Graph
Cases3 cases
1 to 3 of 3
IL-0084Packet drops on a bare metal provider's vSwitch forced Namespace to rebuild its fra3 region and left global capacity short, and the next day slow NVMe writes on a control plane node drove the Kubernetes API server to very high CPUNamespace2024- Symptoms
From 17 October 2024, packets through the vSwitch that joined Namespace's bare metal machines at one provider in the fra3 region were dropped at random. Retries in TCP, QUIC and the Namespace control plane hid most of it, but the SLO error budget for latency targets on key interactions began to burn.
- Trigger
Random packet drops on the bare metal provider's vSwitch from 17 October 2024; for the second outage, a rate of Kubernetes changes that the slow NVMe on one control plane node could no longer keep up with.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
SLO-based monitoring of latency targets showed the error budget burning while retries hid the individual packet drops.
- Remediation
- diverted all customer traffic from fra3 to other regions
- connected each provider machine to the zrh1 cluster over Wireguard instead of the vSwitch
- repaved every fra3 machine with a new identity, certificates and encryption-at-rest keys, dropping regional caches to recover faster
- cloned existing datasets in a more distributed way to speed up repaving the machines
- added machines back to the new region in batches and returned the region to the compute pool
- redirected workloads away from zrh1 during the second outage
- cloned the failing control plane node's key state to a higher-capacity node that took over its role and IP address
- Action items
- Credit all instances that ran during the outages back to customers
- Build up backup regions and solutions so a similar event has options that do not affect customers
- Lessons
Running hot with a delayed hardware delivery left no room to take a region out, so fixing a provider network fault turned into a global capacity shortage. After one outage the team was anchored on its cause and first looked for network problems in the second outage, which had a different cause: a control plane node whose disk could not keep up with the Kubernetes change rate.
IL-0024Expensive cache-backed API calls and uncancelled database requests overloaded MongoDB and took the Hugging Face Hub down three timesHugging Face2024- Symptoms
At 08:45 CET on 22 April 2024 the Hugging Face Hub became unstable, and by 09:30 it was unresponsive. For most users the website was slow or could not be reached at all.
- Trigger
Bursts of requests to revision endpoints that read heavily from the *_info_cache collections: a call to https://huggingface.co/api/datasets/lighteval/mmlu/revision/main rose sharply right before the first crash, and a call to https://huggingface.co/api/models/sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2/revision/main, a model with 300+ associated spaces, lined up with the crash at 21:30 on 23 April.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Instability started at 08:45 on 22 April and the Hub was unresponsive by 09:30; the team followed MongoDB Atlas metrics and a MongoDB support case. The root cause was found days later from a new graph of requests per URL.
- Remediation
- Added a firewall rule blocking all requests with a Java/* user agent
- Disabled the quicksearch feature on the Hub
- Scaled the MongoDB Atlas cluster by hand from tier 2 to tier 3
- Switched the Hub to maintenance mode with a 503 page through AWS WAF and blocked incoming traffic
- Scaled all Hub pods down to 0 and brought them back
- Set an aggressive rate limit
- Added timeouts to requests and reworked database queries that were slow or returned large bodies
- Action items
- Add timeouts to requests based on their usual completion time
- Optimise requests that took too long or returned a large body, and rework poorly designed database queries
- Remove old unused indexes from the database
- Build new dashboards and monitoring metrics
- Move the *_info_cache collections to Redis
- Make it possible to abort any database request when the client aborts theirs
- Lessons
Finding the root cause took two to three days: the existing charts did not show it, and a per-URL request breakdown did. Not cancelling database work when a client goes away turns a strained database into a thundering herd. A close inspection of the database exposed architectural flaws and bottlenecks, such as a collection with large unused indexes, and taught the team which metrics need closer watching to anticipate crashes. Unrelated failures happening at the same time added to the stress and made restoring service harder.
IL-0205The GKE cluster autoscaler could not add nodes to GitLab.com's production cluster because Google Cloud ran out of SSD persistent disks in us-east1GitLab2021- Symptoms
At 08:05 UTC on 2021-06-21 the API service's Apdex (the share of requests that finish within a target time) and Rails request queuing began trending the wrong way. At 09:01 the team found the API deployment unhealthy: it needed more pods for the day's growing traffic, but no new nodes could be added to give it pod capacity. Users saw slow responses; the review found no sign that error rates rose.
- Trigger
Google Cloud ran out of SSD persistent disk stock in us-east1, the region GitLab.com runs in, while the API service needed more nodes for rising user traffic.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
There was no alert on resource availability. Apdex and Rails queuing began trending the wrong way at 08:05 UTC and an engineer declared the incident in Slack at 08:43; finding the cause took a lot of log digging: cluster autoscaler errors about node pools in backoff, then ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED at the instance-group level, and finally Google Cloud support naming SSD as the exhausted resource.
- Remediation
- added a node pool that uses pd-standard disks
- scaled the new node pool by hand across all three zones to relieve the API
- brought more pd-standard node pools online for the other blocked workloads
- stopped production deployments and opened a Google Cloud support case about the cluster autoscaler not working with the new node pools
- changed node pools and nodeSelectors so the remaining workloads ran on pd-standard nodes
- removed the SSD-backed node pools after a day without problems
- Action items
- Move Kubernetes services to pd-standard disks (delivery#1837)
- Capture resource exhaustion errors as a metric
- Lessons
A cloud region can run out of one specific resource, here SSD persistent disks, and the only error may be a generic ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED that does not name it. GitLab could neither monitor nor reserve resource availability, so detection took 22 hours and the cause came from Google Cloud support. The workloads ran fine on pd-standard disks. A second problem found on the way, a cluster autoscaler that does not fall back to another matching node pool when one cannot scale, slowed the move to the new node pools.
These 3 cases involve Cluster autoscaler and Application database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause2
Cloud provider outage2 cases
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
IL-0084Packet drops on a bare metal provider's vSwitch forced Namespace to rebuild its fra3 region and left global capacity short, and the next day slow NVMe writes on a control plane node drove the Kubernetes API server to very high CPUNamespace2024IL-0205The GKE cluster autoscaler could not add nodes to GitLab.com's production cluster because Google Cloud ran out of SSD persistent disks in us-east1GitLab2021
Software defect1 case
- Contributing factor
- Organisation