Incident Library
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  • Component
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  • Contributing factor
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Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 15:22 US/Pacific on 16 May 2024, new VMs and other new instances across Google Cloud came up without network programming, so the new instances could not open network connections, and VMs that were migrated or restarted lost connectivity. Changes to virtual network configuration, such as firewall rules and load balancers, were not applied. Internal monitoring alerted Google engineers at 15:41.

    Trigger

    Google's infrastructure team ran a routine maintenance action meant to shut down one unused VPC Controller in a single Google Cloud zone, and the automation shut down VPC controllers in all zones where the controllers were still in use.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal monitoring alerts reached Google engineers at 15:41 US/Pacific, and the investigation started immediately.

    Remediation
    • Paused maintenance operations to prevent the shutdown from repeating
    • Brought the affected VPC Controllers back into a serving state in every zone
    • Stopped the automation responsible for the shutdown until safeguards are in place
    • Recovered partial Apigee proxy deployments by hand
    • Cleaned up VMs left behind by failed Dataproc cluster deletions
    Action items
    • Add safety measures that check that maintenance operations carry correctly scoped zone information
    • Make the underlying tools reject maintenance operations that do not specify zones
    • Tighten on-demand access control so one maintenance invocation cannot work across multiple zones
    • Add safety checks, testing and validation for maintenance operations, including positive and negative test cases for the new safety measures
  2. Symptoms

    From 7:30 AM JST on 2 September 2021, AWS Direct Connect customers saw intermittent connectivity problems and elevated packet loss on traffic going to their VPCs in the Tokyo (AP-NORTHEAST-1) Region. Internal AWS alarms on Direct Connect packet loss fired at the same time.

    Trigger

    Customer traffic consistently generated packets with a very specific set of attributes and contents, and these packets set off a latent defect in the network device operating system on one layer of the Direct Connect network in Tokyo.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal alarms alerted AWS engineers to elevated packet loss for Direct Connect customers connecting to the Tokyo Region at 7:30 AM JST. The automation that monitors network devices also saw a higher rate of failed devices than normal and alerted engineers.

    Remediation
    • Removed the failing network devices from service so healthy devices carried the traffic, which helped only for a time
    • Reset failed devices and brought them back into service slowly, without stopping the failures
    • Disabled the new protocol in a single Availability Zone, then across the Tokyo Region
    Action items
    • Apply the change carefully to all other AWS Regions, with a new way to detect and remediate the issue before customers are affected
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Transit gateway or network interconnect. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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