Incident Library
Applied filters SymptomService outageFactorOverlapping failuresClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases10 cases

1 to 5 of 10

  1. Symptoms

    On 19 August 2026 the first equipment-level signs in Nebius's us-central1 region appeared around 09:40 UTC: the InfiniBand fabric degraded and GPU over-temperature alerts began to accumulate. Customer reports followed shortly after 10:00. At 10:15 on-call engineers were paged on critical component temperature alerts, and the incident was declared at 10:21.

    Trigger

    A storm-related event at the data center building took the building management system offline and shut down the chilled-water cooling loop.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    No facility-level alert fired, because the storm also disabled the building management system that monitors the facility. Engineers acted on component over-temperature alerts that paged on-call at 10:15 UTC, after InfiniBand degradation, GPU over-temperature alerts and customer reports; the temperature rise from about 09:15 was visible on dashboards but had no alert.

    Remediation
    • had the facility operator switch cooling to manual bypass mode and opened rack rear doors to vent heat
    • re-energised tripped racks, control-plane racks first
    • restored the regional infrastructure control plane by manual intervention
    • restarted block-storage host components to clear stale disk attachment state
    • raised the VM recovery rate limits by hand for the region-scale recovery
    • started the affected Managed Kubernetes control-plane instances by hand
    • applied a controlled stop and start to control-plane instances whose data disk had been left unattached
    • identified and started 104 customer VMs that the incident had stopped
    Action items
    • Complete a joint resilience review with the facility operator covering redundancy of facility-management and monitoring systems, cooling that keeps running when those fail, electrical protection of cooling equipment and on-site response
    • Add facility-level environmental alerting on cooling plant state and room temperature trend that pages on-call independently of the building management system
    • Set up a documented emergency escalation path with the facility operator, with an on-call contact tree and guaranteed response times
    • Define an emergency heat-load reduction procedure with criteria, ownership and mechanics for shutting down or degrading workloads during a cooling loss
    • Establish a dependency-ordered region cold-start procedure with clear ownership for each service layer
    • Run regular region-scale recovery drills that cover VMs, storage attachments and Managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Fix the disk-attachment bug that extended the Managed Kubernetes outage and deploy the fix to all production regions
    • Improve the recovery policies Compute users can configure, and move all Managed Kubernetes control-plane nodes to the improved policy
    • Automate reconciliation of stale storage attachment state after abrupt host failures
    • Remove in-region dependencies from monitoring startup and recovery, and extend cross-region monitoring
    • Make regional health checks used for global traffic management reflect real service availability
    Lessons

    Facility monitoring that runs on the same system it watches goes silent in exactly the failure it should report, and with no alert on the room temperature trend there was no practical window to shed heat load in a controlled way. A cold start of a whole region exercised recovery paths built for isolated failures: single-attempt VM recovery, conservative rate limits and stale disk attachments all needed manual work. The longest part of the outage was restoring customer resources, Managed Kubernetes control planes above all, so Nebius is extending its recovery drills to that layer.

  2. Symptoms

    From 17 October 2024, packets through the vSwitch that joined Namespace's bare metal machines at one provider in the fra3 region were dropped at random. Retries in TCP, QUIC and the Namespace control plane hid most of it, but the SLO error budget for latency targets on key interactions began to burn.

    Trigger

    Random packet drops on the bare metal provider's vSwitch from 17 October 2024; for the second outage, a rate of Kubernetes changes that the slow NVMe on one control plane node could no longer keep up with.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    SLO-based monitoring of latency targets showed the error budget burning while retries hid the individual packet drops.

    Remediation
    • diverted all customer traffic from fra3 to other regions
    • connected each provider machine to the zrh1 cluster over Wireguard instead of the vSwitch
    • repaved every fra3 machine with a new identity, certificates and encryption-at-rest keys, dropping regional caches to recover faster
    • cloned existing datasets in a more distributed way to speed up repaving the machines
    • added machines back to the new region in batches and returned the region to the compute pool
    • redirected workloads away from zrh1 during the second outage
    • cloned the failing control plane node's key state to a higher-capacity node that took over its role and IP address
    Action items
    • Credit all instances that ran during the outages back to customers
    • Build up backup regions and solutions so a similar event has options that do not affect customers
    Lessons

    Running hot with a delayed hardware delivery left no room to take a region out, so fixing a provider network fault turned into a global capacity shortage. After one outage the team was anchored on its cause and first looked for network problems in the second outage, which had a different cause: a control plane node whose disk could not keep up with the Kubernetes change rate.

  3. Symptoms

    At 08:45 CET on 22 April 2024 the Hugging Face Hub became unstable, and by 09:30 it was unresponsive. For most users the website was slow or could not be reached at all.

    Trigger

    Bursts of requests to revision endpoints that read heavily from the *_info_cache collections: a call to https://huggingface.co/api/datasets/lighteval/mmlu/revision/main rose sharply right before the first crash, and a call to https://huggingface.co/api/models/sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2/revision/main, a model with 300+ associated spaces, lined up with the crash at 21:30 on 23 April.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Instability started at 08:45 on 22 April and the Hub was unresponsive by 09:30; the team followed MongoDB Atlas metrics and a MongoDB support case. The root cause was found days later from a new graph of requests per URL.

    Remediation
    • Added a firewall rule blocking all requests with a Java/* user agent
    • Disabled the quicksearch feature on the Hub
    • Scaled the MongoDB Atlas cluster by hand from tier 2 to tier 3
    • Switched the Hub to maintenance mode with a 503 page through AWS WAF and blocked incoming traffic
    • Scaled all Hub pods down to 0 and brought them back
    • Set an aggressive rate limit
    • Added timeouts to requests and reworked database queries that were slow or returned large bodies
    Action items
    • Add timeouts to requests based on their usual completion time
    • Optimise requests that took too long or returned a large body, and rework poorly designed database queries
    • Remove old unused indexes from the database
    • Build new dashboards and monitoring metrics
    • Move the *_info_cache collections to Redis
    • Make it possible to abort any database request when the client aborts theirs
    Lessons

    Finding the root cause took two to three days: the existing charts did not show it, and a per-URL request breakdown did. Not cancelling database work when a client goes away turns a strained database into a thundering herd. A close inspection of the database exposed architectural flaws and bottlenecks, such as a collection with large unused indexes, and taught the team which metrics need closer watching to anticipate crashes. Unrelated failures happening at the same time added to the stress and made restoring service harder.

  4. Symptoms

    At 16:40 UTC on 19 April 2024 CoW Protocol's mainnet production environment stopped producing settlements; the outage officially began then.

    Trigger

    During a cluster capacity expansion, the Infrastructure as Code automation updated the AWS VPC CNI plugin, because the CNI version was not hardcoded in the IaC and the IaC library version had recently changed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The CNI version mismatch was identified as the cause at 17:03 UTC, 23 minutes after settlements stopped.

    Remediation
    • upgraded the Kubernetes cluster
    • set up new node groups with a new version of the networking plugin
    Lessons

    Versions in IaC scripts should be specified explicitly so an automation run cannot update a component such as the CNI plugin unintentionally. Changes in production need change management that is easy to revert.

  5. Symptoms

    At 20:31 UTC on 15 November 2023, some GPU virtual machines in us-northcentral1-a became unavailable. One row of servers in a Crusoe Cloud data center in the us-northcentral1 region had lost power, and every server in the row powered off together with the VMs running on it.

    Trigger

    While the row's UPS was in bypass mode for routine maintenance, power switched from the primary source to a backup source for reasons unrelated to the maintenance.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The power failure happened at 20:31 UTC. The first status post, at 21:07 UTC, said certain VMs in us-northcentral1-a were unavailable, and at 21:31 UTC the status page said the affected VMs had been identified.

    Remediation
    • identified the VMs on the row that lost power
    • restarted the affected VMs after power was restored
    Action items
    • Review the standard operating procedures for UPS maintenance to minimise customer impact during future maintenance
    • Build future data centers with redundant UPSs
    • Improve recovery procedures to reduce mean time to resolution
    Lessons

    When the only UPS for a row is in bypass for maintenance, the row is exposed to any power event during that window, even one unrelated to the work. Crusoe Cloud's response is redundant UPSs in future data centers, a review of maintenance procedures, and faster recovery of VMs after power returns.

Check your cluster for this

These 10 cases involve Cluster autoscaler and Application database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Dependency failure2 cases

  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026
  2. IL-0135 A power source switch during UPS maintenance cut power to a row of GPU servers and shut down Crusoe Cloud VMs in us-northcentral1

Cloud provider outage3 cases

  1. IL-0084 Packet drops on a bare metal provider's vSwitch forced Namespace to rebuild its fra3 region and left global capacity short, and the next day slow NVMe writes on a control plane node drove the Kubernetes API server to very high CPU
  2. IL-0193 A GCP persistent disk degradation took down a Cassandra StatefulSet whose OrderedReady policy blocked recovery, and Metrictank could not reconnect to the recreated pods, causing a 23-hour Graphite query outage
  3. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0024 Expensive cache-backed API calls and uncancelled database requests overloaded MongoDB and took the Hugging Face Hub down three times
  2. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0114 An unpinned AWS VPC CNI plugin was updated automatically during a capacity expansion, leaving new pods Pending without IP addresses and stopping CoW Protocol settlements for about 3.5 hours

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0115 One of OpenAI's three production AKS clusters went offline through a human error, and rebuilding it took 10½ hours because an AKS Kubernetes upgrade broke the ingress and AKS cannot be downgraded
    OpenAI2022

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0199 A non-essential container exceeding its memory limit made GitHub's production pods unavailable, and their restarts failed because a DNS maintenance change had left the clusters unable to reach the image registry
    GitHub2020