Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 21:38 UTC on 21 March 2025, Cloudflare R2 object storage returned errors for 1 hour and 7 minutes: all object writes failed and about 35% of object reads failed globally. R2 global availability alerts fired at 21:45 UTC, at a 2% error budget burn rate.

    Trigger

    During a routine rotation of the credentials the R2 Gateway Worker uses to authenticate with the storage infrastructure, the new credentials were deployed to the Worker of the default environment instead of the production Worker, and the old credentials were then removed from the storage infrastructure at 20:37 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    R2 global availability alerts fired at 21:45 UTC, seven minutes after impact began, at a 2% error budget burn rate, and the R2 engineering team turned to operational dashboards and logs.

    Remediation
    • Deployed the new credentials to the production R2 Gateway Worker, which restored R2 availability
    Action items
    • Add logging tags with the suffix of the credential ID the R2 Gateway Worker uses
    • Require confirmation that the new token ID suffix matches storage infrastructure logs before deleting the old token
    • Run key rotation through the hotfix release tooling, which enforces the environment, instead of manual wrangler commands
    • Write the two-person validation of these changes into the standard operating procedures
    • Extend the closed loop health check system to test new keys, report their status through alerting and confirm global propagation before releasing the gateway Worker
    • Add observability views of upstream success rates that bypass caching
    Lessons

    Because the deletion of the old credentials took effect gradually, availability metrics were a poor way to confirm the change. Cloudflare said the team should have checked directly which token the R2 Gateway service was using to authenticate with the storage infrastructure instead of relying on those metrics.

  2. Symptoms

    From 18:02 UTC on 2 June 2021, the Jenkins infrastructure AKS cluster logged errors about pods that were unable to mount volumes and about scaled-up nodes that were unable to obtain a network virtual interface from the CNI.

    Trigger

    The Azure Service Principal credential of the AKS cluster expired at 17:53 UTC on 2 June 2021.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The error behind the failures was found in the AKS UI console while the team investigated the root cause of the LTS 2.289.1 release problem.

    Remediation
    • Renewed the AKS cluster's Azure Service Principal credential, which made AKS restart all nodes automatically
    Action items
    • Add an automatic PagerDuty check that alerts a week before the service principal expires, as is done for certificates
    • Keep a team-level calendar for manual operations such as resetting a credential
    • Consider managed identities, which renew automatically, instead of the service principal
  3. Symptoms

    On Sunday 25 October 2020 the GoCardless API, dashboard, payment pages and partner integrations were all unavailable for 22 minutes, from 07:32 to 07:54 GMT. Automated monitoring paged the on-call engineer at 07:32, a minute after every request to the API had started failing because no healthy backend was left.

    Trigger

    At 07:22 the TLS certificate Vault was still serving expired. cert-manager had already renewed it, but Vault does not load a new certificate without a restart or a SIGHUP.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the failing requests and paged the on-call engineer at 07:32. Certificate expiry monitoring existed for the Layer-7 load balancers but did not cover the TCP load balancer that Vault uses.

    Remediation
    • Forced cert-manager to recreate the Vault certificate
    • Restarted the Vault cluster by hand so it loaded the new certificate
    • Deleted some pods of critical workloads to skip their 5-minute exponential backoff
    Action items
    • Check the certificate of the TCP load balancer in front of Vault with the Blackbox exporter, as for the Layer-7 load balancers
    • Deploy the Reloader controller to roll Vault when its certificate data changes
    • Change theatre-envconsul so envconsul no longer manages the child process and only injects secrets at container startup
    Lessons

    A system that almost every service depends on, such as the secrets store, can take everything down at once, and failure scenarios like Vault becoming unreachable had not been tested enough. Assuming the certificate had expired, when it had been renewed but not reloaded, added a slow and unnecessary recreation step to the recovery.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve cert-manager and Cluster cloud identity. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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