Incident Library
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Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    Services on Buffer's kops-managed cluster on AWS (about 60 nodes and 1500 containers) answered more slowly than they should have. The container throttling metric showed that many containers were being throttled whatever their CPU usage was, including containers that never came close to their CPU limit.

    Trigger

    CPU limits on user-facing services, enforced through CFS quota by a Linux kernel with a bug that throttled containers even when they were well under their limit.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    While reviewing the container throttling metric, the team noticed many containers being throttled even though their CPU usage stayed far below their limits.

    Remediation
    • removed CPU limits from all services directly or indirectly on the users' critical path
    • moved those services to dedicated tainted nodes and gave them matching tolerations
    • set each service's CPU request to its peak usage over a few months plus a margin of more than 20%, and set memory requests the same way
    Action items
    • Move nodes to a kernel that contains the CFS throttling fix (4.19 or later), which for Buffer means a kops version whose host image is Ubuntu 20.04
    • After the kernel upgrade, check whether throttling is fully gone and update the post
    Lessons

    A CPU limit can slow a service down even when the service uses a small part of it, because of how the kernel enforces CFS quota on older kernels; the throttling metric shows it, the CPU usage graph does not. Upgrading the kernel is the safer fix. Removing limits works for latency, but only together with honest CPU and memory requests, isolation of the unbounded services, and monitoring of node usage, since unbounded containers can starve the kubelet.

  2. Symptoms

    An alert fired because some Metrictank instances could not drain their write queue, which meant they could not write to Cassandra. Google had not yet published an incident, but a team member's Discord server, also hosted on GCP, was down, which pointed at GCP; Google confirmed an SSD persistent disk incident about 90 minutes after it began.

    Trigger

    A Google Cloud incident in which SSD persistent disks performed so poorly that many I/O operations failed for an extended period.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert that Metrictank write instances could not flush their write queue to Cassandra. Error rates alone rose too slowly to notice quickly, because most queries were served from memory.

    Remediation
    • Added compute nodes hoping new nodes could attach the disks, which did not work
    • Deleted and recreated the Cassandra StatefulSet with an updated pod management policy, so all pods but one started
    • Raised Kafka topic retention to avoid data loss during the long downtime
    • Temporarily added nodes so Metrictank restarts were not slowed by CPU starvation
    • Restarted all Metrictank instances, which took more than 20 hours, so they connected to the new Cassandra IPs
    Action items
    • Re-instantiate the gocql connection in Metrictank when it is detected dead, so it reconnects even when all Cassandra IPs change
    • Fix the Metrictank write-queue deadlock by updating an internal data structure with atomics instead of a lock
    Lessons

    An OrderedReady StatefulSet cannot recover past a single pod whose volume will not attach; when every pod is down, the ordering that protects normal start-up blocks the whole cluster. A client that learns peer addresses only from live peers needs a way to go back to the service name when all peers are replaced at once. A long-tolerated bug with a config workaround can surface at the worst time; this one turned out to have a simple fix. Writing incoming data to a Kafka write-ahead log first meant all data could still be ingested after recovery, and Kafka on non-SSD disks escaped the disk incident. With both Metrictank bugs fixed, the team expects a similar event to take less than 3 hours to recover from instead of 23.

  3. Symptoms

    Fewer than 20% of the nodes in one Zalando cluster were available. Most nodes reported NotReady at the same moment, and only a handful stayed Ready.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • none; the nodes recovered on their own after about 15 minutes
  4. Symptoms

    An upgrade of the network subsystem under Target's datacenter OpenStack, meant to cause only a brief disruption, ran into problems and left network connectivity disrupted for several hours. Kafka, which runs on that OpenStack, became intermittently available.

    Trigger

    A network subsystem upgrade in the datacenter OpenStack infrastructure disrupted connectivity for several hours and made Kafka intermittently available.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • enabled gossip encryption on Consul so messages from the poisoned mesh were rejected
    • stabilized the deployment engine and redeployed the development environment with encryption, terminating instances without it
    • upgraded Consul in place to 1.2.3 and then to 1.3.0
    Action items
    • Reduce how much of an outage a single Docker daemon can cause, together with running smaller and more numerous clusters
    Lessons

    Smaller and more numerous clusters limited the damage: the smaller development clusters and production were not hit the same way as the one large cluster, and dev and prod on one cluster would have been far worse. A Docker daemon shared by many workloads is a brittle failure point. Per-workload logging and metrics sidecars were judged the right design; a shared cluster-level agent would almost certainly have made the problem worse and harder to fix.

  5. Symptoms

    At about 15:00 UTC on 19 July 2018, monitoring alerted on rising 5xx responses from several APIs, most notably pilot and tiles. Logins failed first, because the pilot service fetches the user's profile, and from there all services became unresponsive. Every affected API ran on the production Kubernetes cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Monitoring alerted on an increase in 5xx responses from several APIs, most notably pilot and tiles.

    Remediation
    • restarted the kubelets on the stuck worker nodes, which did not last
    • restarted all worker nodes in a staggered order starting at about 18:00 UTC, which took about 1.5 hours
    Action items
    • Restart nodes on a rolling schedule to keep nodes and kubelets healthy until the fixes land upstream and reach the cloud provider, Microsoft Azure
    Lessons

    When nodes keep falling back to NotReady after kubelet restarts and pods fail on network and DNS errors, a known upstream bug may be the cause; matching the symptoms to the upstream issue tracker, with help from the community, found the cause and the fix candidates.

Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Container runtime. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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