Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 30 September 2026, between about 07:35 and 07:40 UTC, new connections to every domain hosted on Railway, both custom domains and *.up.railway.app domains, got HTTP 404 in all regions. Internal alerting paged the on-call team as soon as route lookups started to fail.

    Trigger

    At 07:29 UTC an engineer merged a change to the routing control plane that contained a database schema update and a new version of the routing service. At about 07:35 the deployment system rolled the new routing service out to every region before the schema update had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal alerting engaged the on-call response team as soon as route lookups began to fail at about 07:35 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Let the CI system finish the schema update, after which the routing service's retried lookups succeeded and routing recovered without a rollback
    Action items
    • Force the migration rollout to run in serial order and unify the deployment pipeline so deploy order and blast radius are checked before merge
    • Block the routing service's blue/green rollout until the database schema matching its version is in place
    • Add shard based rollouts per region to the distributed control plane to isolate impact
  2. Symptoms

    At 11:48 UTC on 22 September 2025, minutes after Railway had resolved a dashboard outage, its control plane showed abnormal resource consumption and elevated API latency. A large backlog of deployments queued during the first outage had started all at once, and the control plane began returning elevated database errors.

    Trigger

    After a dashboard outage caused by a schema change was fixed, a large backlog of queued deployments started at the same time and put the control plane and its database, behind a newly upgraded PgBouncer, under heavy load.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported at 11:05 UTC that the project canvas failed to load; the control plane's abnormal resource consumption and elevated API latency were seen at 11:48 UTC and opened as a new incident.

    Remediation
    • Deployed a fix for the API failure caused by the schema change within 15 minutes
    • Suspended deployments for non-Pro users so Pro users could deploy and the queue could drain
    • Suspended all deployments, Pro included, for up to 20 minutes during peak instability
    • Scaled up the control plane database's CPU, memory, connection limits and IOPS
    • Rolled PgBouncer back to the previous stable version, which brought all metrics back to nominal
    • Re-enabled deployments for all non-Pro users
    • Fixed the edge case in which private networks and their endpoints were missing from the dashboard
    Action items
    • Re-engineer parts of the control plane to be more resilient, moving large parts of its storage layer away from Postgres
    • Add CI validation that keeps disruptive schema changes out of production and automated schema compatibility checks before backend deployments
    • Monitor and alert on PgBouncer node CPU, memory and connection pool utilization
    • Upgrade PgBouncer in phases, instance by instance, instead of everywhere at once
    Lessons

    Railway believes that without the breaking schema change reaching production the cascade would not have happened, that monitoring PgBouncer's own CPU, memory and pool metrics would have shown the performance regression earlier and shortened recovery, and that upgrading PgBouncer instances one at a time would have exposed the version-specific problem before it reached every instance.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and CI system. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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