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Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    Between about 4:26 PM and 4:56 PM PST on 4 March 2026, some OpenAI API requests to several models failed or took longer than usual, and some Codex traffic was affected too. The overall API success rate dropped temporarily.

    Trigger

    A protective circuit breaker that had paused some scheduling operations was released, and the infrastructure actions queued during the pause were executed at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • manually reassigned infrastructure resources to the affected models
    • brought the removed inference engines back online and reassigned them until error rates returned to normal
    Action items
    • Improve safeguards in the automated capacity management systems so they detect and respond to state drift
    • Improve observability of circuit breakers and scheduling systems so their status and effects are easier to identify
    • Add safeguards so queued actions cannot run in large batches after long pauses
    • Improve monitoring and alerting around capacity reconciliation problems
    Lessons

    Pausing one automated system does not stop the systems that feed it. Changes queued during the pause reflect the state at the time they were queued, and releasing the queue all at once applies those stale decisions together. The fixes OpenAI names are detecting state drift, making circuit breaker status visible, and preventing large batches from executing after a long pause.

  2. Symptoms

    From early August 2025 a number of users reported that Claude's responses had become worse. At first the reports were hard to tell apart from the normal variation in user feedback. By late August they had become frequent and persistent enough for Anthropic to open an investigation.

    Trigger

    A bug from 5 August that sent some Sonnet 4 requests to servers configured for the upcoming 1M-token context window; a misconfiguration deployed to the Claude API TPU servers on 25 August; token-selection and sampling-code changes deployed on 25 and 26 August that removed a December 2024 workaround and exposed a latent XLA:TPU compiler bug; and a routine load-balancing change on 29 August that increased the misrouted traffic.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    User reports of degraded responses from early August, including reports online. They were hard to tell apart from normal feedback variation, and their rising frequency and persistence by late August led Anthropic to open an investigation; internal evaluations did not detect the degradation.

    Remediation
    • Fixed the routing logic so short- and long-context requests go to the correct server pools (deployed 4 September, rolled out to all platforms by 18 September)
    • Rolled back the TPU server change that corrupted token generation (2 September)
    • Rolled back the top-k sampling change for Haiku 3.5 (4 September), Opus 3 (12 September) and Sonnet 4
    • Switched from approximate to exact top-k and standardized some additional operations on fp32 precision
    Action items
    • Add detection tests for unexpected character outputs to the deployment process
    • Develop more sensitive evaluations that reliably tell working and broken implementations apart
    • Run quality evaluations continuously on true production systems
    • Build infrastructure and tooling to debug community-sourced feedback faster without sacrificing user privacy
    • Fix the approximate top-k compiler bug together with the XLA:TPU team
    Lessons

    Benchmarks, safety evaluations and canary deployments missed degradation that users noticed, partly because the model often recovers from isolated mistakes, and Anthropic relied too heavily on noisy evaluations, with no clear way to connect rising reports to each of its recent changes. Overlapping bugs with different symptoms on different platforms looked like random degradation, and privacy controls on user interactions kept engineers from examining the interactions needed to identify or reproduce the bugs. Anthropic concluded that it needs evaluations running continuously on production and a continuous signal from users, such as the /bug command in Claude Code and the thumbs-down button in the Claude apps.

  3. Symptoms

    Every service in the homelab Kubernetes cluster stopped answering: the V-Rising server, Grafana, Jellyfin and Linkding were all unreachable, and the Kubernetes API was down, so the cluster could not be managed at all. The outage was found by hand, about 3 hours after it began, when someone tried to use the services.

    Trigger

    A power outage forced the Kubernetes master node to reboot.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Manually, when someone tried to access the services; there were no automated alerts.

    Remediation
    • Connected a monitor to the master node and read the boot logs, which showed the kernel panic
    • Booted the previous kernel version, which brought the system back
    • Removed the broken Nvidia packages with sudo apt-get remove --purge '^nvidia-.*' and ran sudo dpkg --configure -a
    • Found remaining broken packages with dpkg -l | grep -v ^ii and removed them by hand
    • Ran sudo apt-get install -f and reinstalled linux-headers-$(uname -r)
    • Rebooted and confirmed the kernel panic was gone
    Action items
    • Make sure GPU driver installations fully succeed, or revert immediately when they fail
    • Move the cluster to a high-availability control plane
    • Expose the Kubernetes API through a load balancer in the HA setup
    • Set up a ticketing system to record incidents and their resolution
    • Write predefined troubleshooting workflows to shorten response time
    • Add infrastructure monitoring such as Prometheus and Grafana
    • Add blackbox HTTP and TCP checks from outside the cluster for critical services
    Lessons

    A driver installation that fails half-way can leave kernel packages broken without any visible effect until the next reboot, which may come weeks later and at the worst time. A failed DKMS build should be fixed or reverted at once. With a single master node and no monitoring from outside the cluster, one unbootable machine meant a total outage that nobody was told about; the fix itself was simple once the boot logs were seen.

  4. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

  5. Symptoms

    A production service at Airbnb showed a high error rate and could not be deployed. The deploy failed with a cryptic Kubernetes error about being unable to access invalid index 5.

    Trigger

    A change to the mutating admission controller, which had been rolled out within the previous month, had gone in seven days before the incident surfaced; when it had to delete two items from an array in a spec, it generated an invalid JSON patch that removed index 2 and then index 3.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The affected service reported a high error rate and its deploy failed; the slow degradation of other services over the previous seven days had gone unnoticed.

    Remediation
    • deleted the mutating admission controller from the affected cluster
    Action items
    • Create alerts from the existing metrics that would have shown the problem earlier
    Lessons

    Keep in mind that a mutating admission controller exists in the cluster; a recently added one is easy to forget during an incident. Search for the exact error message early instead of working on the visible symptoms. Page a teammate when progress stalls.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve kubelet and Linux kernel. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Software defect8 cases

  1. IL-0124 Capacity changes queued while a circuit breaker was engaged ran all at once when it was released, taking multiple OpenAI inference engines out of service and raising API error rates
    OpenAI2026
  2. IL-0022 Three overlapping infrastructure bugs (context-window misrouting, TPU output corruption and an XLA top-k miscompilation) degraded Claude's responses
  3. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days
  4. IL-0112 The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeouts
    DFDS2022
  5. IL-0032 Mutating admission controller generated broken JSON patches, silently blocking deploys for a week until a production service ran down to two pods
    Airbnb2020
  6. IL-0041 fluent-bit silently stopped shipping application logs from one node to Elasticsearch
  7. IL-0012 CPU limits and an unpatched kernel CFS quota bug throttled multi-threaded services into stalls, failed health checks and timeouts
    Omio2020
  8. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017