Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    Event ingestion and the Honeycomb UI in EU1 became unavailable at 22:00:10 UTC on April 9, 2024, and the status page reported that the EU1 instance was down. Both the ingestion service and the service behind the web UI stopped at roughly the same moment.

    Trigger

    A routine system update to the Kubernetes cluster, rolled out earlier on April 9, followed by a regular deployment that replaced pods one at a time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first status post, saying the EU1 instance was down, went up at 15:08 PDT (22:08 UTC), about 8 minutes after the outage began. There was no alerting on the AWS Load Balancer Controller.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the AWS Load Balancer Controller
    • Rolled back the Kubernetes cluster system update
    Action items
    • Find the exact cause of the failure so the system update can be deployed safely
    • Add monitoring and alerting on the AWS Load Balancer Controller so on-call engineers learn of a failure quickly and can pause deployments
    Lessons

    A rolling deployment can look healthy while the component that wires new pods into the load balancer is broken; the failure only shows when the last old pod goes away. Honeycomb now treats the AWS Load Balancer Controller as a critical component that needs its own alerting, so deployments can be paused before they remove the last pods that still receive traffic. Extensive testing in development and staging did not reveal the bad interaction.

  2. Symptoms

    Between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC on 8 March 2023, Kubernetes nodes in several Datadog regions lost network connectivity at the same time, on AWS, Google Cloud and Azure. All services across multiple regions were affected, including the regions that host Datadog's CI/CD and automation tools. Datadog's regions are not connected to each other and changes are rolled out one region at a time, so a simultaneous failure on several cloud providers looked implausible at first.

    Trigger

    On 7 March 2023 Ubuntu published a systemd patch for a CVE (249.11-0ubuntu3.7). Ubuntu's default unattended upgrades installed it on the nodes between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC on 8 March, and installing it restarted systemd-networkd.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • restarted thousands of disconnected instances on Google Cloud and Azure through the cloud APIs, keeping their local disks
    • rebuilt the data lost with terminated AWS instances' local disks through replication, reprocessing and restores from backup
    Lessons

    A change in a base operating system component can stay dormant for months until something restarts that component. Here the trigger was a security patch, and the change reached every region at once because automatic OS updates ran outside the progressive, region-by-region process used for every other change. Cloud providers react differently to an instance that loses its network. Google Cloud and Azure left the instances running, so a restart recovered them with their disks; AWS replaced them quickly, which brought stateless services back fast but destroyed the local-disk data the stateful services needed.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cilium and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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