Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 22:47 UTC on 25 August 2026 the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, job queue and notifications stopped working for every customer. No one could create a build from the UI or the REST API, job dispatch was delayed, and some builds that were already running when the outage began stayed stuck until the services recovered.

    Trigger

    At 22:44 UTC an application deploy created a surge of new pods, which used up the free capacity on the existing nodes and made the EKS cluster scale out. Background worker pools with unusually high maximum replica counts were scaling out at the same time and kept asking for more pods while new nodes were still being provisioned. Together they produced an unusually high rate of change in applications, network endpoints and nodes, and with it a sudden rise in demand on CoreDNS.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first status post, at 22:55 UTC, eight minutes after the outage began, said something had gone wrong, and at 23:05 UTC the status page said a sitewide outage was being investigated. CoreDNS query duration had been rising as the cluster grew, but a defect in a key monitoring query and too little monitoring of query volume meant this went unnoticed before the outage.

    Remediation
    • paused further application deploys
    • scaled CoreDNS from three to twelve pods
    • raised each CoreDNS pod's memory limit from 512 MiB to 2 GiB
    • expanded the system node pool that runs CoreDNS
    Action items
    • Increase immediate CoreDNS headroom: twelve pods instead of three, a 2 GiB memory limit instead of 512 MiB, and a larger system node pool
    • Enable EKS-managed CoreDNS autoscaling with a tested minimum replica count and enough capacity to spread the replicas across nodes and availability zones
    • Add direct alerts on CoreDNS query duration, query volume, goroutine growth, memory pressure, OOM restarts and available replicas, and track longer-term trends in capacity planning
    • Find other cluster-critical services that lack tested capacity, direct alerting, spread across failure domains, and either safe autoscaling or documented static headroom, and fix them
    Lessons

    A CoreDNS deployment sized once and left at a fixed size can carry a growing cluster for months and then fail on the first burst of churn it cannot absorb. When query processing slows, pending queries take up memory, the pods hit their limits and restart, and client retries keep the service down after the restart. Server-side DNS query duration and volume need their own alerts: here client-side latency was masked by unrelated application speed-ups, and a broken monitoring query hid the server-side trend. Maximum replica counts raised as a temporary measure remove the cap that normally stops runaway scaling when new nodes are slow to arrive.

  2. Symptoms

    When traffic changed sharply, CoreDNS came under heavy load, and the cluster saw network problems and a sudden rise in latency. The horizontal pod autoscaler then added pods, database connections surged, and the impact spread to the whole service.

    Trigger

    Sharp changes in traffic loaded the small number of CoreDNS pods beyond what they could handle.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Set up the Cluster Proportional Autoscaler for CoreDNS with nodesPerReplica and coresPerReplica chosen for the instance types in use
    • Spread CoreDNS with soft topologySpreadConstraints (ScheduleAnyway) instead of anti-affinity so Karpenter could consolidate nodes
    • Added alert thresholds on CoreDNS error rate, panics, request duration and request rate
    • Deployed NodeLocal DNSCache so each node answers DNS from a local cache and forwards misses to the main CoreDNS
    Lessons

    A fixed, small number of CoreDNS pods cannot follow a cluster whose nodes and pods change quickly with traffic, and the damage spreads: DNS latency triggers autoscaling, which in turn floods the database with connections. Simply adding many CoreDNS replicas created a different problem, because with tainted nodes and a maxSkew: 1 spread constraint the pods piled onto a few nodes and blocked Karpenter consolidation. Scaling CoreDNS in proportion to the cluster and putting a DNS cache on every node handled both.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve CoreDNS and Horizontal pod autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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