapshots of the production databases every hour
    • Take Azure disk snapshots of the production databases
    • Move staging to the ARM environment
    • Recover the production replicas
    • Test recovery of PostgreSQL database backups automatically
    • Improve the PostgreSQL replication documentation and runbooks
    • Investigate pgbarman for PostgreSQL backups
    • Investigate WAL-E for database backup and realtime replication
    • Build a streaming database restore
    • Assign an owner for data durability
    • Set up multiple secondaries and balance load among them with pgpool-II
    • Provide a tool for developers to run and revert Rails migrations on staging
    • Build owned recovery procedures for the rest of the GitLab.com infrastructure, not only the database
    • Publish a backup monitoring dashboard and add more backup data to it
    • Improve the abuse reporting and response system so removal for spam does not hard delete
    • Redact engineers' names in future public incident documents
    Lessons

    GitLab split the incident into two problems: GitLab.com went down because the primary's data directory was removed by mistake during a manual, undocumented replication rebuild, and recovery took over 18 hours because the backups had failed silently, disk snapshots were not enabled and the only copy sat on slow staging disks. The backup procedure was never tested because no one owned it. GitLab chose to focus on fast, regularly practised recovery and on making it obvious which host an engineer is on, rather than on blocking commands, since a safer rm only protects against one of many ways to lose data.

  2. Symptoms

    On July 30th, a few minutes after the OSU Open Source Lab started reloading the MySQL server mysql2 to fix its replication errors, the team saw that databases were being dropped on mysql1 as well. The script was stopped, and the MySQL service behind mysql1-vip stayed down through a long restore.

    Trigger

    On July 30th at 4:00PM PDT the team stopped slave replication on mysql2 and began dropping its databases one at a time to reload it and fix replication errors.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team watching the reload noticed after a few minutes that mysql1 was also dropping databases; the delays between drops in the script gave them that time.

    Remediation
    • Stopped the script that was dropping databases
    • Restored the databases from the mysql-zrm backups
    • Pulled each database that failed to restore out of the 200GB backup file and restored it separately
    • Recovered most data with the binary logs from the 17th through the 30th
    Action items
    • Evaluate better replication strategies, including row-based replication
    • Store binlogs as a backup on a separate server
    • Take backups with Percona XtraBackup for much faster full restores
    • Use mydumper instead of mysql-zrm for faster logical backups
    • Improve documentation and training for complex systems
    • Test full restores regularly on a spare server as part of the backup process
    • Gather more accurate time estimates for the restore process
    • Audit the hosted databases regularly, since test and very large databases delayed the restore
    • Migrate to a bigger, more powerful MySQL cluster
    • Set a policy and tools to keep the community informed of outages, maintenance and resource use, with dashboards
    • Define and monitor capacity limits for core services
    • Implement redundancy and restore practices for core services, including staff drills
    • Migrate more core services to Chef
    • Review documentation, policies and performance metrics periodically
    • Find better ways to draw on community expertise
    • Raise funds to replace the oldest infrastructure and reduce technical debt
    Lessons

    The lab had stretched its resources to host as many projects as possible, and that came with tradeoffs such as heavily compressed backups to save disk and less redundancy than wanted; the heavy compression made this restore CPU-bound. The lab concluded that it needs to change how it plans, monitors and manages resources, and that the length of the outage and the lack of progress reports were not acceptable.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database backups and snapshots. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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